Anderson v . Peterson, et a l . CV-02-315-M 12/31/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Clint Anderson, Plaintiff
v. Civil N o . 02-315-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 226 Robert Peterson, Lynda Warhall, John Doe, New Hampshire Adult Parole Board, Thomas Hammond, George Iverson, Cecile Hartigan, Amy Vorenberg, and Thomas Winn, Defendants
O R D E R
This case1 arises from a search of parolee Clint Anderson’s
home by two state parole officers (Robert Peterson and Lynda
Warhall) and a Concord police officer. Anderson seeks damages,
under 42 U . S . C . § 1983, for violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to privacy, and also seeks a declaration that the
regulation under which the search was conducted, N . H . CODE ADMIN.
R . Par. 401.02(b)(9), is unconstitutional. Before the court is
an unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by defendants
1 By order dated June 2 5 , 2002 (document n o . 2 6 ) , Civil N o . 02-315-M was consolidated with Civil N o . 02-516-M for all purposes. Pearson, Hammond, Iverson, Hartigan, Eckert, Vorenberg, and Winn.
For the reasons given below, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R . CIV. P .
56(c). “To determine whether these criteria have been met, a
court must pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and carefully
review the parties’ submissions to ascertain whether they reveal
a trialworthy issue as to any material fact.” Perez v . Volvo Car
Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 310 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Grant’s Dairy-
Me., L L C v . Comm’r of M e . Dep’t of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 232
F.3d 8 , 14 (1st Cir. 2000)). When ruling upon a party’s motion
for summary judgment, the court must “scrutinize the summary
judgment record ‘in the light most hospitable to the party
opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor.’” Navarro v . Pfizer, 261 F.3d 9 0 , 94 (1st
Cir. 2001) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v . Smith, 904 F.2d 1 1 2 , 115 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
2 Background
On March 3 , 1994, Anderson was sentenced to prison for not
less than five years and not more than ten years for the crime of
aggravated felonious sexual assault. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
T.) On July 2 4 , 2000, Anderson was paroled. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J., Ex. B at 1.) Under the general conditions of his parole,
Anderson agreed to “permit the parole officer to visit [his]
residence at any time for the purpose of examination and
inspection in the enforcement of the conditions of parole and
submit to searches of [his] person, property, and possessions as
requested by the parole officer.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B
at 2 . ) 2 The specific conditions and restrictions of Anderson’s
2 That parole condition is derived from the Administrative Rules of the Adult Parole Board, which provide, in pertinent part, that all parolees shall “[p]ermit[] the parole officer to visit parolee’s residence at any time for the purpose of examination and inspection in the enforcement of the conditions of parole and submit to searches of his person, property, and possessions as requested by the parole officer.” N . H . CODE ADMIN. R . Par. 401.02(b)(9). In order to assist its field services staff, including parole officers, in carrying out their duties, the Department of Corrections has promulgated various policy and procedure directives (“PPDs”) pertaining to searches. According to P P D 5.6, titled Supervision of Adult Offenders, the Rules and Regulations of Probation and Parole include the following:
I will submit to reasonable searches of my person, property and possessions as requested by the P / P O and
3 parole included: participating in and satisfactorily completing
sex offender counseling (Rule 1 3 C ) ; remaining out of the
unsupervised company of minors at any time (Rule 1 3 E ) ; refraining
totally from the use of alcoholic beverages (Rule 1 3 G ) ; and
abiding by all terms and conditions of an Intensive Parole
Supervision (“ISP”) contract (Rule 1 3 I ) . (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.,
Ex. B at 2.) The ISP contract, in turn, contained the following
permit the P/PO to visit my residence at reasonable times for the purpose of examination and inspection in the enforcement of the conditions of Probation and Parole. (The key words in this rule are “reasonable” and “purpose”. Any home visit should include a casual inspection of the premises. Guidance for in-depth searches is contained in the section on Rehabilitative Inspections, Contraband and Evidence.)
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. M (PPD 5.6(IV)(D)(6)(h) at 5 (emphasis added).) PPD 5.77, titled “Searches and Inspections,” contains the following provision:
EVIDENCE OF A NEW CRIME 1. When other law enforcement agencies seek assistance in looking for evidence of a new crime, care must be taken to avoid invalidating the new evidence. Substituting administrative searches under our authority to avoid the warrant process for other agencies could invalidate the evidence. In latter hearings the court will make a decision on evidence suppression based on the actual basis for the search. We must be careful not to use administrative authority as a substitute for a warrant.
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. O (PPD 5.77(IV)(C)(1) at 3.)
