Andrei Johnson v. City of Spokane Police Department; Chief Craig Meidl; Nate Spiering; Todd Belitz

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00085
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Dec 16, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 ANDREI JOHNSON, a single person, Case No. 2:25-CV-00085-MKD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITH LEAVE TO RENEW DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 CITY OF SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF CRAIG ECF No. 22 11 MEIDL, each in their personal and representative capacities; NATE 12 SPIERING, each in their personal and representative capacities; TODD 13 BELITZ, each in their personal and representative capacities, 14 Defendants. 15 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16 22. The Court has considered the motion and the record and is fully informed. For 17 the reasons stated below, the Court denies the motion with leave to renew 18 following the close of discovery. 19

20 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case stems from a June 13, 2022, incident in which Officer Todd Belitz

3 of the Spokane Police Department released his K-9 on Plaintiff. ECF No. 1-2 at 5 4 ¶ 4.1, 6 ¶ 4.9. Plaintiff alleges that he was already incapacitated from a Taser at 5 the time Officer Belitz released the K-9. Id. at 5 ¶ 4.8. Also present at the incident

6 were Sergeant Jeremy McVay and Officer Christopher Perry. See ECF Nos. 27, 7 28. 8 Plaintiff initially brought this action against the City of Spokane Police 9 Department, Chief Craig Meidl, Sergeant Nate Spiering, and Officer Belitz in

10 Spokane County Superior Court alleging the following causes of action: (1) 11 excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 12 1983, (3) supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) violations of the

13 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (5) assault and battery, (6) negligence 14 and gross negligence, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and 15 (8) respondeat superior. Id. at 4, 7-17. Defendants removed the case to this Court 16 on March 13, 2025. ECF No. 1.

17 On May 1, 2025, the Court held a scheduling conference, ECF No. 7, and 18 subsequently issued a Jury Trial Scheduling Order, ECF No. 9. The discovery 19 cutoff is February 27, 2026, and the deadline for dispositive motions is March 6,

20 2026. Id. at 19. 1 On October 21, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment.1 ECF No. 2 22. Plaintiff, in response, filed a Rule 56(d) Motion Opposing Summary

3 Judgment, ECF No. 30.2 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 A district court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that

6 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 7 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 8 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). However, under Rule 56(d): 9 If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify 10 its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 11 (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or 12 (3) issue any other appropriate order. 13

14 1 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment does not address Plaintiff’s claim of 15 respondeat superior. See generally ECF No. 22. 16 2 The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to follow LCivR 56(c)(1)(B) by omitting a 17 “Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute” in conjunction with his Response, 18 ECF No. 30. See ECF No. 34 at 2 ¶ 2 (noting that Plaintiff did not comply with 19 LCivR 56(c)(1)(B)). The Court cautions Plaintiff to comply with the Local Rules 20 and scheduling order. 1 “The purpose of Rule 56(d) relief is to prevent the nonmoving party from 2 being ‘railroaded’ by a summary judgment motion that is filed too soon after the

3 start of a lawsuit for the nonmovant to properly oppose it without additional 4 discovery.” Hollyway Cleaners & Laundry Co., Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of 5 Omaha, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Celotex Corp.,

6 477 U.S. at 326); see also Weinberg v. Whatcom Cnty., 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 7 2001) (“Rule 56[d] thus protects parties from a premature grant of summary 8 judgment.” (citation omitted)).3 Thus, Rule 56(d) motions “should be granted 9 almost as a matter of course unless the non-moving party has not diligently

10 pursued discovery of the evidence.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine 11 & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Rsrv., 323 F.3d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 Wichita Falls Office Assoc. v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 919 n.4 (5th Cir.

13 1992)). 14 The party invoking Rule 56(d) bears the burden of demonstrating that “(1) it 15 has set forth in affidavit [or declaration] form the specific facts it hopes to elicit 16

17 3 Effective December 1, 2010, this rule was amended so that “[s]ubdivision (d) 18 carries forward without substantial change the provisions of former subdivision 19 (f).” See Fed. R. Evid. 56 (amended 2010); Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d

20 1156, 1169 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting this change). 1 from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are 2 essential to oppose summary judgment.” Fam. Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed.

3 Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing State of Cal. 4 ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th 5 Cir. 1998)).

6 DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 8 on the basis that discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff has not yet obtained 9 information that is “essential to opposing summary judgment,” including Taser

10 data and training policies. ECF No. 30 at 2. Defendants in turn, assert that 11 Plaintiff has failed to exercise diligence in seeking discovery, raise any issue of 12 material facts, or specify how delay or denial of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

13 judgment would lead to the discovery of evidence presenting a genuine issue of 14 material facts. See ECF No. 33. The Court addresses each of these arguments 15 below. 16 A. Diligence in Discovery

17 Discovery is not set to close until February 27, 2026. ECF No. 9 at 19. 18 Initial Disclosures were due on May 30, 2025. Id. at 18. A little over a month 19 later, on July 2, 2025, Plaintiff served his First Request for Production. ECF No.

