Anderson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp.

694 F. Supp. 1294, 1988 WL 88016
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 2, 1988
DocketCiv. A. C86-3955
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 694 F. Supp. 1294 (Anderson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 694 F. Supp. 1294, 1988 WL 88016 (N.D. Ohio 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANN ALDRICH, District Judge.

On April 11, 1985, the plaintiff, Edgar Anderson, was fired by his employer, the Hewlett-Packard Corporation (“H-P”). He brings suit for breach of contract or, in the alternative, under a theory of promissory estoppel. Anderson previously voluntarily dismissed his claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for discrimination on account of race.

On July 25 and 26, the Court heard this case without a jury. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, it now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and finds for defendant Hewlett-Packard.

I

Anderson worked for H-P as a personnel supervisor in its Cleveland office. H-P fired Anderson on April 11, 1985. Anderson alleges that this firing violated his employment contract. He alleges that the H-P personnel and policy manual constituted an employee handbook and an employment contract. He also alleges that before he accepted employment at H-P, he was given oral assurances as to the reasons for which he could be fired, and the procedures that would be followed in the event that he was fired. Anderson argues, alternatively, that H-P is bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

It is undisputed that, prior to his employment, Anderson was interviewed in H-P’s office in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, near Chicago. Any promises which were made to him were made there. When he was hired, Anderson was told that he would eventually be transferred to either St. Louis or Cleveland. After he was hired, Anderson spent almost a full year at the Rolling Meadows office, being trained *1296 for a position elsewhere. The Court determines that Illinois law is applicable.

The H-P guidelines on which Anderson relies were given to him in his capacity as a personnel supervisor. These guidelines are not distributed to employees, nor are they distributed to all managers. The testimony at trial was undisputed that only one copy existed in the Cleveland personnel office. The Court thus concludes that the H-P personnel and policy guidelines are not an employee handbook, and thus do not constitute an employment contract under Illinois law.

Anderson might, however, reasonably have relied on the guidelines. The guidelines, along with statements made to him by H-P employees, might form a basis for promissory estoppel. The Court does not reach this question, however, because it finds that under any set of promises that might have been made to Anderson, H-P was fully entitled to fire him in the manner in which it did.

II

Findings of Fact .

A. Anderson was graduated from West Point Academy in 1972, with a major in engineering. He then entered the Army, where he trained drill sergeants who, in turn, trained civilians to become soldiers. He left the Army in 1975, and was employed -briefly by two engineering firms until 1979, when- he went to graduate school at Yale. In 1981, he received a masters degree in public and private management from the Yale School of Management. In August 1981, H-P contacted Anderson to interview for a position as a personnel representative. He was flown to Rolling Meadows, where he met with Gloria Leffridge, an H-P personnel representative; Willard Harlow, the H-P personnel supervisor for the mid-west region; and three other H-P managers.

Leffridge spoke to Anderson about the “H-P way”, a corporate philosophy which pervades H-P. The “H-P way” includes, for example, an undertaking by H-P to not lay-off any of its employees because of economic downturns, but rather to retrain them for employment elsewhere in the “H-P family”. The philosophy also emphasizes that failures on the part of employees are viewed as management failures, and that a strenuous effort will be made to assist failing employees to become productive and to remain with H-P. Practices such as providing fruit, doughnuts, and coffee every morning at company expense, and putting all personnel on a “first-name” basis, are also part of the “H-P way.”

Leffridge also spoke to Anderson about the procedures to be followed when employees were fired, and the reasons for which they could be terminated. Anderson was most interested in this, because he did not want to work in the personnel department of a company where he would be required to fire workers at the whim of their supervisors. Leffridge also told Anderson about the “deadly sins”, set forth in Section 2 of H-P’s personnel guidelines, see infra pp. 1296-97, and advised him that committing a deadly sin could result in a person being fired without any written or oral warning. The Court notes that one of the deadly sins is employee harassment.

After this set of interviews, Anderson was asked back for a second set. Eventually he was hired as a personnel representative. Harlow and Anderson had discussed salary and had agreed upon $30,000 per year. Although this was less than Anderson might have made in a large Wall Street firm in New York, it was more than any other H-P personnel representative was receiving at the time. Harlow testified that H-P saw Anderson as a promising manager.

Anderson moved to Rolling Meadows in October 1981, and began his training. It first consisted of a formal course, at which he was given, and studied, the personnel guidelines. Section 2 of the guidelines is entitled “Involuntary Termination” and states in relevant part:

2. INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
With the amount of discretion HP gives supervisors, no set of policies or guidelines will ever replace good judgment in making decisions. This is espe *1297 dally true in making dedsions about involuntary termination, where there are many variables. With HP’s basic belief in people, supervisors must strive to ensure that consistency and fairness are part of the decision-making process.
******
Termination because of gross misconduct represents a difficult situation for both the supervisor and the employee. It is possible that the supervisor will have little warning or foreknowledge of the situation, and action may have to be taken quickly. The information in this section is also provided, therefore, to assist the supervisor who may be faced with the unpleasant duty of terminating an employee because of gross misconduct.
2.2 GROSS MISCONDUCT
An employee engaged in willful, harmful acts involving the company may be required by the supervisor to leave the premises. The functional, personnel, and entity managers will review the circumstance^) and determine whether termination is appropriate. Willful, harmful acts which may be the basis for termination include, but are not limited to, the following: theft or damage of HP property; unauthorized access of computer files; use, possession, sale, or dissemination of illegal drugs; being under the influence of alcohol or drugs; fighting; intimidation; insubordination; and harassment. Written or verbal warnings are not required.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
694 F. Supp. 1294, 1988 WL 88016, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-hewlett-packard-corp-ohnd-1988.