4 relevant provision: “I understand and agree to submit to a search
of my person, property, possessions and residence at any time of
the day or night as requested by the Intensive Supervision
Officer.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. C.) Both the standard
“Parole Conditions and Restrictions” form and the “Intensive
Supervision Program Participation Contract” bear Anderson’s
signature.
In June 2001, Anderson violated the terms of his parole.
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Exs. E-H.) He was terminated from sex
offender counseling,3 which placed him in violation of Rule 13C,
and he failed to abstain from the consumption of alcoholic
beverages, in violation of Rule 13G. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
I.) Anderson admitted those violations, and was returned to
parole status under several additional conditions. (Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J., Ex. G.) His ISP contract appears to have remained in
effect. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G.)
3 He was terminated from sex offender counseling for having unapproved sexual relations and for consuming alcohol. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Exs. F-G.)
5 On November 1 3 , 2001, Anderson’s parole officers, Warhall
and Peterson, learned from the Concord Police Department that a
fifteen-year-old female runaway, Crystal, had made calls from
Anderson’s home phone and from his cell phone. (Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J., Ex. A (Peterson Aff.) ¶ 11.) That same day, Anderson
was contacted on his cell phone, at his place of work in
Massachusetts, by a Concord police officer, who asked him where
Crystal was. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) Anderson told the officer he
did not know. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) After trying, unsuccessfully,
to reach Peterson by phone, to report the police contact,
Anderson subsequently received a call from Peterson. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 1 6 , 18.) When Peterson asked Anderson about Crystal, Anderson
denied having any contact with her, other than allowing her, on
one occasion, to use his cell phone. (Peterson Aff. ¶ 11.)
Peterson ordered Anderson to return to Concord as soon as
possible, and Anderson agreed to meet Peterson at 6:30 p.m. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.)
While Anderson was returning to Concord, Peterson conducted
a “rehabilitative inspection to determine whether Anderson or the
runaway were in the apartment, as well a s , to determine whether
6 Anderson was violating the terms of his parole.” (Peterson Aff.
¶ 14.) After a cursory search, Peterson identified in plain view
in Anderson’s kitchen, and subsequently seized, items that
appeared to belong to a female minor. (Peterson Aff. ¶ 15.)
When Anderson pulled into his driveway, he saw Peterson, Warhall,
and the Concord officer coming out of his apartment. (Am. Compl.
¶ 26.) Shortly thereafter, Anderson and his passenger were
removed from their vehicle at gun point. (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.)
Peterson informed Anderson that his apartment had been searched
and that the search had yielded some of Crystal’s clothing. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 29.)
Based upon the discovery of Crystal’s clothing in his
apartment, Anderson was charged with violating the terms of his
parole by allowing Crystal to reside with him for approximately
one week, and for lying to his parole officer about Crystal’s
presence in his residence. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. J.) After
a revocation hearing, at which he pled guilty, Anderson was given
a six-month setback. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. H.) He was
again paroled on September 3 , 2002. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
Q.) The “Parole Conditions and Restrictions” form Anderson
7 signed on September 3 was identical to the form he signed upon
his previous parole, and included the provision requiring him to
submit to searches at the request of his parole officers.
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Exs. B and Q.) The record does not
indicate that Anderson objected to the search condition at the
time of his parole. The portion of the form detailing special
conditions refers to Anderson being under intensive supervision,
but does not mention a separate ISP contract. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J., Ex. Q.)
While in prison serving his setback, Anderson filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the New Hampshire
Superior Court. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. R.) In that
petition, he argued that his incarceration was unconstitutional
because: (1) the Parole Board denied him a timely preliminary
hearing on one of two warrants charging him with a parole
violation; (2) after he was arrested for violating parole, he was
held in custody for more than the forty-five days allowed by
statute; (3) the Parole Board denied him equal protection of the
law by failing to release him when no revocation hearing had been
held within forty-five days, despite the fact that others
8 similarly situated had been released; and (4) at his revocation
hearing, his parole officer failed to present the Parole Board
with a statement Crystal gave to the Concord police that would
have supported his claim that he had been misled into believing
that she was over eighteen years old. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
R.) His petition for habeas relief did not mention the parole
condition requiring him to submit to searches. The Superior
Court denied Anderson’s petition, ruling that none of his
“procedural or substantive rights under the New Hampshire or the
United States Constitution were violated.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J., Ex. S.)
