ACCEPTED 01-14-00862-CR FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/31/2015 7:17:22 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK No. 01-14-00862-CR
In the Court of Appeals for the First District of TexasFILED IN At Houston 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/31/2015 7:17:22 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE No. 1364962 Clerk In the 178th District Court Of Harris County, Texas
ANDRE DEMONT THOMPSON Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee
STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
DEVON ANDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas
DAVID ABRAMS Assistant District Attorney
HEATHER A. HUDSON Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas State Bar No. 24058991
1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel.: 713/755-5826 Fax No.: 713/755-5809
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list
of the names of all interested parties is provided below.
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:
Ms. Devon Anderson ― District Attorney
Mr. David Abrams ― Assistant District Attorney at trial
Ms. Heather A. Hudson ― Assistant District Attorney on appeal
APPELLANT:
Andre Demont Thompson
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Mr. Jules Johnson Mr. Eric Davis ― Assistant Public Defenders at trial
Mr. Glenn J. Youngblood ― Appointed counsel on appeal Mr. Franklin Bynum ― Retained counsel on appeal
PRESIDING JUDGE:
Hon. David L. Mendoza
i STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State believes the briefs in this case adequately apprise this Court of the
issues and the law, and any marginal benefit from oral argument does not justify
the considerable amount of time that preparation for oral argument requires of the
parties and the Court. Therefore, the State does not request oral argument.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................i
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................ ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 3
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 4
I. Defense counsel’s general objections to an “improper argument” are insufficient to preserve error for appellate review. ...............................6
II. The prosecutor’s jury argument was justified as a reasonable deduction from the evidence. .....................................................................8
III. The prosecutor’s jury argument was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to constitute reversible error. ................................................13
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................................ 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 16
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. State, No. 12-02-00138-CR, 2004 WL 187217 (Tex. App.--Tyler Jan. 30, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ..............................................................14 Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) ........................................ 11 Branch v. State, 774 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989, pet. ref’d) ........................................ 11 Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ..............................................................12 Brown v. State, 978 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) ........................................9 Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ................................................................6 Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).............................................................. 11 Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................................................................8 Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ................................................................8 Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ................................................................9 Garza v. State, 783 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, no pet.) .................................... 11 Gonzalez v. State, 115 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2003, pet. ref’d) ............................................................................................... 8, 9, 13, 14 Hernandez v. State, 791 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) .............................14
iii Lowe v. State, 676 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) ........................................7 Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ................................................................14 Miles v. State, 312 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)........................6 Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ......................................................................8 Thompson v. State, 729 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1987, pet. ref’d) ....................................10 Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ....................................................... 12, 14 Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........................................................... 9, 14
RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) ................................................................................................6 TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) ..............................................................................................13
iv TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was indicted on a charge of murder. (C.R. 15). Appellant
proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury of the charged offense. (C.R. 109-
10). The jury sentenced appellant to 30 years in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (C.R. 109-10). Appellant filed a timely
written notice of appeal on October 8, 2014. (C.R. 113). On April 13, 2015,
appointed counsel for appellant filed an Anders brief asserting that the appeal was
wholly frivolous. On June 22, 2015, appellant’s newly-retained counsel filed a
brief on appellant’s behalf raising a single point of error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of October 5, 2012, Jackie Bergeron and the complainant,
Thomas Williams, Jr., were at the Green Arbor apartment complex in Houston
waiting for a ride. (3 R.R. 164-66). While at the complex, Bergeron saw appellant
hanging out by the playground. (3 R.R. 170). Bergeron and appellant had
previously gotten into a fistfight. (3 R.R. 169). When appellant spotted Bergeron
and the complainant, he approached them with a gun visibly tucked in his pants. (3
R.R. 174). A verbal confrontation ensued. (3 R.R. 175-76). Williams told
appellant he was not worried about appellant’s gun because they also had guns. (3
R.R. 177). Williams lifted his shirt to display an unloaded pistol tucked in his pants. (3 R.R. 177-78). At some point, appellant placed his hand on his gun, and
Bergeron and Williams turned to leave. (3 R.R. 181-83). Bergeron ran when he
heard gunshots behind him. (3 R.R. 182-83). He looked back and saw Williams
fall. (3 R.R. 184). Bergeron circled back around and found the deceased
complainant lying face-down on the ground. (3 R.R. 185-86).
The offense was also witnessed by a resident of the apartment complex who
looked out the window when he heard several gunshots. (4 R.R. 94-95). He saw a
black man with a gun chasing a boy.1 (4 R.R. 96). The resident saw the boy fall
face down, and the man stood over the boy and shot him two more times before
fleeing the scene. (4 R.R. 97-98).
An autopsy of the complainant revealed that he had been shot seven times.
(5 R.R. 26). His injuries were consistent with the witnesses’ testimony that he was
shot from behind as he attempted to flee from appellant. (5 R.R. 29-44).
