Anderson v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 24, 2025
• Docket: 277, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TYRONE ANDERSON, § § Defendant Below, § No. 277, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. N1608006981 § Appellee. §

Submitted: September 2, 2025 Decided: October 24, 2025

ORDER

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Tyrone Anderson, appeals from a Superior Court order

denying a motion for correction of an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion

to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face

of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(1) A Superior Court jury found Anderson guilty of ten drug dealing-

related offenses that occurred in April, June, July, and August 2016. Certain

offenses merged for sentencing. The Superior Court sentenced Anderson on the

remaining offenses as follows: for drug dealing in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4752(2), twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended after eight years for decreasing levels

of supervision; for drug dealing in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4752(1), twenty-five

years of imprisonment, suspended after eight years for probation; for drug dealing

in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4752(2), five years of imprisonment, suspended after

four years for probation; for drug dealing in violation of 16 Del. C. § 4753(1), two

years of imprisonment, suspended for probation; for second-degree conspiracy, two

years of imprisonment, suspended for probation; and for attempted possession of

heroin, six months of imprisonment, suspended for probation. This Court affirmed

on direct appeal1 and on appeal from the denial of motions for postconviction relief

and sentence correction.2

(2) In May 2025, Anderson filed another motion to correct an illegal

sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). He argued that his sentence is

illegal under Erlinger v. United States,3 Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 and other decisions

addressing related legal principles because the Superior Court, rather than a jury,

considered aggravating factors when determining his sentence. The Superior Court

denied the motion, and Anderson has appealed to this Court.

1 Anderson v. State, 2018 WL 6344697 (Del. Dec. 4, 2018). 2 Anderson v. State, 2023 WL 7014091 (Del. Oct. 24, 2023); Anderson v. State, 2021 WL 5023363 (Del. Oct. 27, 2021). 3 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 4 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

2 (3) We review the denial of a motion for correction of an illegal sentence

for abuse of discretion, although questions of law are reviewed de novo.5 A sentence

is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with

respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory,

omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is

a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.6

(4) On appeal, Anderson argues that his sentence runs afoul of Erlinger and

Apprendi because the Superior Court considered aggravating factors set forth in the

Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) sentencing guidelines—such

as his prior convictions, custody status at the time of the offense, and undue

depreciation of the offense—when sentencing Anderson. He also contends that his

reindictment illegally increased the range of penalties to which he was exposed by

charging higher-class offenses than the original indictment, without factfinding by a

jury.

(5) In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court held that a unanimous

jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a defendant’s prior offenses

were committed on separate occasions before the defendant’s sentence can be

enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act.7 In Apprendi, the Court stated that

5 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 6 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 7 Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834-35.

3 “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”8 Anderson does not contend, and the record

does not reflect, that his sentence was enhanced beyond the statutory range

applicable to the offenses of which the jury found him guilty at trial. Erlinger and

Apprendi are not implicated when the Superior Court considers aggravating factors

to explain an upward departure from the SENTAC guidelines, within the statutory

penalty range.9 We find no reversible error in the Superior Court’s denial of

Anderson’s motion for sentence correction.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

8 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. 9 See Krafchick v. State, 2025 WL 2925378, at *1 (Del. Oct. 14, 2025) (“Erlinger is not implicated here because the aggravating factors that the Superior Court cited to explain its upward departure from the SENTAC sentencing guidelines did not increase the range of penalties to which Krafchick was otherwise exposed.”); McCray v. State, 2025 WL 1779553, at *1 (Del. June 26, 2025) (holding that sentence exceeding SENTAC guideline based on court’s finding of an aggravating factor was not illegal under Apprendi because the sentence was within the statutory maximum for the offense).