Based upon the foregoing, Anderson filed two suits in this
court that were consolidated. In his consolidated action,
Anderson asserts a § 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive
damages against Peterson, Warhall, and the (unnamed) Concord
police officer, for conducting a search of his home that was
unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, and he seeks a
declaratory judgment that the regulation governing searches of
parolees is facially unconstitutional.4
4 In his complaint in 02-315-M, plaintiff contended that “[t]he parole regulation authorizing the search of Plaintiff’s
9 Discussion
Defendants Peterson, Hammond, Iverson, Hartigan, Eckert,5
Vorenberg, and Winn (hereinafter “defendants”) move for summary
judgment, arguing that: (1) Peterson’s search of Anderson’s home
did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the Parole Board’s
search rule is not unconstitutional as applied; (3) both of
plaintiff’s suits are barred by res judicata; and (4) the
doctrine of qualified immunity bars plaintiff from recovering
money damages.
I. The § 1983 Claim
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is set out in his amended complaint
(document n o . 11) as follows:
residence is unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) In his petition for declaratory judgment in 02-516-M, plaintiff appears only to assert that the regulation is unconstitutionally vague. (Pet. ¶¶ 9, 17-18.) Defendants, on the other hand, have construed Anderson’s facial challenge to the regulation as a claim of overbreadth. In 02-315-M, Anderson also raised a due process challenge to various procedures employed by the Parole Board, but that claim was dismissed by a November 1 5 , 2002, order (document n o . 14) adopting an October 1 5 , 2002, Report and Recommendation (document no. 1 0 ) . 5 Eckert has already been dismissed.
10 The parole regulation authorizing the search of Plaintiff’s residence is unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. That the actions of Parole [o]fficers Peterson and [Warhall] were not reasonable as to the search they conducted. That the actions of defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The actions of defendants Robert Peterson, Lynda [Warhall], and John Doe [the Concord officer] in entering the Plaintiff’s apartment by force, failing to make a valid request to make a warrantless search as required by regulation, conducting the search without Plaintiff present, and conducting said search to aid in a law enforcement investigation, violated the due process rights of the Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution and his rights to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5 2 , 55(A)(3)). In addition, Anderson makes the
suggestion, albeit in the supporting affidavit attached to his
original complaint, that once Peterson had enough information to
arrest him for violating the conditions of his parole, his work
as a parole officer was finished and he became an agent of the
police, and needed a warrant to conduct a search of his
apartment. (Anderson Aff. at 1.) Defendants argue that
Peterson’s search did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the
standards set out in Griffin v . Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987),
11 and United States v . Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The court
agrees.
In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search
of a probationer’s “residence was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a
valid regulation governing probationers.” 483 U.S. at 880. That
regulation, in turn, was constitutionally sufficient because it
allowed a probation officer to search a probationer’s home,
without a warrant, only “as long as his supervisor approves and
as long as there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe the presence
of contraband – including any item that the probationer cannot
possess under the probation conditions.” Id. at 871 (citation
omitted).
More recently, in Knights, the Supreme Court expanded the
authority of probation officers to conduct warrantless searches.
The search in Knights was conducted pursuant to a condition under
which plaintiff, a probationer, agreed to “[s]ubmit his . . .
person, property, place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal
effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant,
12 warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or
law enforcement officer.” 534 U.S. at 114. After conducting an
“ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that consider[ed] all the
circumstances of [the] search,” id. at 1 2 2 , but which did not
mention any probation regulation other than the condition to
which Knights was subject, the Supreme Court held that “the
warrantless search of Knights, supported by reasonable suspicion
and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Here, Anderson was subject to both a general parole
condition and a special condition that allowed for searches as
requested by the parole officer. But, unlike the condition in
Knights, neither of the conditions applicable to Anderson
expressly allowed a search without reasonable cause. Thus, the
probation condition in Knights was measurably less protective of
Fourth Amendment rights than the regulation, or the two parole
conditions, in this case. In addition, the search of Anderson’s
apartment was supported by reasonable suspicion, and likely
probable cause, for Peterson to believe that Anderson had
violated the conditions of his parole. As Anderson himself
13 acknowledges, he admitted to a relevant parole violation in his
cell phone conversation with Peterson. Under those conditions,
Anderson was not allowed to be in the unsupervised company of
minors, and Peterson had information from a reliable source – the
Concord Police Department – that telephone calls had been made
from both Anderson’s home phone and cell phone by a runaway
minor. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for Peterson to search
Anderson’s apartment in order to determine how, and to what
extent, Anderson had violated his parole conditions.
Anderson’s various arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
On the undisputed factual record, Peterson’s search was not an
investigatory search for law enforcement purposes that required a
search warrant. Neither the assistance of a Concord police
officer in the search, nor the fact that it was initiated by
information the police provided, is enough to transform
Peterson’s search from a parole compliance search into an
investigatory search for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g.,
Knights, 534 U.S. at 115 (constitutionally permissible probation
search was conducted by Sheriff’s Department detective, based
14 upon his own investigation); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871
(constitutionally permissible probation search based upon police
tip was conducted by probation officers accompanied by police
officers); see also United States v . Watts, 67 F.3d 7 9 0 , 794 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)
(“collaboration between a probation officer and police does not
in itself render a probation search unlawful”) (citations
omitted). Anderson’s assertion that Peterson was acting as an
agent for the Concord Police is also undermined by the fact that
the search did not result in any new charges being brought
against him, despite the fact that the search did, in fact,
produce clothing belonging to an underage runaway.6
6 The absence of new charges against Anderson accounts for the rather unusual procedural posture of this case. Typically, a Fourth Amendment claim arising from a search of a parolee or probationer is presented in a motion to suppress evidence collected during the search, when the government attempts to use that evidence in a trial of new charges arising from the search. See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 116; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872; United States v . Newton, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1 5 7 , 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v . Baker, 221 F.3d 4 3 8 , 440 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v . Payne, 181 F.3d 7 8 1 , 785 (6th Cir. 1999); but see Patterson v . Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. P a . 1994) (granting summary judgment, on qualified immunity grounds, to parole officer sued under § 1983 for conducting search of parolee that allegedly violated the Fourth Amendment); Diaz v . Ward, 437 F. Supp. 6 7 8 , 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“although no prior case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights has been found, I conclude that the civil rights statutes afford an entirely appropriate vehicle for asserting
15 Moreover, the fact that Peterson had sufficient evidence to
arrest Anderson before the search (based upon Anderson’s
admission that he had violated the conditions of his parole by
allowing Crystal to use his cell phone) did not change the status
of Peterson’s search from a parole compliance search to an
investigatory search for law enforcement purposes. See United
States v . Hill, 967 F.2d 9 0 2 , 911 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
when parolee was arrested for parole violation, “the parole
agents’ interest in inspecting [the parolee’s] place of residence
did not terminate upon his arrest; if anything, it intensified”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); c f . United
States v . Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting parolee’s argument that parole officer’s search of his
residence became unreasonable once the parole officer determined
that the parolee was not at home and, therefore, did not pose an
immediate threat at that time and place).
Finally, Peterson’s search is not rendered unlawful by his
failure to ask Anderson for permission to conduct i t . In Newton,
a parolee “signed a standard certificate of release in which he
their claims that those rights have been infringed”). 16 agreed that during his period of supervision, he ‘ . . . will
permit the search and inspection of his person, residence and
property.’” 181 F. Supp. 2d at 159. In that case, three parole
officers and three police officers handcuffed the parolee and
then conducted a search of his mother’s apartment, where he was
an overnight guest. Id. at 159-69. Because the officers did not
ask him for permission to conduct the search when they arrived at
his mother’s apartment, the parolee argued that the search
violated a state parole regulation providing that “a releasee’s
residence may be searched only . . . with the consent of the
releasee . . .” Id. at 162. The district court disagreed,
finding that “New York courts have strongly implied that the
standard certificate of release means that the parole officers do
not need further consent to conduct searches that are reasonably
and rationally related to their duty.” Id. at 165 (citations
omitted). The court went on to note that most courts that have
considered the issue “have held that the consent to search signed
by a parolee upon his release allows parole officers to perform
searches based on reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 166 (citing
Cherry v . State, 791 S.W.2d 3 5 4 , 356-57 (Ark. 1990); Commonwealth
v . Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Pa. 1997); Pena v . State,
17 792 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 1990); People v . Reyes, 968 P.2d 445,
455-56 (Cal. 1998)). While the precise wording of the New York
parole regulation is somewhat different from that of the New
Hampshire regulation, the same reasoning applies. By agreeing to
both the general and specific conditions of his parole, Anderson
effectively gave the consent required by N . H . CODE ADMIN. R . Par.
401.02(b)(9).
Because the warrantless search of Anderson’s apartment was
supported by reasonable suspicion, and was authorized by his
parole conditions, it was reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. See Knights, 534 U . S . at 1 2 2 .
