Andre L. Owens v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 28, 2015
• Docket: 49A05-1503-CR-98
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Oct 28 2015, 5:38 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andre L. Owens, October 28, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1503-CR-98 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Linda E. Brown, State of Indiana, Judge. Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G10-1410-CM-47496

Garrard, Senior Judge

[1] Andre Owens appeals his conviction of trespass as a Class A misdemeanor.

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (2014). We affirm.

[2] Owens presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the

State presented evidence sufficient to support his conviction of trespass.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-98 | October 28, 2015 Page 1 of 3 [3] The evidence most favorable to the judgment follows. On the evening of

October 13, 2014, Owens entered Big Red Liquors and made a purchase. It

was raining heavily, so Owens stayed inside the store until the rain subsided.

Owens then exited the store but stood right in front of the door on the sidewalk

outside the store. After a period of time, Dana Holmes, an employee of Big

Red Liquors, asked Owens to move because he was blocking the door. Owens

refused to move, so Holmes asked him to leave. Again, Owens refused her

request. Holmes asked Owens to leave four or five times, but he still refused.

At that point, Owens became verbally aggressive and suggested that Holmes

call the police. Holmes did call the police, and an officer arrived and directed

Owens to leave. Owens still refused to leave, and the officer arrested him.

Owens was charged with trespass. At Owens’ bench trial, Holmes testified that

the sidewalk in front of the store is Big Red Liquors’ property and privately

owned. Owens testified that he does not own, rent or have any contractual

interest in the property at that location. Owens was found guilty as charged.

He was sentenced to 365 days with 361 days suspended, was given credit for

four days, and was placed on probation for 361 days, to include sixty-four hours

of community service. Owens now appeals his conviction.

[4] Owens’ sole argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses.

Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-98 | October 28, 2015 Page 2 of 3 reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of

probative value from which a reasonable fact-finder could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed.

Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[5] To convict Owens of trespass, the State was required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he, not having a contractual interest in the property,

knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the property of another person after

having been asked to leave by the other person or that person’s agent. See Ind.

Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).

[6] Here the evidence reveals that Owens, who had no contractual interest in the

property of Big Red Liquors and who was standing on its property, refused to

leave when asked to do so numerous times by Holmes, an employee of Big Red

Liquors. Based upon this evidence, the fact-finder could reasonably conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that Owens committed the offense of trespass.

[7] For the reasons stated, we conclude that this evidence is sufficient to sustain

Owens’ conviction of trespass.

[8] Affirmed.

[9] Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-98 | October 28, 2015 Page 3 of 3