Andrade v. General Services Administration

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 5, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-0245
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEILA ANDRADE, ) ) Plaintiff ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-cv-00245 (TSC) ) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the court is the unopposed Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 4,

filed by Defendant, the United States General Services Administration (“GSA”). For the reasons

explained below, the GSA’s Motion to Dismiss is granted, and this case is dismissed pursuant to

Federal Rule 12(b)(1). 1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Leila Andrade, originally filed this matter on August 18, 2022, in the Superior

Court for the District of Columbia, see Superior Ct. Record (“Record”), ECF No. 6, at 2–5, 2

Superior Court Docket (“Sup. Ct. Dkt.”); see also Def.’s Notice of Removal (“Not.”), ECF No.

1, by filing a pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1, seeking between $30,450 and $50,000

in damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in the District of Columbia, see

id. at 1, 14–15. 3 The Complaint itself contains spare information regarding damages and is left

1 GSA also moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). See MTD at 1–5. However, because the court finds that it is without subject matter jurisdiction and dismisses this matter in full based on this superseding ground, it need not reach GSA’s 12(b)(6) arguments. 2 The court references the ECF-generated page numbers in citing to the Superior Court record. 3 The court references the ECF-generated page numbers in citing to the Complaint. 1 blank in all other respects. See id. at 1–2. Although Andrade attaches a handful of Exhibits to

her Complaint, see id. at 5–7, 9–13, she neither cites to them nor explains their significance, see

id. at 1–2; see also D.C. LCvR 5.1(e), (g). As far as it can be gleaned from those Exhibits, on the

morning of April 28, 2022, Andrade was driving to work when she struck a vehicle on 17th Street

NW. See id. at 10, 12. She contends that “intense” steam was emanating from a nearby

manhole, which obstructed her view and caused her to rear-end the vehicle directly in front of

her, “head on without [any] brakes.” See id. at 10. Notwithstanding, Andrade was found at fault

for the accident and cited by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for “fail[ing] to control

speed to avoid colliding.” See id. at 12. Andrade, as well as the driver and two passengers of the

other vehicle, were all transported to George Washington Hospital for medical attention. See id.

Andrade sues GSA for negligence, seemingly arising from its possible installation of a steam

pipe below the manhole, and its subcontractor’s maintenance of same. See id. at 9. She seeks

compensation for her traffic fine, the damage to her vehicle, the cost of her car rental and

ambulance ride, and for unspecified pain and suffering, see id. at 1.

On January 27, 2023, GSA removed this matter to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1442(a)(1). See Not. at 1. The case was assigned to this court on February 9, 2023, see Dkt. at

Case Assignment, and on April 14, 2023, GSA filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. On April

17, 2023, the court entered an Order, ECF No. 5, advising Andrade of certain formal

requirements and of her general obligations to follow the D.C. Local Civil Rules and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and referring her to the court’s “Pro Se Non-Prisoner Handbook,”

located on the court’s public website. See id. at 1. Andrade was also forewarned that failure to

adhere to either the Local or Federal Rules, or orders of this court, could result in sanctions, up to

and including dismissal of this action. See id. at 2. On the same date, the court entered a

2 separate Minute Order, staying the case pending receipt of the official record from the Superior

Court. See Minute Order (entered 4/17/2023). The Superior Court record was entered on the

docket on July 25, 2023. See Dkt. at Record (Date Entered).

Having received the record, on September 19, 2023, the court then lifted the stay, see

Minute Order (entered on 9/19/23), and separately issued an Order, ECF No. 7, advising

Andrade of her obligation to respond to GSA’s pending Motion to Dismiss by October 20, 2023,

or risk the court ruling on the Motion, or otherwise dismissing the case, without her input, see id.

at 1–2 (citing Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). That deadline

has long since elapsed, and Andrade has neither filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, nor

requested additional time to do so. Indeed, Andrade has not once directly participated in this

matter since its removal to federal court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule 12(b)(1)

“Article III of the Constitution prescribes that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited

subject-matter jurisdiction’ and ‘ha[ve] the power to decide only those cases over which

Congress grants jurisdiction.’ ” Bronner v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2020)

(alterations in original) (quoting Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2012));

see Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“‘Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’”) (quoting

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Federal courts have an

obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction. Absent subject-matter

jurisdiction over a case, a court must dismiss it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

506–07 (2006) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

3 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden

of demonstrating a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim at issue. Arpaio v. Obama,

797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1103 (2016); see also Hertz Corp. v.

Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942). When

considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must accept as true all

uncontroverted material factual allegations contained in the complaint and “‘construe the

complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the

facts alleged’ and upon such facts determine jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v.

FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972

(D.C. Cir. 2005); Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). A court need not

accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff, however, if those inferences are unsupported by facts

alleged in the complaint or amount merely to legal conclusions. See Browning v. Clinton, 292

F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

When reviewing a challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a court may consider documents

outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,

735 n.4 (1947); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). By considering

documents outside the pleadings when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),

a court does not convert the motion into one for summary judgment; “the plain language of Rule

12(b) permits only a 12(b)(6) motion to be converted into a motion for summary judgment”

when documents extraneous to the pleadings are considered by a court. Haase, 835 F.2d at 905.

And, in considering a motion to dismiss in a pro se case, the court should consider the plaintiff’s

pro se filings in toto. See Brown v Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 151–52

4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“a district court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s

complaint ‘in light of’ all filings[.]”).

DISCUSSION

Andrade has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), a claimant may sue the federal government for “personal

injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). First, and notable here, the “United States of America is

the only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA.” Chandler v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 226 F.

Supp. 3d 1, 6 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016); see Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 125 (D.D.C. 2016)

(“[A] plaintiff may not bring tort claims against federal officials in their official capacities or

against federal agencies; the proper defendant is the United States itself[.]”) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1346(a)(2); Goddard v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345–46 (D.C. Cir.

1961); Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F. Supp. 3d 212, 223 (D.D.C. 2015)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a)

(“The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed

to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section

1346(b)[.]”).

Andrade has named GSA as the sole defendant to this lawsuit. See Compl. at 1, 4. Her

“[f]ailure to name the United States as the defendant in an FTCA action requires dismissal for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Coulibaly, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (citing Johnson v.

Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 133 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2015); Cox v. Sec’y of Labor, 739 F.

Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1990)).

Second, to bring suit under the FTCA, a claimant must first satisfy the FTCA’s

exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2675, which provides that 5 [a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for . . . personal injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and h[er] claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for the purposes of this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, in doing so, a claimant must comply with

specific formal requirements, including timely presenting the agency with (1) a written statement

sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a

sum-certain damages claim. See id. §§ 2675(a)–(b); GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901,

905 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

“The Supreme Court has interpreted [§ 2675] to mean that ‘[t]he FTCA bars claimants

from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies[,]’”

Norton v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)), and has further instructed that a claimant’s failure to “heed [the

FTCA's] clear statutory [exhaustion] command” warrants dismissal of their FTCA claim. See id.

(quoting McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113; citing Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL 2574175,

at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Likewise, D.C. Circuit precedent holds that the “FTCA's requirement of

filing an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency prior to instituting an action [is]

jurisdictional.” Simpkins v. Dist. of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Odin v.

United States, 656 F.2d 798, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that exhaustion under the FTCA is a

“‘jurisdictional prerequisite[ ]’ to suit”); GAF Corp., 818 F.2d at 904–05 (holding that § 2675

imposes a “jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a tort suit against the United

States”). Because the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, it cannot be waived. See

6 Corsi v. Mueller, 422 F. Supp. 3d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d

227, 245–46 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 (1987)), aff’d, 819 Fed.

Appx. 6, (D.C. Cir. 2020); Smith v. Clinton, 253 F. Supp. 3d 222, 238 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding

that “the FTCA's exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be excused” and stating that

futility applies only to non-jurisdictional exhaustion), aff'd, 886 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 459 (2018); Norton, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 7 (same); Chien v. United States, No.

17-2334, 2019 WL 4602119, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2019) (“[A] court may not waive the

FTCA's exhaustion requirement on equitable grounds.”)).

Here, there is no indication that Andrade ever administratively exhausted her tort claim

with GSA. To the contrary, GSA submits an uncontested Declaration, authored by Dawn Austin,

a paralegal with GSA’s National Tort Claims Center (“NTCC”), the sole entity responsible for

processing administrative tort claims for the GSA. See Declaration of Dawn Austin, ECF No. 4-

1, ¶ 1. Austin clearly attests, within her professional dominion and with personal knowledge,

that she searched for any existing administrative claim submitted by Andrade to the GSA, but

none was found. See id. ¶¶ 1–3. Simply put, because Andrade has failed to exhaust her FTCA

claim, this court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction, and it is thus obligated to dismiss this

matter. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113.

7 CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, GSA’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is

GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(1).

A separate Order will be issued contemporaneously.

Date: January 5, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge