Anderson v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Anderson v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia

67 S.E. 53, 152 N.C. 1, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 190

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedFebruary 25, 1910

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 67 S.E. 53 (Anderson v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Anderson v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 67 S.E. 53, 152 N.C. 1, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 190 (N.C. 1910).

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Opinion

Hoke, J.,

after stating the case: It is a principle very generally accepted that a beneficiary who has caused or procured the death of the insured under circumstances amounting to a felony will be allowed no recovery on the policy. Vance on Insurance, 392-393; Cooley’s Insurance Briefs, 3153; 25 Oyc., 153; 3 A. and E. (2 Ed.), 1021.

This wholesome doctrine, referred by most of the cases to the maxim, Nullios commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, has been uniformly upheld, so far as we are aware, except in certain cases where the interest involved was conferred by statute, and the statute itself does not recognize any exception. Such an instance has occurred in our own Court, in Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C., 240, where a widow convicted as accessory before the fact to her husband’s murder was awarded dower under the statute — a decision which caused an immediate amendment of the statute, Laws 1889, ch. 499; and this amendment has since prevailed as the law of the State on-that subject.

The authorities are also to the effect that in cases like the present, where the contract is made between the insured and the company for another’s benefit, that is, a valid contract of that character, a felony of the kind indicated on the part of the beneficiary will not relieve the company of all liability on the policy, but recovery can be had usually by the representative of the insured and for the benefit of the latter’s estate. Vance and Cooley, supra; Schmidt, admr., v. Ins. Co., 112 Iowa, 41; Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill., 277; Ins. Co. v. Davis, admr., 96 Va., 737; Shea v. Mass. Benefit Assn., 160 Mass., 289; Tyler v. Odd Fellows Relief, etc., 145 Mass., 134; Cleaver et al. v. Mutual Res. Fund, L. R. Q. B., 1892, p. 147.

This latter ruling would very likely not obtain in an ordinary life policy, where a valid contract of insurance had been made and purported to be between the company and the beneficiary, and such, beneficiary was and continued to be throughout the owner of the policy and of all interest in it. Such a position, however, is not presented here in any aspect of it, as the company recognizes its liability on the policy, and the question is on the right to the fund as between the representative of the insured and of the beneficiary. On that question, and under *3 tbe authorities cited, there is no error in the ruling of the court below, awarding the fund to the representative of the insured, and the judgment to that effect is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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Hoke, J.,

after stating the case: It is a principle very generally accepted that a beneficiary who has caused or procured the death of the insured under circumstances amounting to a felony will be allowed no recovery on the policy. Vance on Insurance, 392-393; Cooley’s Insurance Briefs, 3153; 25 Oyc., 153; 3 A. and E. (2 Ed.), 1021.

This wholesome doctrine, referred by most of the cases to the maxim, Nullios commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, has been uniformly upheld, so far as we are aware, except in certain cases where the interest involved was conferred by statute, and the statute itself does not recognize any exception. Such an instance has occurred in our own Court, in Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C., 240, where a widow convicted as accessory before the fact to her husband’s murder was awarded dower under the statute — a decision which caused an immediate amendment of the statute, Laws 1889, ch. 499; and this amendment has since prevailed as the law of the State on-that subject.

The authorities are also to the effect that in cases like the present, where the contract is made between the insured and the company for another’s benefit, that is, a valid contract of that character, a felony of the kind indicated on the part of the beneficiary will not relieve the company of all liability on the policy, but recovery can be had usually by the representative of the insured and for the benefit of the latter’s estate. Vance and Cooley, supra; Schmidt, admr., v. Ins. Co., 112 Iowa, 41; Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill., 277; Ins. Co. v. Davis, admr., 96 Va., 737; Shea v. Mass. Benefit Assn., 160 Mass., 289; Tyler v. Odd Fellows Relief, etc., 145 Mass., 134; Cleaver et al. v. Mutual Res. Fund, L. R. Q. B., 1892, p. 147.

This latter ruling would very likely not obtain in an ordinary life policy, where a valid contract of insurance had been made and purported to be between the company and the beneficiary, and such, beneficiary was and continued to be throughout the owner of the policy and of all interest in it. Such a position, however, is not presented here in any aspect of it, as the company recognizes its liability on the policy, and the question is on the right to the fund as between the representative of the insured and of the beneficiary. On that question, and under *3 tbe authorities cited, there is no error in the ruling of the court below, awarding the fund to the representative of the insured, and the judgment to that effect is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

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67 S.E. 53, 152 N.C. 1, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-life-insurance-co-of-virginia-nc-1910.

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