Anderson v. Shaw

87 F.2d 903, 24 C.C.P.A. 951, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 65
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 23, 1937
DocketNo. 3732
StatusPublished

This text of 87 F.2d 903 (Anderson v. Shaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Shaw, 87 F.2d 903, 24 C.C.P.A. 951, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 65 (ccpa 1937).

Opinion

Leneoot, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding- wherein tbe Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirmed a decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention upon the counts here involved to appellee.

The counts in issue read as follows:

Count 1. In a hydraulic machine of the character described, the combination of a tracer mechanism, a cutter, a support on which the tracer mechanism and cutter are mounted, a master, a second support on which the master and the work-piece are mounted, means for effecting relative movements of said supports towards and away from each other, hydraulic means for relatively moving said supports transversely of each other, and hydraulic means for controlling both said previously recited means operative by displacements of the tracer point through contact with the master.
Count 2. In a hydraulically operated die-sinking machine, including means for supporting a work piece and a master as a first pair in predetermined relative position, and additional means for supporting a tool in opposition to the work piece and a tracer body in opposition to the master as a second pair, a hydraulic motor for effecting a movement of one of said pairs in a direction toward or away from the other pair, a second hydraulic motor for effecting movement of one of said pairs transversely with respect to the other pair, hydraulic valve means for controlling the operation of said hydraulic motors, [952]*952a tracer point for engagement with the master, means mounting the tracer point in the tracer body for universal movement whereby on contact with the master it may be displaced in any direction from its normal position, and operative connections between the tracer point and the hydraulic valve means whereby deflection of the tracer point relative to the tracer body energizes said hydraulic valve means to keep the tracer point and master in contact one with, the other and thus cause the relative path of movement between cutter and work to conform with the shape of the master.

The interference arises between a patent to appellant and an application filed by appellee on May 22, 1930. Appellant’s patent, No.. 1,952,231, was issued on March 27, 1934, upon an application filed. October 20, 1931. The claims here involved were copied by appellee-from appellant’s said patent on April 26,1934. The interference was: declared on June 14,1934.

On the same date that appellant’s said patent was issued, another patent, No. 1,952,230, was issued to him upon an application filed August 1, 1927. Both of said patents relate to the same general subject matter.

The invention involved relates to a machine that will cut irregular-shapes in metal, in accurate correspondence with a master or pattern of the desired contour which is to be duplicated. The details of the-machine involved in this interference are sufficiently described in-the counts.

On May 12, 1932, an interference (No. 63,869) was declared between appellant’s first application and appellee’s application and certain other applications, which interference terminated on January 31, 1933 by an award of priority to appellant herein. In the decision of the Examiner of Interferences in said interference we find the following:

In view of the judgment which will -be hereinafter rendered adverse to all' junior parties the party Anderson will be entitled to claim all patentable subject matter common to the applications here involved.

■ The interference declared on May 12, 1932 will be hereinafter referred to as the “first interference,” and the interference directly involved in this appeal will be referred to as the “instant interference.”' . At the time the first interference was declared involving appellant’s application upon which his patent No. 1,952,230 was issued,, appellant’s second application, upon which his patent No. 1,952,231 was issued, was pending and it contained a claim corresponding to-count 1 of the instant interference, but that application was not involved in the first interference.

Of the counts here in issue, but one element in each count is here involved. In count 1 this element is described as “means for effecting relative movements of said supports towards and away from each other.” (Italics ours.) In count 2 this element is described as “a [953]*953hydraulic motor for effecting a movement of one of said .pairs in a ■direction toward or away from, the other fair(Italics ours.)

After the instant interference was declared, and after the preliminary statements of the parties were opened, appellee moved for judgment of priority of invention in his favor upon the ground that appellant was estopped to claim priority of invention by reason of his failure to bring forth his second application during the prosecution of the first interference and request a two-party interference with appellee upon claims corresponding to the counts here involved.

Appellant also moved for judgment in his favor on the ground of ■res adjudieata growing out of appellee’s failure to make claims in the first interference corresponding to the counts here involved.

The Examiner of Interferences denied appellant’s motion for judgment and granted the motion of appellee upon the ground of estop-pel set up by him as hereinbefore stated. Upon appeal, the Board ■of Appeals affirmed the decision of said examiner, and from the decision of the board appellant took this appeal.

The principal contention of appellant here is that the board erred in not holding that appellee was estopped from claiming priority of invention, for the reason that the question herein involved could have been decided in the first interference, and, appellant having been the successful party in that interference, the judgment rendered therein was determinative of every claim which was or could have been included in the issue, based upon the applications in that interference. Therefore, appellant contends, the rule of res adjudieata applies, and appellee is estopped from claiming priority of invention in the instant interference.

We will first examine this contention of appellant, for it is conceded that if it is well taken the decision of the board must be reversed, and it will not be necessary in that event to consider other •questions raised in this appeal.

The question first to be considered is whether the counts here involved read upon appellant’s first application involved in the first interference. If they do, appellant’s claim of estoppel under the rule of res adjudieata is well taken.

Upon this question the Board of Appeals in its decision stated:

In the Anderson patent No. 1,952,230, granted on the earlier Anderson application, the work support is mounted for straight-line movement in a horizontal plane and the tool support is mounted for horizontal movement in a direction at right angles to the movement of the work support, hut in a horizontal plane located above the plane of the work support. The work support carries a template and the tool support carries a tracer which engages the template and controls hydraulic mechanism for moving the work support and the tool support in such manner that the tool follows a path on the work similar in shape to the outline of the template.
[954]

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87 F.2d 903, 24 C.C.P.A. 951, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-shaw-ccpa-1937.