Anderson v. Nystrand Lloyd Corp.

11 Fla. Supp. 171
CourtFlorida Industrial Commission
DecidedSeptember 27, 1957
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Fla. Supp. 171 (Anderson v. Nystrand Lloyd Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Florida Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Nystrand Lloyd Corp., 11 Fla. Supp. 171 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1957).

Opinion

JOHN V. CHRISTIE, Deputy Commissioner.

Hearings were held before the undersigned at Miami on March 11, April 26 and June 14, 1957. Upon consideration of all the evidence and testimony submitted and the stipulations of the parties, the undersigned deputy commissioner finds—

That on August 30, 1955 Harley Anderson, claimant, while engaged in the perf ormance of his duties as an employee of Nystrand Lloyd Corporation fell off a truck seriously and permanently injuring his back.

That at the time he was so injured, he was an efficient and experienced roofer with an average weekly wage of $88, making his rate of compensation $35 per week.

That he was immediately hospitalized and placed under the care and treatment of Dr. Robert P. Keiser by the employer; that Dr. Keiser discharged him on October 28,1955 with a permanent partial disability rating of 20% of the body as a whole attributable to the back injury.

That on December 2, 1955, Harley Anderson, by his attorney, filed a claim for further benefits stating in said claim — “The carrier’s physician has dismissed Anderson with a rating of 20% permanent partial disability. It is claimant’s contention that he has not reached maximum degree of recovery, that he is in need of further medical attention and that he will probably have permanent partial disability greater than 20%. An early hearing is requested.” That a hearing was set by the undersigned on said claim for February 17, 1956; that two days before the hearing scheduled for February 17, 1956 the parties agreed to an indefinite postponement by reason of the fact that claimant was in the hospital undergoing a back operation — the carrier having agreed at the time that he was temporarily and totally disabled.

That on January 22, 1957, Harley Anderson, by his attorney, filed further claim for permanent total disability and requested a hearing.

That on March 14, 1957, the carrier, Bituminous Casualty Corp., filed written Notice to Controvert on the grounds — “That the claimant has sustained only a 50% permanent partial disability as a result of his accident of August 30, 1955. It is affirmatively stated that the employee has continued to be paid compensation since the date of the accident and is presently being paid based on Dr. Christian Keedy’s evaluation of 50% permanent partial disability of the body.” That on March 18, 1957 the employer filed [173]*173Notice of Request for Reimbursement from Second Disability Fund, alleging—

1. The employee was under a permanent physical impairment as a result of a congenital condition prior to August 30, 1955.
2. The prior “permanent physical impairment” consists of a “progressive neurological disorder which is due to cord compression as a result of kyphosis of the spine.”
3. The prior physical impairment has combined with the injuries sustained in the accident of August 30,1955, resulting in a permanent disability that is materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the accident alone.
4. The employer had knowledge of the existence of said “permanent physical impairment” at the time the employee was hired and prior to the accident.

That on April 5,1957 the Florida Industrial Commission Special Disability Fund Conservation Committee filed Notice to Controvert Employer’s Claim of Right to Reimbursement from Special Disability Fund on the grounds—

1. That prior to the alleged injury the claimant did not have a “permanent physical impairment” within the meaning of section 440.15(5) (d)5, F. S., which defines same as “any permanent condition due to previous accident or disease or any congenital condition which is or is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to employment.”
2. That the alleged pre-existing condition did not have any limiting effect upon the employee’s ability to work which was known to the employer.
3. That the burden of proving that such alleged pre-existing condition was or was likely to be an obstacle to employment and that the employer had knowledge thereof prior to the alleged injury in his employ, is on the employer.
4. That the employer did not either hire the employee or continue the employment of the employee with knowledge of the alleged pre-existing condition, nor with knowledge that same was a permanent condition which was or was likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to employment.
5. That any permanent disability which may be suffered by claimant as a result of the alleged injury in the employment of [174]*174the employer will not be “a permanent disability caused by both conditions” within the meaning of section 440.15 (5) (d) 8, F. S.
6. That as a result of the alleged pre-existing condition and the alleged injury claimant does not have a permanent disability caused by both conditions that is materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the alleged injury alone, within the meaning of the statute.
7. That under the statute the employer and carrier are liable for all benefits provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Law for such alleged injury when considered by itself, and said section 440.15(5) (d) does not contemplate nor provide for aggregating a pre-existing condition and a disability from injury which are totally unrelated for the purpose of determining an aggregate permanent disability as a basis for awarding compensation in excess of that allowed for such injury when considered by itself, unless such injury aggravates the pre-existing permanent physical impairment or both together cause permanent total disability.
8. That claimant’s permanent loss of earning capacity, if any, as a result of the alleged injury will not be substantially and materially greater by reason of the alleged pre-existing condition.

That as a result of said accidental fall from the truck on August 30, 1955, Harley Anderson was temporarily totally disabled until March 27, 1956 at which time he returned to work driving a taxicab. That the claimant is entitled to temporary partial disability compensation for the weeks he was able to work from March 27, 1956 until August 21, 1956, and for temporary total disability for the weeks during said period in which he was unable to work. That until the claimant’s condition began deteriorating after his returning to work as a cab-driver, there was considerable hope that he would not be permanently and totally disabled, and it is the finding of the undersigned that this optimism was justified and that the permanent total disability rating should not begin until August 22, 1956; in fact, the carrier argued at the time of the final hearings held herein, that the claimant was not totally disabled; that claimant is suffering from an involvement of the spinal cord and of the peripheral nerves, a condition which cannot be cured; that since said accidental back injury, claimant earned some small amounts in trying to work as a taxicab driver; that claimant’s physical condition is such that he can do no work and he will need further medical treatment for relief of pain.

[175]*175That claimant’s average weekly wage at the time of the accident was $88 as stipulated to by the parties.

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Bluebook (online)
11 Fla. Supp. 171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-nystrand-lloyd-corp-flaindcommn-1957.