Anderson v. Runge

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 23-1535
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES P. ANDERSON, No. 23-1535 D.C. No. 3:21-cv-00922-TLT Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

KEVIN RUNGE; L. RICHARDSON; D. ARVIZO,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Trina L. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 17, 2025**

Before: CANBY, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner James P. Anderson appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation and

due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). de novo. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anderson’s

retaliation claim because Anderson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact

as to whether defendants took an adverse action against him because of his

protected conduct. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

(setting forth the requirements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anderson’s due

process claim because Anderson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as

to whether his constitutional rights were violated. See Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (no due process violation where an

inmate was given notice of and an adequate opportunity to comply with a

regulation that restricted personal property because “that is all the process that is

due”); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (an unauthorized

deprivation of property, whether negligent or intentional, is not actionable if the

state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d

813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-

deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

2 23-1535 All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-1535