Andre Debrie, Inc. v. United States

2 Cust. Ct. 108, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 28
United States Customs Court·Decided February 10, 1939·No. C. D. 100·Published

Opinion

Dallingeh, Judge:

This is a suit against the United States, arising at the port of New York, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been improperly exacted on a particular importation consisting of a machine for printing colored motion-picture positive films from colored motion-picture negative films. Duty was levied [109] tllereon at the rate of 35 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 353 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device. It is claimed that said articles are properly dutiable at the rate of 25 per centum ad valorem under the provision in paragraph 372 of said act for printing machinery, or alternatively at 27 ½ per centum ad valorem under the same paragraph as a machine not specially provided for.

The plaintiff offered in evidence the testimony of two -witnesses. The first, Herman Jordan, a mechanic in the employ of the plaintiff corporation, testified that he assisted in the assembling and installing of the machine in question; that said machine is about 7 feet square and 5 feet high; that the base was composed of iron casting, the top of aluminum casting, the gears of steel, and the bearings of brass; that there are two electric-light bulbs located in what is known as the light houses of the machine, one of said houses being in the back and the other in the front of the machine; that with the machine as imported came an electric motor packed in a separate case; that said motor was mounted on a bracket on the back of the machine, being fastened by a couple of bolts and screws, and that the motor is connected with the operating parts of the machine by a direct coupling.

On cross-examination he testified that the motor was intended to be used with this particular machine and was used to operate it after its installation; that there were holes in the casting of the motor and also in the casting of the machine for the attachment of said motor; that the coupling which connected the motor with the machine was a flexible coupling and that the machine is used for printing motion-picture films, the printing being done by means of the electric lights; that there is an electric wire inserted into the machine connecting the two electric lamps; that the machine cannot print the film without the use of these electric lamps and that there were electrical wiring- and switches inside of the machine to utilize the electric current to light the lamps.

■ Reginald Fawn Mitchell, an electrical engineer in the employ of the plaintiff corporation, described the machine at bar as follows:

Essentially, it consists of a framework incorporating an intermittent mechanism, designed to operate film intermittently, which includes, of course, gears, • cams, and countershafts, and such. In addition, as it brings the film down to an aperture, it contains a mechanism that opens the light houses, concentrating the .light on the film, when the printing operation occurs, and then releases the intermittent gears or mechanism that moves the film down, and the operation is repeated on the film for the entire length, which is a thousand feet.

The witness then testified that the machine could be operated by power other than electric motor; that in order to do so the motor would have to be removed and a shaft with a pulley installed; that in that case an electric battery would have to be installed to operate [110] the electric lights in the light houses; that the electric motor in that case would not control the lights; that the machine in question could be used either to print by light or by pressure; that in order to print by pressure the light houses would have to be removed, which would not be expensive, and that he had operated the machine .im..qjiestion only by hand in order to make a check on it to see if it was functioning.

On cross-examination he testified that he had never seen a machine identical with that at bar operated by other than an electric motor; that when the intermittent action of the gears, which advances the negative and positive films to position for printing, ceases, then the' lights in the machine do the printing; that the electric fights in the machine are on continuously during this operation and actually do the printing; that said lamps are continuously lighted in the machine by electricity; that the machine is wired so that an electric current can keep the lamps lighted; that this particular machine was primarily designed for printing by electric fight rather than by pressure; that in speaking of the machine as a printing machine the witness referred to photographic printing from a negative to a positive film; and that the machine does not do any printing by the use of type or colored plates and does not print on paper.

On redirect examination the witness testified that he had never operated a machine identical with the one at bar; and that in his opinion the motor and its frame could be removed and a belt pulley and shaft substituted therefor.

The witness Jordan being recalled by the plaintiff testified that the machine shown by him to the witness Mitchell was similar to the machine at bar except that it had no motor.

On recross-examination he testified that the machine shown by him to the witness Mitchell was operated by electricity and all of the machines similar to the one here in question are driven by electric power.

Upon this record counsel for the plaintiff in their brief filed herein1 contend, first, that the machine herein is printing machinery within the meaning of paragraph 372 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and that that classification is more specific than paragraph 353 under which •the machine was assessed for duty. On this point we are of the opinion that the case of United States v. Paramount Publix Corp., 22 C. C. P. A. 452, T. D. 47453, is here controlling. In that case the' First Division of this court had held a certain machine for reproducing motion pictures by printing on a blank film the picture which is •developed on a developed film to be printing machinery within the meaning of paragraph 372, as claimed by the importer. In holding that the machine was not so classifiable the appellate court said:

[111] , -Appellant’s contention that the importation should.be held to be, a printing-machine under the provisions of paragraph 372, and dutiable at only 25 per centum ■h'd' <t%lbrfetn, :mtist next be considered. This question involves not only a consideration of the context of the paragraph, but of the legislative history connected therewith. It will be noticed that the paragraph provides for “printing machinery (except for textiles), bookbinding machinery, and paper-box machinery, 25 per centum ad valorem * * *.”
The testimony in this case shows that the image on a developed film projected onto a mirror is photographed onto an undeveloped film and that this process is. styled “printing” by those who use the term in connection with photography. It is a matter of common knowledge that the term “printing” is often applied to the act of transferring, by the agency of light, to a sensitized positive, an image which is on a negative. * * *

■■ Then, after considering in some detail the legislative history of paragraph 372 of the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, the appellate court continues as follows:

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Andre Debrie, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cust. Ct. 108, 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 28 (cusc 1939).

2 Cust. Ct. 108 (Andre Debrie, Inc. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.