Anderson v. Edmiston & Co., Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Anderson v. Edmiston & Co., Inc.

131 A.D.3d 416, 14 N.Y.S.3d 376

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 4, 2015

Docket14724 150407/13

StatusPublished

Cited by14 cases

This text of 131 A.D.3d 416 (Anderson v. Edmiston & Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Anderson v. Edmiston & Co., Inc., 131 A.D.3d 416, 14 N.Y.S.3d 376 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

*417 Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered December 20, 2013, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant is a New York corporation specializing in the sale, charter, management, and new construction of yachts around the world. Defendant employed plaintiff as a Charter Assistant from July 2008 until November 8, 2012, when allegedly she “was effectively terminated . . . as a result of her complaint of gender discrimination.” According to the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff’s supervisor harbored a discriminatory animus against women and made numerous sexist and misogynist remarks, both directed at her and in her presence.

Plaintiffs allegations suffice to state claims of gender-based employment discrimination (see Serdans v New York & Presbyt. Hosp., 112 AD3d 449, 450 [1st Dept 2013]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]) and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law (see Fletcher v Dakota, Inc., 99 AD3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]; Albunio v City of New York, 67 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 472 [2011]). In particular, according her the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Askin, 110 AD3d at 622), plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was terminated, for purposes of stating the foregoing claims.

Plaintiff has also adequately alleged a claim for hostile work environment by alleging that her supervisor routinely made deprecatory, vulgar, and offensive remarks about women, including that they were useful only for administrative services and sex (see Salemi v Gloria’s Tribeca Inc., 115 AD3d 569, 569-570 [1st Dept 2014]; Gaffney v City of New York, 101 AD3d 410, 410 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]).

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Acosta, Moskowitz, Richter and Kapnick, JJ.

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*417 Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered December 20, 2013, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant is a New York corporation specializing in the sale, charter, management, and new construction of yachts around the world. Defendant employed plaintiff as a Charter Assistant from July 2008 until November 8, 2012, when allegedly she “was effectively terminated . . . as a result of her complaint of gender discrimination.” According to the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff’s supervisor harbored a discriminatory animus against women and made numerous sexist and misogynist remarks, both directed at her and in her presence.

Plaintiffs allegations suffice to state claims of gender-based employment discrimination (see Serdans v New York & Presbyt. Hosp., 112 AD3d 449, 450 [1st Dept 2013]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]) and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law (see Fletcher v Dakota, Inc., 99 AD3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]; Albunio v City of New York, 67 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 2009], affd 16 NY3d 472 [2011]). In particular, according her the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Askin, 110 AD3d at 622), plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was terminated, for purposes of stating the foregoing claims.

Plaintiff has also adequately alleged a claim for hostile work environment by alleging that her supervisor routinely made deprecatory, vulgar, and offensive remarks about women, including that they were useful only for administrative services and sex (see Salemi v Gloria’s Tribeca Inc., 115 AD3d 569, 569-570 [1st Dept 2014]; Gaffney v City of New York, 101 AD3d 410, 410 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 858 [2013]).

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Acosta, Moskowitz, Richter and Kapnick, JJ.

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131 A.D.3d 416, 14 N.Y.S.3d 376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-edmiston-co-inc-nyappdiv-2015.

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