ANDERSON VALENTINE SHABAZZ v. MATTHEWS

• Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 20, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01757
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANNY AMEN ANDERSON : VALENTINE SHABAZZ, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-1757 : ELIZABETH MATTHEWS, et al., : Defendants. : ORDER AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2023, upon consideration of Plaintiff Danny Amen Anderson Valentine Shabazz’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 4) and Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2. The Amended Complaint is DEEMED filed. 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket to reflect Shabazz’s current mailing address as 65 Irby Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30305, in accordance with the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 4 at 6) and the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5 at 4). 4. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum. 5. Shabazz may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any second amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the second amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the second amended complaint and shall state the basis for Shabazz’s claims against each defendant. The second amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint, Amended Complaint, or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his second amended complaint, Shabazz should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his Amended Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the filing of a second amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.

6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Shabazz a blank copy of this Court’s current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Shabazz may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so. 7. If Shabazz does not wish to amend his Amended Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Amended Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an

appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”). 8. If Shabazz fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Shabazz intends to stand on his Amended Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.1 See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

BY THE COURT:

/S/Wendy Beetlestone, J.

WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.

1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).