Anderson v. Foshee

Supreme Court of Alabama

Anderson v. Foshee

112 So. 356, 216 Ala. 78, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 33

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

DecidedApril 14, 1927

Docket3 Div. 766.

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 112 So. 356 (Anderson v. Foshee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Anderson v. Foshee, 112 So. 356, 216 Ala. 78, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 33 (Ala. 1927).

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Opinion

SOMERVILLE, J.

Count 3 of the complaint fails to show that these defendants, are liable to plaintiff under their indemnity contract, as shown by Exhibit C. Defendants’ undertaking was not to pay all debts and obligations of the Foshee Lumber Company, but only to see that none of them became a lien or charge on the property pur *79 chased by plaintiff from the lumber company, and to hold plaintiff harmless against such of those debts as were or became liens, incumbrances, or charges upon it. The count alleges tbe existence of a debt due from the lumber company to the Western Railway of Alabama, and that plaintiff was compelled to pay it; but it does not show that the debt had become, or would or could become a lien on any of the property intended to he protected. Several grounds of the demurrer aptly point out this defect, and the demurrer was therefore properly sustained.

We deduce from the pleadings and exhibits that the vital point of controversy between plaintiff and defendants is upon the status of the obligation of the lumber company to pay to’ the lessor railway company the cost of constructing a certain spur track on the lumber company’s leased premises under penalty •of cancellation of the lease contract in case nf default therein; that is, whether, under the sale and transfer of that lease by the lumber company to plaintiff, that obligation was assumed by plaintiff, or remained the obligation of the lumber company, in view of a stipulation therein that plaintiff—

“assumes and agrees to perform the obligations therein [in the railroad lease contract with the lumber company] set forth.”

Under count 6 of the complaint, plaintiff could make proof of his entire ease as fully and completely as he could have done under counts 4 and 5, and hence the elimination of the latter counts on demurrer was not prejudicial to plaintiff and cannot work a reversal of the judgment. Bice v. Steverson, 205 Ala. 576, 88 So. 753.

We find no prejudicial error, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, O. J„ and THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., concur.

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SOMERVILLE, J.

Count 3 of the complaint fails to show that these defendants, are liable to plaintiff under their indemnity contract, as shown by Exhibit C. Defendants’ undertaking was not to pay all debts and obligations of the Foshee Lumber Company, but only to see that none of them became a lien or charge on the property pur *79 chased by plaintiff from the lumber company, and to hold plaintiff harmless against such of those debts as were or became liens, incumbrances, or charges upon it. The count alleges tbe existence of a debt due from the lumber company to the Western Railway of Alabama, and that plaintiff was compelled to pay it; but it does not show that the debt had become, or would or could become a lien on any of the property intended to he protected. Several grounds of the demurrer aptly point out this defect, and the demurrer was therefore properly sustained.

We deduce from the pleadings and exhibits that the vital point of controversy between plaintiff and defendants is upon the status of the obligation of the lumber company to pay to’ the lessor railway company the cost of constructing a certain spur track on the lumber company’s leased premises under penalty •of cancellation of the lease contract in case nf default therein; that is, whether, under the sale and transfer of that lease by the lumber company to plaintiff, that obligation was assumed by plaintiff, or remained the obligation of the lumber company, in view of a stipulation therein that plaintiff—

“assumes and agrees to perform the obligations therein [in the railroad lease contract with the lumber company] set forth.”

Under count 6 of the complaint, plaintiff could make proof of his entire ease as fully and completely as he could have done under counts 4 and 5, and hence the elimination of the latter counts on demurrer was not prejudicial to plaintiff and cannot work a reversal of the judgment. Bice v. Steverson, 205 Ala. 576, 88 So. 753.

We find no prejudicial error, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, O. J„ and THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

112 So. 356, 216 Ala. 78, 1927 Ala. LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-foshee-ala-1927.

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