1 The complainant was only 15 or 16 years old. (3 R.R. 164; 4 R.R. 115). 2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant has not preserved a claim that the trial court erred in overruling
defense counsel’s objections to the prosecutor’s improper jury argument.
Counsel’s general objections to “improper argument” were not sufficient to
preserve a complaint that the prosecutor was engaging in improper name-calling.
Moreover, it was not improper for the prosecutor to compare appellant to a lion and
a shark while making a plea for law enforcement because these comparisons were
reasonable deductions from the evidence. Even if the jury argument was improper,
it was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to require reversal.
3 REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR
In a single point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred by
overruling objections to the prosecutor’s jury argument at the punishment phase of
trial because the prosecutor improperly referred to appellant as a monster or a wild
animal. See (Appellant’s Brief p. 9). The prosecutor argued, in relevant part, as
follows:
So, just focus on the amount of years.
And in determining that, you heard the expression, “Motivation determines behavior.” What that means is that who you are as a person, decides how you act. I don’t know if any of you saw that it was in a video back on CNN, maybe six months, a year ago, something like that, where it was a mother, who had her little baby, and she was holding - - she was at the zoo - - and she holding this baby near the lion cage.
And there was a clear plastic barrier between this baby and the lion, and the baby is sitting there dancing, moving around, and the lion comes out. It’s gnawing right there. Everybody thinks, oh, it’s hilarious. It’s cute. It’s so great mom’s filming it, sends it to CNN, everybody watches it. But was that really cute? What would have happened if that glass barrier was not there? That baby is a goner. Because the motivation of a lion, a lion is a killer. A lion is a predator. That lion would have eaten that baby and nothing would have changed.
The defendant is a killer. He is a predator. We know he carries guns. We know that he will use a gun if you provoke him verbally. And we know that he will chase you down, firing round after round into your back and sides and then stand over you and execute you.
..........
4 Giving someone time for what they did, giving them less time, and then them getting out and victimizing someone else again, that is the scariest thing. That is the real fear that we have, right, that it happens again.
Have you guys seen the movie, Jaws?
MR. JOHNSON: Objection; improper argument.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. ABRAMS: Have you seen the movie, Jaws? I mean, for those who haven’t seen it, it’s a [sic] about a man-eating shark, right? And there is a scene in which there [sic] on a dock, all right.
And Chief Brody, he’s one of the main characters in the movie. And they’re on this dock, and he had this gigantic shark hanging right there and he’s standing there. He’s feeling good. He’s pumping his chest. I did a great job. I caught this shark, and there’s a group of people around him. They’re pumping their chests. Great job, Chief.
And then there’s a woman that comes up to him. She’s dressed in black. She’s obviously mourning, slaps him across the face and says. “Why did you let people go in the water if you knew there was a shark?” And she walks away.
Now, everyone else gets around and says, “Don’t worry, you did a good job. You caught that shark. Don’t worry. Don’t listen to her. It’s not your fault.”
And he says, “No, it is.”
This man is a shark. We have to decide if we want to let him back in the waters in our community.
MR. JOHNSON: Objection, Your Honor; improper argument.
THE COURT: It’s overruled.
5 MR. ABRAMS: Do we want to remove that clear plastic barrier between the lion and the baby? Do we want to do that?
MR. JOHNSON: Objection, Your honor; improper, calls for law enforcement.
THE COURT: It’s overruled.
MR. ABRAMS: That’s your decision. You get to decide because he’ll get out eventually. He will. You get to decide when you feel comfortable having this predator, this killer back with our families on our streets. (6 R.R. 32-36).
I. Defense counsel’s general objections to an “improper argument” were insufficient to preserve error for appellate review.
To preserve a claim for appellate review, a timely objection must be raised
stating the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity to make the trial
court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the
context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). “A general or imprecise objection may be
sufficient to preserve error for appeal, but only if the legal basis for the objection is
obvious to the court and to opposing counsel.” Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772,
775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis in original). A general objection to an
“improper argument” is typically insufficient to preserve error. See Miles v. State,
312 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding that
defense counsel’s objection to an “improper argument” was not sufficient to
preserve error because the objection was too general and the trial court made no
6 statements indicating that it understood the nature of the objection); Lowe v. State,
676 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (general objection to
“this type of argument” did not preserve error).
Here, defense counsel raised two general objections to “improper argument,”
and a third objection to the prosecutor’s plea for law enforcement. During closing
argument the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the appellant, without objection, as
a “killer” and a “predator.” No objection was raised until the prosecutor asked
whether the jury had seen the movie “Jaws,” at which point defense counsel
generally objected that this constituted “improper argument.” Defense counsel did
not elaborate further, and the objection was overruled.