20 32-2. Plaintiff conducted a deposition of Sergeant McVay on October 15, 2025, 1 ECF No. 32-4, and subsequently served his Second Request for Production on 2 November 6, 2025, ECF No. 32-3. Plaintiff has also noticed the deposition of

3 Officer Perry. ECF No. 32-5. 4 Despite this ongoing discovery, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff has already 5 had a realistic opportunity to pursue discovery” and emphasize that as of October

6 30, 2025, Plaintiff had only conducted a single deposition for Sergeant McVay. 7 ECF Nos. 33 at 8-10, 35-3 (email from defense counsel to Plaintiff’s counsel 8 regarding dates of availability for depositions), 35-4 (email from defense counsel 9 to Plaintiff’s counsel regarding a deposition date for Officer Belitz).4 Plaintiff, in

10 turn, asserts that he was seeking to be efficient by not conducting the depositions 11 of Chief Meidl, Officer Perry, Officer Belitz, or the Spokane Police Department’s 12 training supervisor, and/or Rule 30(b)(6) designee before obtaining training

13 materials and Taser data. ECF No. 32 at 4 ¶ 15. Plaintiff received Taser data on 14 November 10, 2025, in response to Plaintiff’s Second Request for Production, at 15

16 4 Defendants also argue that they complied with the Court’s Initial Disclosure 17 deadline and have complied with discovery requests. ECF Nos. 33 at 9, 35-1 18 (Defendants’ Initial Disclosures), 35-2 (email producing Taser deployment logs). 19 But the fact that Defendants have complied with their own discovery obligations

20 does not establish that Plaintiff has not diligently pursued discovery. 1 which time defense counsel also informed Plaintiff that training materials would be 2 forthcoming. Id. at 3 ¶ 14. There is no evidence currently before the Court that

3 Plaintiff has received such training materials. 4 Furthermore, two days before Defendants filed their Motion for Summary 5 Judgment, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Extend Expert Witness

6 Disclosures, noting, “[t]he parties are actively conferring on discovery; 7 supplemental productions are ongoing; and the first deposition is currently set for 8 October 15, 2025. ECF No. 20 at 1. 9 Thus, this is not a case where Plaintiff has not diligently pursued discovery.

10 Compare Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[The 11 plaintiff] waited nearly three years to conduct any discovery and filed a defective 12 request only two weeks prior to discovery cutoff.”); Landmark Dev. Corp. v.

13 Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that under the 14 schedule most depositions should have been completed when the defendant moved 15 for summary judgment and that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to proceed with the additional 16 depositions promptly” after receiving the letters at issue).

17 B. Issues of Material Fact 18 Plaintiff asserts that discovery into Taser data,5 the Spokane Police 19

20 5 Plaintiff received the Taser data the day before filing his Rule 56(d) Motion 1 Department’s internal academy training, and K-9 reporting remains ongoing and 2 that this discovery is essential to summary judgment. ECF Nos. 30 at 2, 32 at 3 ¶

3 10, 4-5 ¶¶ 18-19. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that “Taser data and training 4 materials are material to evaluation of reasonableness, supervision, training and 5 policy adequacy.” ECF No. 32 at 4 ¶ 16. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Rule

6 56(d) Motion lacks the required specificity and that the evidence sought by 7 Plaintiff is not essential to opposing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 ECF No. 33 at 2-8. 9 First, Plaintiff has set forth via a declaration by counsel the specific facts he

10 hopes to elicit from further discovery and the existence of these facts. Namely, 11 Plaintiff asserts that the Spokane Police Department’s “internal police-academy 12 training may deviate from accepted best practices” and that evidence of this fact

13 can be found in the Spokane Police Department’s internal academy training and K- 14 9 reporting. ECF No. 32 at 3 ¶¶ 10, 13. Plaintiff also asserts that he is seeking to 15 establish he was incapacitated at the time Officer Belitz released the K-9 and that 16 this can be established by Taser data, which Plaintiff recently received and is

18 Opposing Summary Judgment and asserts, “Plaintiff is now consulting with 19 experts with respect to the Taser’s data and the [his] neuromuscular incapacitation . 20 . . .” ECF No. 30 at 6; see also ECF No. 32 at 4 ¶ 16. 1 working to have reviewed by an expert. Id. at 2 ¶ 4, 3 ¶ 10, 4 ¶ 16. 2 Second, the facts sought by Plaintiff are essential to his ability to oppose

3 summary judgment. For example, to establish a Monell claim, “a plaintiff must 4 show that the government entity violated statutorily or constitutionally protected 5 rights under color of state law.” NeSmith v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 15-CV-629,

6 2019 WL 1326701, at *26 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 7 Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). The government entity is not 8 vicariously liable for its employees’ actions, but rather it is only liable for its “own 9 illegal acts.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citation omitted).

10 “Because government entities can only act through individuals, to attribute actions 11 of individuals to the government entity itself without imposing vicarious liability, 12 the individual’s actions must be performed ‘pursuant to official municipal policy’

13 or according to ‘practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the 14 force of law.’” NeSmith, 2019 WL 1326701, at *26 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 15 61; Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). Thus, the 16 City of Spokane Police Department’s policies are essential to allow Plaintiff to

17 oppose Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Monell claim. 18 Regarding the claim of supervisor liability: 19 [S]upervisors can be held liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of 20 subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or 3) for 1 conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. 2 Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations and quotation 3 marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges the supervisory officers in this case failed to 4 adequately supervise Officer Belitz, failed to report or discipline Officer Belitz 5 “for prior incidents involving excessive K9 deployments,” or “[i]mplement correct 6 measures or training to address [Officer] Belitz’s conduct.” ECF No. 1-1 at 11 ¶ 7 6.20. Thus, the City of Spokane Police Department’s policies are also essential to 8 allow Plaintiff to oppose Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim 9 of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 10 The claims of excessive force, violations of the ADA, assault and battery, 11 negligence, and IIED also depend on whether the use of force against Plaintiff was 12 appropriate in the circumstances, including whether Plaintiff was incapacitated by 13 a Taser. See ECF No. 1-2 at 7, 12-16. 14 Thus, the Court finds good cause to grant Plaintiff’s request for a 15 continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) to allow him to conduct the needed 16 discovery. Defendants may renew their Motion for Summary Judgment after this 17 additional discovery is conducted. 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 19 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22, is 20 DENIED with leave to renew following the close of discovery. 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this 2 Order and provide copies to counsel.

3 DATED December 15, 2025. 4 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9

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