II. The Facial Challenge to the Parole Regulation
Anderson has also mounted a facial challenge to N . H . CODE
ADMIN. R . Par. 401.02(b)(9) in both his amended complaint in 02-
316-M, as quoted in the previous section, and in his petition for
declaratory judgment. In his petition, he argues that the
probation regulation is void for vagueness because it “lacks
sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” (Pet. ¶ 17.) While variously stated in terms of
18 overbreadth and vagueness, Anderson’s principal argument seems to
be that the Parole Board’s regulation is overbroad, because it
authorizes searches even when a parole officer lacks reasonable
suspicion to believe that a parole violation has occurred (or is
void for vagueness, because it does not instruct parole officers
that searches of parolees must be supported by reasonable
suspicion). Defendants do not directly address plaintiff’s
facial challenge, but instead, argue that “the parole board’s
administrative rule regarding search[es] is not unconstitutional
as applied.” (Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 17.)
Plaintiff’s argument is not without merit. N . H . CODE ADMIN.
R . 401.02(b)(9) broadly requires a parolee to “submit to searches
of his person, property, and possessions as requested by the
parole officer.” The Department of Corrections’ policy and
procedure directives do describe a reasonableness requirement,
but the regulation itself does not. In United States v .
Giannetta, the court of appeals for this circuit observed that
the lack of a reasonableness limitation in a probation search
condition “theoretically render[ed] the probation search
19 condition overbroad.” 909 F.2d 5 7 1 , 576 (1st Cir. 1990). 7 In
United States v . Jeffers, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held a probation condition unconstitutionally overbroad
because it required probationers to “submit person and property
to search and seizure at any time of the day or night when so
requested by a probation officer with or without a warrant and
with or without probable cause.” 573 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir.
1978). 8 Finally, in State v . Moses, in a direct appeal of a
sentence to probation, the Vermont Supreme Court sustained a
facial challenge to a probation condition requiring a probationer
to “consent in writing to all inspections and enforcement of
these conditions, including search and investigation without
7 The special probation condition in Giannetta required the probationer “at all times during his period of probation, [to] readily submit to a search of his residence and of any other premises under his dominion and control, by his supervising probation officer, upon the officer’s request.” Id. at 573. However, because “the decision to search was in fact narrowly and properly made on the basis of reasonable suspicion,” id. at 576, the court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment and “expressed no opinion as to whether the type of broad search condition [in that case] could routinely be imposed on all probationers,” id. at 576 n.2. 8 Like the court in Giannetta, the Jeffers court upheld the challenged search, in the context of a motion to suppress, because the overbroad search authority was “narrowly and properly exercised.” Id. (citing United States v . Gordon, 540 F.2d 4 5 2 , 454 (9th Cir. 1976)).
20 warrant when necessary.” 618 A.2d 4 7 8 , 480 (Vt. 1992). 9 Thus,
persuasive authority supports the conclusion that N . H . CODE ADMIN.
R . Par. 401(b)(9), as written, is unconstitutionally overbroad on
its face.10
Defendants have not briefed, or even addressed, plaintiff’s
facial challenge to N . H . CODE ADMIN. R . Par. 401.02(b)(9), perhaps
recognizing its merit. In any event, resolution of that issue is
purely a question of law. Defendants shall either show cause,
within thirty days of the date of this order, why Par.
401.02(b)(9) should not be declared unconstitutional, o r , amend
9 Moses is the only facial challenge to a probation or parole search condition the court has been able to locate. Facial challenges are rare, it seems, because searches of probationers and parolees are litigated, for the most part, in motions to suppress evidence filed in criminal cases arising from the discovery of contraband or other evidence during such searches. 10 As plaintiff points out in his petition, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has not had occasion to construe N . H . CODE ADMIN. R . Par. 401(b)(9). However, it is worth noting that the court’s decision in State v . Zeta Chi Fraternity, 142 N . H . 16 (1997), should not be read as suggesting that the Supreme Court would construe Par. 401(b)(9) not to include a reasonable suspicion requirement. Zeta Chi involved a specific condition of probation, imposed by a sentencing court, rather than an agency regulation of general applicability. Thus, the holding in Zeta Chi has little bearing on the construction the New Hampshire Supreme Court might give N . H . CODE ADMIN. R . Par. 401.02(b)(9).
21 the rule to include the reasonable suspicion requirement
described in Griffin and Knights.
Conclusion
For the reasons given, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (document n o . 27) is granted in part and denied in part.
The motion is granted with respect to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim,
and judgment shall enter in favor of defendants. The motion is
denied with respect to plaintiff’s petition for declaratory
judgment. The case will proceed on that theory alone, as
outlined above. Trial, previously scheduled for February 2004,
is no longer required.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
December 3 1 , 2003
cc: Clint Anderson Michael K. Brown, Esq. Lynda Warhall