Andrea Murphy v. The Electric Board of the City of Russellville; Darren S. Woodruff, individually and as chairman of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville; Charles R. Canida, individually and as chief executive officer of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville; and Joan Pace, Jerry McDuffa, Dexter Hamilton, and Bill Jackson, individually and as members of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville (Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court: CV-17-900080).

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: October 4, 2024
• Docket: SC-2023-0697
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: October 4, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0697 _________________________

Andrea Murphy

v.

The Electric Board of the City of Russellville; Darren S. Woodruff, individually and as chairman of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville; Charles R. Canida, individually and as chief executive officer of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville; and Joan Pace, Jerry McDuffa, Dexter Hamilton, and Bill Jackson, individually and as members of the Electric Board of the City of Russellville

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court (CV-17-900080) SC-2023-0697

SHAW, Justice.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.

Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and

Cook, JJ., concur.

Mitchell, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

2 SC-2023-0697

MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I agree that we should affirm the Franklin Circuit Court's summary

judgment on Andrea Murphy's defamation claims. But Murphy also

purports to appeal the trial court's order dismissing her due-process,

breach-of-contract, negligence, wantonness, wrongful-termination, and

civil-conspiracy claims. Her appeal of the order dismissing those claims

is untimely. Therefore, I dissent from affirming that aspect of the trial

court's rulings, and I would instead dismiss her appeal in part.

Facts and Procedural History

The Electric Board of the City of Russellville ("the Board") hired

Murphy as an accountant in 2006. Later, Murphy rose to become the

Board's Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). During Murphy's tenure as

CFO, the Board provided her with an employee handbook ("the

Handbook"). The Handbook stipulated that employees could be

terminated only for "cause" and were entitled to a pretermination

process. But the Board fired Murphy in 2015, allegedly without either

cause or process. The reason for her termination remains unclear.

Murphy, a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers ("the IBEW"), attempted to vindicate her alleged right to process

3 SC-2023-0697

under the Handbook. The Board refused. Murphy then sued the Board

and several of its members in both their individual and official capacities.

Murphy's complaint raised the following claims: (1) violation of due

process under Alabama law, (2) breach of a contract between the IBEW

and the Board under a third-party-beneficiary theory, (3) negligence or

wantonness, (4) wrongful termination, (5) defamation, and (6) civil

conspiracy.

The Board filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ.

P. In May 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing most of

Murphy's pending claims, leaving only her defamation claims remaining.

Murphy asked the court to certify that order as final under Rule 54, Ala.

R. Civ. P. She also asked the trial court to certify two questions of law

related to the dismissed claims for interlocutory appeal. The court

granted both motions on May 25, 2021.

Murphy sought permission to raise the certified questions on

interlocutory appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. This Court

unanimously denied her petition to do so in August 2021. Murphy did

not, at that time, bring an appeal of right from the trial court's dismissal

order certified as final under Rule 54(b).

4 SC-2023-0697

Two years later, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor

of the defendants on the remaining defamation claims. At that time,

Murphy again asked the trial court to certify as "final" its prior 2021

order dismissing the other claims. The trial court then entered an order

on August 17, 2023, stating: "The Court hereby certifies as final for

appeal purposes this ORDER and the ORDER of DISMISSAL of the other

counts dated May 17, 2021." (Capitalization in original.) Murphy

appealed.

Analysis

I concur in affirming the trial court's summary judgment on

Murphy's defamation claims. In fact, it is not clear that Murphy even

intended to appeal the summary judgment on those claims. If she did,

however, then she abandoned that appeal by not mentioning those claims

in her brief. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; Lay v. Destafino, 385 So.

3d 15, 23 (Ala. 2023). And when an appellant fails to raise an issue on

appeal, she forfeits that argument. Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., 303 So.

3d 1188, 1193 (Ala. 2020). As a result, the majority is correct to affirm

the summary judgment on the defamation claims. See State v. Epic Tech,

LLC, 378 So. 3d 467, 487 (Ala. 2022).

5 SC-2023-0697

I write separately to dissent from affirming the trial court's order

dismissing Murphy's other claims. Murphy's appeal of that order is

untimely, and, as such, we do not have jurisdiction to hear her appeal.

Consequently, we are required to dismiss her appeal, and it is beyond our

authority to affirm the trial court's ruling on those claims. See Rule

2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.; Wynlake Residential Ass'n v. Hulsey, 358 So. 3d

387, 391 (Ala. 2021) (noting that when a defendant's "notice of appeal [is]

untimely, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal").

The trial court entered an order dismissing Murphy's due-process,

breach-of-contract, negligence, wantonness, wrongful-termination, and

civil-conspiracy claims in May 2021. Shortly thereafter, the trial court

certified that order as final under Rule 54(b). In accordance with Rule 4,

Ala. R. App. P., Murphy was required to file a notice of appeal within 42

days of that certification. But she did not file her notice of appeal until

September 2023 -- well after the allotted 42 days had lapsed, rendering

her claims defunct.

Murphy cannot resurrect those claims simply by asking the trial

court for a new certification of finality. Wallace v. Belleview Props. Corp.,

120 So. 3d 485, 496 (Ala. 2012) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) (noting

6 SC-2023-0697

that " 'an aggrieved party must appeal a Rule 54(b) judgment within the

time permitted by Appellate Rule 4(a) and may not seek review of the

judgment after the remaining claims have been adjudicated' " (citation

omitted)). This would "eviscerate Rule 54(b) and render it meaningless."

Id. at 494. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to hear Murphy's appeal of

the dismissal order that the trial court rendered final in May 2021, and

we are obligated to dismiss that aspect of her appeal. For that reason, I

respectfully dissent from affirming the May 2021 order.