Andrea Wood v. Sgt Investment

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: 23-15939
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREA CLAIRE WOOD; TAYLOR No. 23-15939 PACKWOOD, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellants, 3:22-cv-00513-MMD-CSD

v. MEMORANDUM* SGT INVESTMENT; CLEMENT HOLDINGS; TOM MALGESINI; TOM MALGESINI IRA; ALAN HORWITZ,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Andrea Claire Wood and Taylor Packwood appeal pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing their foreclosure-related action. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. We review de novo a dismissal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rhoades v. Avon

Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any basis

supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.

2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wood’s claims against SGT

Investment (“SGT”) and Clement Holdings (“Clement”) because the claims are

barred by the two-dismissal rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B); Rose Ct., LLC v.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 119 F.4th 679, 685-686, 688 (9th Cir. 2024)

(setting forth the requirements for application of the two-dismissal rule, and

explaining that “a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if

it arises from the same set of facts as the first action and the claim could have been

or was raised in the preceding action” and that the “rule applies even to a defendant

who was not previously named if that defendant is substantially the same as the

defendant dismissed” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Dismissal

of Wood’s claims against Tom Malgesini and Tom Malgesini IRA was also proper

under the two-dismissal rule. See id.

Dismissal of Wood’s claims against Alan Horwitz was proper because

Wood failed to include any allegations about Horwitz in the amended complaint.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to survive a motion to dismiss, a

plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference

2 23-15939 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).

The district court properly dismissed Packwood’s claims against SGT and

Clement because Packwood failed to allege an injury in fact for purposes of Article

III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)

(constitutional standing requires an “injury in fact,” that is, “an invasion of a

legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)). Dismissal of Packwood’s claims against the remaining defendants was

also proper because Packwood failed to allege an injury in fact. See id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the amended

complaint without leave to amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,

Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would

be futile).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-15939