Andrea Resnick v. Netflix, Inc.

779 F.3d 914
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 27, 2015
Docket11-18034, 12-16160, 12-16183
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 779 F.3d 914 (Andrea Resnick v. Netflix, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrea Resnick v. Netflix, Inc., 779 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Judge:

These consolidated antitrust actions arise out of an agreement (“Promotion Agreement”) between Netflix and Wal-mart 1 whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix, and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart’s DVD sales business. The plaintiffs, individuals representing a class of Netflix subscribers (“Subscribers”), contend that this arrangement violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by illegally allocating and monopolizing the online DVD-rental market. The Subscribers’ theory of injury is that they paid supracompetitive prices for one of Netflix’s subscription plans because Netflix would have reduced the price of that plan but for its allegedly anticompeti-tive conduct.

We agree with the district court that the Subscribers have not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether they suffered antitrust injury-in-fact, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. We vacate in part the district court’s cost award, and remand for consideration in light of this opinion.

I

In 1997, Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph co-founded Netflix, the first internet-based DVD rental service. Netflix *919 commenced operations in 1998, offering customers through its website the option to rent or buy DVDs by mail. Netflix initially offered DVD rentals on a pay-per-rental basis, but soon replaced that system with a monthly subscription model. In 2000, it discontinued its DVD sales business altogether. Several Netflix subscription plans permitted customers to rent an unlimited number of DVDs, differing in how many DVDs a customer could borrow at a given time. For example, in 2003, Netflix offered its “3U” plan, which permitted three DVDs to be rented at a time, for $19.95 per month, while its “4U” plan cost $24.95 per month and allowed four DVDs at a time. Netflix’s DVD-rental business flourished under the new model, and by 2005 it had a 77.8% share of the online DVD-rental market, rising to 92.3% by 2010.

Netflix faced no serious competition in its early years. However, in 2003, Wal-mart, one of the nation’s largest retail companies, launched its own online DVD-rental service. Walmart initially offered its 3U plan for $18.76 a month. Although Walmart’s 3U plan was cheaper than Net-flix’s ($19.95 per month), Netflix did not alter its 3U plan price for a full year. When Netflix eventually did change its 3U price, in June 2004, it increased the price to $21.99 per month.

Two months later, in August 2004, Blockbuster, the largest store-based DVD rental company, launched its own online DVD rental service, becoming the third major competitor in the market. Blockbuster offered its 3U plan at $19.99 per month and included with it two free coupons per month for in-store rentals.

In October 2004, in apparent response to rumors that Amazon planned to enter the online DVD-rental market as well, Netflix announced that it would lower the price of its 3U plan from $21.99 to $17.99 per month. Blockbuster responded the next day by announcing that it would cut its 3U price to $17.49 per month. In November 2004, Walmart reduced its 3U price to $17.36 per month. In December 2004, Blockbuster again reduced the price of its 3U plan, this time to $14.99 per month— the lowest 3U plan price in the market. Netflix maintained its $17.99 price until August 2007, when it lowered the price to $16.99.

During this period, Walmart’s online DVD-rental business performed poorly. Walmart never had more than 60,000 subscribers. In contrast, in mid-2004 Netflix had over 2 million subscribers, and Blockbuster had 400,000 subscribers. From June 2003, when Walmart opened its online DVD-rental business, until it signed the Promotion Agreement with Netflix in March 2005, Walmart gained an average of 5.000 subscribers per quarter. Netflix added 250,000 subscribers per quarter over the same period. Walmart’s subscriber share peaked at 2.4% in early 2004 and declined from that point. By February 2005, Walmart had only a 1.4% market share. In contrast, Netflix controlled 77.8% of the market in 2005. Walmart lost 7.000 subscribers during the final quarter of 2004.

In October 2004, Netflix’s CEO Reed Hastings sought a meeting with Walmart CEO John Fleming. Hastings testified that he requested the meeting because he hoped to form a partnership with Walmart that would strengthen Netflix’s position before Amazon entered the market. Hastings was aware that Walmart’s online DVD-rental service was performing poorly, and hoped that Walmart might therefore be open to a partnership. The two CEOs met on October 27, 2004. Hastings recounts that Walmart seemed uninterested in a deal at the time and that there was no discussion about Netflix selling new *920 DVDs. Fleming provided a similar account. No agreement was reached at the meeting.

Unbeknownst to Hastings, Walmart was entertaining other suitors. Walmart considered a potential partnership with Yahoo!, and a draft partnership agreement to that effect was prepared as early as December 1, 2004. Walmart considered a similar deal with Microsoft.

Walmart began considering alternative strategic options for its online DVD-rental business, and ultimately looked in depth at four possibilities: (1) continuing to run the business with a low subscriber amount, (2) aggressively building the business, (3) partnering with Yahoo!, and (4) exiting the online DVD-rental business. After carefully analyzing each option, Walmart concluded that none would be profitable and that, in fact, it would probably suffer mul-ti-million dollar financial losses under all four scenarios.

Walmart made the final decision to exit the market by early January 2005. It established an impairment reserve to cover any losses incurred from the closure and stopped accepting new subscribers for its 3U and 4U plans. By February 2005, Walmart had incurred $3 million of costs associated with shuttering its online DVD-rental business. By March 2005, Netflix had 3 million subscribers. Walmart had 52,000. Walmart employees speculated that Walmart’s online DVD-rental business did not succeed because Walmart devoted insufficient resources to marketing, could not match Netflix’s guaranteed one- to two-day delivery, had a poorly designed website, and offered a relatively limited selection of DVDs.

Aware of Walmart’s market share decline, but unaware of its plan to discontinue its online DVD-rental business, Hastings renewed his efforts to meet with Fleming. The two CEOs met on February 9, 2005. Fleming did not inform Hastings that Walmart had decided to leave the online DVD-rental business. Although no agreement was reached at the meeting, Hastings’s efforts did eventually bear fruit. By March 17, 2005, Hastings and Fleming had reached a verbal agreement, the key terms of which were that: (1) Walmart DVD-rental subscribers and their rental queues would be transferred to Netflix, for those customers who so chose, free of charge, and customers would be offered the same subscription price for one year; (2) Walmart would promote on its website Netflix’s online DVD-rental business; (3) Netflix would pay Walmart a 10% revenue share for each subscriber who transferred, as well as a $36 bounty for each new Netflix subscriber gained from Walmart’s referrals; and (4) Netflix would promote Walmart’s DVD sales business.

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