Defense counsel again raised a general “improper argument” objection when
the prosecutor described the appellant as a “shark” and argued “[w]e have to
decide if we want to let him back in the waters in our community.” It is unclear
whether defense counsel was complaining that it was improper for the prosecutor
to refer to the appellant as a “shark.” The objection was overruled without further
comment from defense counsel. Finally, the prosecutor compared appellant to a
caged lion, and defense counsel objected that the argument was improper because
it “calls for law enforcement.”
There is nothing in the record reflecting that defense counsel’s general
objections to “improper argument” were directed specifically at the prosecutor’s
7 comparison of the appellant to a shark and a lion. Moreover, there is no indication
that the trial court was aware that counsel was objecting on the basis of improper
name-calling. Finally, defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor’s argument
called for law enforcement, although more specific, does not preserve the claim
presented on appeal.2 Accordingly, nothing has been preserved for review and
appellant’s point of error should be overruled.
II. The prosecutor’s jury argument was justified as a reasonable deduction from the evidence.
Moreover, appellant has not shown that the prosecutor’s jury argument was
improper. There are four generally accepted areas of jury argument: (1)
summations of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3)
responses to the arguments of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas for law enforcement.
Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Closing argument
may not be used to insert matters before the jury that are outside the record and
prejudicial to the accused. Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986); Gonzalez v. State, 115 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi-
Edinburg 2003, pet. ref’d).
2 This objection also seems to suggest that defense counsel was laboring under the misapprehension that a plea for law enforcement is not a valid jury argument. It is well-settled that a plea for law enforcement is a permissible area of jury argument. See Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 8 An improper jury argument does not constitute reversible error unless, “in
light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper,
violative of a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into
the trial proceeding.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000); Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 284. In reviewing a claim that that the prosecution
engaged in improper argument, the appellate court considers the remark in the
context in which it appears. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988). The remark must be a willful and calculated effort by the State to
deny the appellant a fair and impartial trial. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115.
“Counsel is allowed wide latitude without limitation in drawing inferences from
the evidence so long as the inferences drawn are reasonable, fair, legitimate, and
offered in good faith.” Gaddis, 753 S.W.2d at 398.
Appellant contends that the prosecutor’s jury argument was improper
because comparisons between the accused and a notorious criminal have
traditionally been considered “an improper and erroneous injection of facts not in
the record that is harmful to the accused.” Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 284-85
(holding that the defendant was harmed by the prosecutor’s closing argument
which compared the defendant to Osama Bin Laden at a time when the events of
September 11th were fresh in the collective minds of the jurors); see also Brown v.
State, 978 S.W.2d 708, 714 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that it
9 was improper for the prosecutor to compare the accused to Jeffrey Dahmer, John
Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy).
In this case, the prosecutor compared appellant to animals, rather than to
infamous criminals. Appellant argues, however, that the prosecutor’s analogies are
indistinguishable from references to terrorists: “Villains and terrifying creatures
take on many forms; the inflammatory caricature of a terrorist is just the same as
the inflammatory caricature of the homicidal shark or the tiger at the zoo.”
(Appellant’s Brief pp. 11-12).
Appellant fails to provide legal precedent supporting this melodramatic
assertion. The only case cited by appellant involving a comparison between the
accused and an animal during jury argument is Thompson v. State, 729 S.W.2d 132
(Tex. App.--Beaumont 1987, pet. ref’d). Appellant mischaracterizes the nature of
the holding in that case, claiming that “a comparison of the defendant to a
venomous spider, along with a reference to a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck,
was reversible.” (Appellant’s Brief p. 11). In Thompson, the prosecutor
commented during jury argument about a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck.
Defense counsel objected that there was no evidence in the record of a spider
tattoo. The prosecutor also compared the defendant to a spider; however, no
objection was raised to that remark and the reviewing court does not explicitly
address whether it was improper. Instead, the court’s rationale focuses on the
10 impropriety of the “tattoo” comment because it inserted prejudicial facts in the
record when there was no evidence of a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck. See
id. at 132-33. Thus, Thompson does not support the proposition that a comparison
between an accused and an animal necessarily constitutes an improper jury
argument.
Furthermore, Texas courts have upheld references to a defendant as an
animal during jury argument when the reference was justified as a reasonable
deduction from the evidence or a summation of the evidence. See Burns v. State,
556 S.W.2d 270, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that the prosecutor’s
reference to the defendant as an “animal” was not an improper deduction from the
evidence because the defendant had brutally tortured and murdered a 58-year-old
man); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 898 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d)
(concluding that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as an “animal” was a
reasonable deduction from the evidence because the facts at trial showed that the
defendant forced his way into a family’s home, beat and terrorized the victims, and
shot three of the family members); Garza v. State, 783 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex.
