1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAULA A. ANDERSON, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01615-JES-KSC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 JOHN PHELAN, Secretary of the Navy, 15 Defendant. [ECF No. 65] 16 17 18 19
20 Plaintiff Paula A. Anderson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action 21 against Defendant John Phelan (“Defendant”), Secretary of the Navy, alleging disability 22 discrimination in her prior employment. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth 23 amended complaint (“4AC”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 8 and 24 12(b)(6). ECF No. 65. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 The Court has outlined the procedural posture of this case in its prior Orders. See 27 ECF Nos. 41, 60. On June 26, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part 28 1 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, finding, inter alia, that 2 Plaintiff failed to set forth plausible factual allegations to support her Rehabilitation Act 3 (“Rehab Act”) claims. ECF No. 60 at 8-9. Plaintiff was provided one final opportunity to 4 amend her complaint in accordance with the Court’s Order. Id. at 11. Subsequently, 5 Plaintiff filed her 4AC on July 10, 2025. ECF No. 61 (“4AC”). On July 24, 2025, Defendant 6 filed the present motion to dismiss the 4AC. ECF No. 65. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD1 8 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted when the 9 allegations do not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Aschroft v. Iqbal, 10 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 11 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 12 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 13 alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard ... asks 14 for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten 15 Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must 17 accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in 18 the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 19 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); see Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th 20 Cir. 2010). Allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 21 action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to 22 enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 23 (9th Cir. 2011). While the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual 24 allegations in favor of the plaintiff, Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 25 26
27 1 Because the Court finds that the 4AC fails under FRCP 12(b)(6), it will not address Defendant’s motion 28 1 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), the court need not credit legal conclusions that are 2 couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 3 When a court dismisses a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6), it must then decide 4 whether to grant leave to amend. FRCP 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely 5 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has 6 discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel 7 v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal without leave 8 to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the 9 complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 10 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, if allowing a party to amend its pleading would be futile, 11 district courts properly decline to grant leave to amend. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun 12 Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 13 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiff asserts two causes of action under the Rehab Act: failure to accommodate 16 and retaliation. See 4AC ¶¶ 18-24. Defendant argues that Plaintiff “fails to plead the general 17 elements of a failure to accommodate claim or retaliation claim, fails to allege factual 18 allegations in support of such claims, and fails to connect factual allegations with the 19 elements required to make such claims facially plausible.” ECF No. 65 at 6. 20 The Court agrees. Plaintiff once again fails to allege exactly what disability she 21 suffers from, whether Defendant knew of her disability, or any plausible allegations that 22 she suffered discrimination because of her disability. Plaintiff, moreover, fails to allege 23 exactly what kind of accommodation she requested. Instead, Plaintiff makes conclusory 24 allegations that she “has a documented disability,” that she submitted a “modest and 25 reasonable” accommodation, and within thirty (30) minutes of submitting her request, she 26 was terminated without explanation or engagement in the interactive process. 4AC ¶¶ 10- 27 14. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim under the Rehab 28 Act. See Jones v. Del Toro, No. 3:24-cv-00989-L-SBC, 2025 WL 509302, at * 2-3 (S. D. 1 || Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) (dismissing Rehab Act claims where plaintiff alleges to be “a disabled 2 || veteran” and “is known to have anxiety symptoms”). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 3 || Plaintiff's claims brought under the Rehab Act. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 6 65. In the Court’s prior Order, it cautioned Plaintiff that failure to cure deficiencies 7 || present in her previous complaints would bar her opportunity for future leave to amend. 8 || See ECF No. 60 at 10-11. Because Plaintiff has failed to do so, and amendment would be 9 || futile, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint without leave to 10 |}amend. See Zucco Partners, LLC vy. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAULA A. ANDERSON, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01615-JES-KSC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 JOHN PHELAN, Secretary of the Navy, 15 Defendant. [ECF No. 65] 16 17 18 19
20 Plaintiff Paula A. Anderson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action 21 against Defendant John Phelan (“Defendant”), Secretary of the Navy, alleging disability 22 discrimination in her prior employment. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth 23 amended complaint (“4AC”) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 8 and 24 12(b)(6). ECF No. 65. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 The Court has outlined the procedural posture of this case in its prior Orders. See 27 ECF Nos. 41, 60. On June 26, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part 28 1 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, finding, inter alia, that 2 Plaintiff failed to set forth plausible factual allegations to support her Rehabilitation Act 3 (“Rehab Act”) claims. ECF No. 60 at 8-9. Plaintiff was provided one final opportunity to 4 amend her complaint in accordance with the Court’s Order. Id. at 11. Subsequently, 5 Plaintiff filed her 4AC on July 10, 2025. ECF No. 61 (“4AC”). On July 24, 2025, Defendant 6 filed the present motion to dismiss the 4AC. ECF No. 65. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD1 8 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted when the 9 allegations do not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Aschroft v. Iqbal, 10 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 11 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 12 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 13 alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard ... asks 14 for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten 15 Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must 17 accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in 18 the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 19 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); see Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th 20 Cir. 2010). Allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 21 action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to 22 enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 23 (9th Cir. 2011). While the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual 24 allegations in favor of the plaintiff, Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 25 26
27 1 Because the Court finds that the 4AC fails under FRCP 12(b)(6), it will not address Defendant’s motion 28 1 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), the court need not credit legal conclusions that are 2 couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. 3 When a court dismisses a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6), it must then decide 4 whether to grant leave to amend. FRCP 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely 5 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has 6 discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel 7 v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal without leave 8 to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the 9 complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 10 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, if allowing a party to amend its pleading would be futile, 11 district courts properly decline to grant leave to amend. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun 12 Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 13 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiff asserts two causes of action under the Rehab Act: failure to accommodate 16 and retaliation. See 4AC ¶¶ 18-24. Defendant argues that Plaintiff “fails to plead the general 17 elements of a failure to accommodate claim or retaliation claim, fails to allege factual 18 allegations in support of such claims, and fails to connect factual allegations with the 19 elements required to make such claims facially plausible.” ECF No. 65 at 6. 20 The Court agrees. Plaintiff once again fails to allege exactly what disability she 21 suffers from, whether Defendant knew of her disability, or any plausible allegations that 22 she suffered discrimination because of her disability. Plaintiff, moreover, fails to allege 23 exactly what kind of accommodation she requested. Instead, Plaintiff makes conclusory 24 allegations that she “has a documented disability,” that she submitted a “modest and 25 reasonable” accommodation, and within thirty (30) minutes of submitting her request, she 26 was terminated without explanation or engagement in the interactive process. 4AC ¶¶ 10- 27 14. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim under the Rehab 28 Act. See Jones v. Del Toro, No. 3:24-cv-00989-L-SBC, 2025 WL 509302, at * 2-3 (S. D. 1 || Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) (dismissing Rehab Act claims where plaintiff alleges to be “a disabled 2 || veteran” and “is known to have anxiety symptoms”). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 3 || Plaintiff's claims brought under the Rehab Act. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 6 65. In the Court’s prior Order, it cautioned Plaintiff that failure to cure deficiencies 7 || present in her previous complaints would bar her opportunity for future leave to amend. 8 || See ECF No. 60 at 10-11. Because Plaintiff has failed to do so, and amendment would be 9 || futile, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint without leave to 10 |}amend. See Zucco Partners, LLC vy. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) 11 district court...may in its discretion deny leave to amend...due to repeated failure to 12 || cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.”’) (internal quotations and citations 13 |} omitted). The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 6 Dated: September 4, 2025 “4 we Se 4, 17 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28