Andrea Michelle Collard v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 02-26-00015-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-26-00015-CR ___________________________

ANDREA MICHELLE COLLARD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 7 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1853892

Before Bassel, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION A jury found Appellant Andrea Michelle Collard guilty of one Class A

misdemeanor count of resisting arrest, search, or transportation, see Tex. Penal Code

§ 38.03(a), and the trial court assessed her punishment at ninety days’ confinement, see

id. § 12.21. The trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Appellant

on fifteen months’ community supervision.1 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.053.

II. BACKGROUND Appellant’s court-appointed appellate attorney2 has filed a motion to withdraw

as counsel and a brief in support of that motion, representing that there are no

reversible, non-frivolous issues to be raised in this appeal. See Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet

the requirements of Anders, which requires presenting a professional evaluation of the

record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for appellate relief. Id.,

87 S. Ct. at 1400; see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding). Appellant’s counsel provided her with a copy of the Anders brief

1 The trial court also credited Collard with five days’ time served. 2 Two attorneys, Kevin C. Smith and Obinna Okeke, are signatories to Collard’s appellate brief; both have moved to withdraw. However, only Smith was appointed by the trial court, and Smith was the only signatory to the notice of appearance filed in this case.

2 and motion to withdraw, notified Appellant of her right to file a pro se response in this

court and to file a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals

should this court agree that the appeal is frivolous, and provided her with a form motion

to access the appellate record. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). Appellant has neither requested a copy of the record from this court nor

filed a response. The State filed a letter stating that it agreed with Appellant’s counsel

that there are no non-frivolous issues and that it would not reply to the Anders brief.

III. DISCUSSION After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel both files a motion to withdraw on

the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the Anders requirements, we must

independently examine the record for any arguable ground for reversal that may be

raised on her behalf. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have fulfilled our duty to independently examine the record. After reviewing

the appellate record and the Anders brief, we have determined that—but for two minor

errors3 in the judgment—the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit.

We may modify a trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors that contradict 3

the record. Alexander v. State, 496 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (en banc) (holding that an appellate court has the authority to modify a judgment in an Anders appeal and to affirm the judgment as reformed).

3 First, we delete from the judgment $5 of “Reimbursement Fees” assessed

without reference to a statutory basis. Chapter 102 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure governs costs to be paid by convicted defendants. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

arts. 102.001–.073. Only statutorily authorized costs may be assessed against a criminal

defendant. See id. art. 103.002 (“An officer may not impose a cost for a service not

performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law.”). Because

the record contains no bill of costs and assesses the reimbursement fee without a

statutory basis, we delete it from the judgment. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Second, we delete from the judgment the $270 in court costs. Although when

the trial court pronounced sentence, the judge stated that “any fines and court costs”

in the case were waived, the written judgment states that $270 in court costs had been

assessed against Collard. Because the written judgment does not reflect the

pronouncement, we modify the judgment to reflect the court-cost waiver. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. art. 43.091(c); Bray, 179 S.W.3d at 726.

Aside from these minor corrections, our independent review reveals nothing that

might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

4 IV. CONCLUSION We modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the $5 reimbursement fee and

$270 court costs and affirm the judgment as modified.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 9, 2026