App.--San Antonio 1990, no pet.) (holding that it was not reversible error for the
prosecutor to refer to the defendant as an “animal” and a “wild dog” during jury
argument because these were summations of the witnesses’ testimony); Branch v.
State, 774 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989, pet. ref’d) (it was not
11 improper for the prosecutor to describe the defendant as an “animal who pounces
without warning” in light of evidence that he brutally attacked a 76-year-old man);
but see Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 217-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
(holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to the defendant as an
“animal” when the argument served no legitimate purpose).
In this case, the prosecutor used an analogy during closing argument of a
barrier between a lion at the zoo and a small child to illustrate the danger appellant
posed to society if released from the confinement of prison. Similarly, the
prosecutor compared appellant to a shark swimming “in the waters in our
community.” (6 R.R. 35). It is not improper for a prosecutor to use an analogy to
emphasize and explain evidence if the argument is supported by a reasonable
deduction from the evidence. See Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 959 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (holding that it was not improper for the prosecutor to compare
the defendant to a volcano where the evidence supported a conclusion that the
defendant behaved peaceably at times, but had a great propensity for violence).
The facts adduced at trial show that the prosecutor’s arguments were
justified as reasonable deductions from the evidence. Appellant left the
playground when he saw Bergeron and walked down an alleyway. (3 R.R. 172).
When appellant returned, a gun was visibly displayed in his waistband. (3 R.R.
174). Appellant approached Bergeron and the complainant. (3 R.R. 175-76). At
12 the time of the offense, the complainant was only 15 or 16 years old. (3 R.R. 164;
4 R.R. 115). Despite the fact that Bergeron and the complainant attempted to
leave, appellant chased after the complainant and ruthlessly shot him seven times.
(3 R.R. 179-84). The complainant’s injuries indicate that he was not facing his
assailant when he was shot. (5 R.R. 29, 31, 33, 34, 39, 42-43). When the
complainant fell to the ground, appellant picked him up and rolled him over. (4
R.R. 103). Then appellant stood over the complainant and shot him two more
times, execution style. (4 R.R. 103). Appellant’s actions were cold-blooded and
predatory. Accordingly, it was not error for the prosecutor to make comparisons
between the appellant and a dangerous animal during his plea for law enforcement.
III. The prosecutor’s jury argument was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to constitute reversible error.
Even assuming the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, the argument
was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to require reversal. To determine
whether harm resulted from an improper jury argument, the reviewing court
employs the harm analysis for non-constitutional error set forth in Rule 44.2(b).
See Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 285. Under Rule 44.2(b), any “error, defect,
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). The harmfulness of an improper argument is measured by
several factors, including: (1) the severity of the misconduct; (2) curative
measures; and (3) the certainty of the punishment assessed absent the misconduct.
13 Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Gonzalez, 115
S.W.3d at 285.
Although the trial court did not take any curative measures, the prejudicial
impact of the prosecutor’s argument was nominal. Viewing the prosecutor’s
remarks in the context of the argument, it is apparent that the purpose of the
prosecutor’s argument was to make a plea for law enforcement, rather than to
deride the appellant or subject him to abuse. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 218
(noting that abuse is not argument). The prosecutor’s argument was clearly not a
calculated attempt to deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial. See Wesbrook,
29 S.W.3d at 115. Even if the argument was improper, it is less inflammatory than
other remarks which have been deemed harmless. See Hernandez v. State, 791
S.W.2d 301, 307 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) (observing that it was
improper for the prosecutor to imply that the defendant was a “scum and goat,” but
not reversible error); Allen v. State, No. 12-02-00138-CR, 2004 WL 187217, *5
(Tex. App.--Tyler Jan. 30, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding
that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as a “monster” was no worse than
other improper arguments that have been held to be harmless). Moreover, the
prosecutor’s remarks were made at the punishment phase of trial, after the jury had
already determined that appellant was guilty of murdering the complainant.
Considering that the jury could have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, the
14 prosecutor’s remarks did not significantly impact the jury’s assessment of a 30-
year sentence. As such, the jury argument was harmless and appellant’s sole point
of error should be overruled.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the judgment of
conviction should be affirmed.
DEVON ANDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas
/s/ Heather A. Hudson HEATHER A. HUDSON Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755-5826 State Bar No. 24058991 hudson_heather@dao.hctx.net curry_alan@dao.hctx.net
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer-generated document
has a word count of 3,329 words, based upon the representation provided by the
word processing program that was used to create the document.
/s/ Heather A. Hudson HEATHER A. HUDSON 15 Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755-5826 State Bar No. 24058991
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument has been
submitted for service by e-filing to the following address:
Franklin Bynum Bynum Law Office PLLC 2814 Hamilton Street Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 343-8844 fgb@lawfgb.com
/s/ Heather A. Hudson HEATHER A. HUDSON Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755-5826 State Bar No. 24058991 Date: 7/31/2015