Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority

205 F. Supp. 2d 106, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8859, 2002 WL 1012913
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedApril 26, 2002
Docket00-CV-6275L
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 205 F. Supp. 2d 106 (Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 205 F. Supp. 2d 106, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8859, 2002 WL 1012913 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, Chief Judge.

This action was commenced by twelve individual plaintiffs and the Center for Disability Rights, alleging claims under the Americans with Disablities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Rochester-Gen-esee Regional Transportation Authority (“RGRTA”), LifL-Line, Inc. (a corporate subsidiary of RGRTA) (“LifULine”), sometimes collectively referred to herein as “the company,” and two individual officers of those entities. Plaintiffs allege that de *107 fendants have systematically violated the ADA by failing to provide paratransit services to the disabled that are comparable to the transportation services provided to the greater public in the Rochester, New York area serviced by defendants. In particular, plaintiffs allege that defendants have not adequately provided “next-day” service, ie., rides provided the day after a ride request is made, as required by 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b).

After both sides moved for summary judgment, the Court heard oral argument on their motions, and reviewed documentary and other evidence concerning defendants’ provision of paratransit services. On August 14, 2001, the Court issued a Decision and Order (“August Decision”) (familiarity with which is assumed) denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granting plaintiffs cross-motion for partial summary judgment on three of plaintiffs’ four claims for relief. The Court declared that defendants had violated plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA by: failing to provide next-day service to all ADA paratransit-eligible persons as required by 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b); engaging in an operational pattern or practice that significantly limits the availability of paratransit services to plaintiffs, in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(f)(3); and failing to provide paratransit or other special transportation services in accordance with the plan that defendants submitted to the Secretary of Transportation under 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(7), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12143(e)(4).

The Court also directed defendants to take immediate steps to comply with their obligations under the ADA and federal regulations implementing it specifically with regard to the provision of next-day paratransit service. In addition, the Court directed the parties to attempt to work together to formulate a comprehensive plan to implement the Court’s August Decision.

In response to the Court’s directives, defendants have undertaken various steps to improve their paratransit services, and it appears from their most recent submissions that those steps have met with some measure of success. Defendants have, for instance, increased the number of buses during peak ridership times, increased the number of schedulers on staff, and hired additional bus drivers. As a result of these and other measures, defendants report that they have been able to schedule 99.86% of all rides requested from November 5, 2001 through January 31, 2002, and 98.8% of all next-day ride requests during that same period. Those figures represent a substantial improvement over defendants’ previous performance which fell far below what the law requires. As I referenced in my August Decision, the evidence showed that during a representative period in 2000, defendants had granted about 95% of all ride requests, but only 43% of requests for next-day service.

Also in accordance the Court’s directives, the parties have met with each other, as well as' with the Court, on a number of occasions in an attempt to work out a mutually satisfactory plan which would not only resolve this litigation but would also establish a mechanism for dealing with future issues concerning the company and its services to the disabled. I believe that the parties worked diligently and in good faith to resolve the litigation, but their efforts proved unavailing. Although the parties had made significant progress and appeared to have reached agreement on many issues, they could not agree on several key issues and, therefore, the parties were unwilling to adopt any agreement at all, even concerning matters about which they appeared to have reached accord. This is regrettable.

*108 It is therefore up to the Court to resolve these remaining disputes, in order to fully effectuate my August Decision. Both sides have submitted their proposals which they believe properly implement the Court’s August Decision. The following Decision and Order, then, sets forth my findings and rulings on those disputes.

The principal holding in the Court’s August Decision was that RGRTA and Lift-Line had failed to provide next-day service to all paratransit eligible persons as required by regulations implementing the ADA. The Court’s August Decision determined that the company had failed to comply with the law and that it must take immediate steps to rectify its noncompliance.

I believe that it is appropriate for the Court to monitor, at least to some extent, Lift-Line’s operation to ensure that the company adopts appropriate practices and procedures to better fulfil its obligations in the future to the disabled.

Although the parties have discussed a wide range of issues relating to paratransit services for the disabled, the parties, and especially plaintiffs, need to understand that the Court’s role is limited — at least at this stage — to directing that appropriate procedures be adopted to ensure that its August Decision is fully implemented.

In order to implement the Court’s August Decision, therefore, I direct and order the following:

1. The company must provide next-day ride service to all ADA paratransit eligible individuals who require such service, consistent with the terms of this Court’s August Decision and consistent with the requirements of 49 C.F.R. (Subpart F), § 37.121, et. seq. “Next-day ride service” shall mean paratransit service requested by an ADA paratransit eligible individual (as defined by 49 C.F.R. [Subpart F], § 37.123 of the Regulations), up to the closing time of the reservation office the day before the day on which the ride is requested. Service provided shall be within one hour before or after the time for which the ride is requested, as required by 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(b)(2).

2. To implement the next-day ride service, the company shall take whatever steps are necessary to obtain more buses, drivers and schedulers to comply with all of the requirements concerning provision of paratransit service.

3.

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Bluebook (online)
205 F. Supp. 2d 106, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8859, 2002 WL 1012913, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-rochester-genesee-regional-transportation-authority-nywd-2002.