Anderson v. Comm'r

2014 T.C. Memo. 77, 107 T.C.M. 1403, 2014 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 77
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 5, 2014
DocketDocket Nos. 16009-10, 4365-11
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2014 T.C. Memo. 77 (Anderson v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Comm'r, 2014 T.C. Memo. 77, 107 T.C.M. 1403, 2014 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 77 (tax 2014).

Opinion

WENDY K. ANDERSON, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Anderson v. Comm'r
Docket Nos. 16009-10, 4365-11
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2014-77; 2014 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 77; 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1403;
May 5, 2014, Filed

Appropriate orders and decisions will be entered.

*77 Wendy K. Anderson, Pro se.
Alicia H. Eyler, for respondent.
KROUPA, Judge.

KROUPA
MEMORANDUM OPINION

KROUPA, Judge: These consolidated cases are before the Court on respondent's motions for default judgment under Rule 123.1 We must decide *78 whether we should hold petitioner in default where she has universally ignored the Court's orders and Rules. We hold petitioner in default. We also must decide whether respondent correctly determined deficiencies and additions to tax for purposes of the decisions to be entered on account of petitioner's default. We hold that he did.

Background

Petitioner resided in Washington State when she filed the petitions.

Petitioner failed to file Federal tax returns for 2000 through 2008 (years at issue). Respondent prepared and filed for petitioner substitutes for returns for the years at issue. Respondent then issued to petitioner deficiency notices determining deficiencies and additions to tax for each of the years at issue.

Petitioner timely filed petitions. Petitioner requested St. Paul,*78 Minnesota as the place of trial. Respondent filed answers to the petitions with affirmative allegations supporting the determinations in the deficiency notices.

Respondent then initiated discovery pursuant to the Rules. Respondent mailed petitioner Branerton letters.2 Petitioner refused to participate in the *79 Branerton conference. Respondent later mailed petitioner a proposed stipulation of facts and requested that petitioner respond. Petitioner did not respond.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to change the place of trial from St. Paul to Seattle, Washington. Petitioner filed with the Court an objection to that motion. Petitioner, however, ignored the Court's attempt to schedule a conference call to address the motion. The Court set the motion for hearing in St. Paul, and petitioner failed to appear*79 for the hearing. The Court granted the motion.

Respondent sent another Branerton letter to petitioner along with a copy of the proposed stipulation of facts for her review. Petitioner declined to participate in a telephone conference and failed to respond to the proposed stipulation of facts. Respondent notified petitioner that he intended to file a motion for order to show cause (OSC) why proposed facts should not be accepted as established. Petitioner did not respond.

*80 Respondent filed and served on petitioner a request for admissions. Respondent informed petitioner that each matter would be deemed admitted if petitioner failed to respond. Again, petitioner never responded.

Respondent then filed and served, as he had previously indicated to petitioner, the OSCs why proposed facts should not be accepted as established. The Court granted the motions and when petitioner again failed to respond, made absolute the OSCs.

Respondent then notified petitioner he intended to file the motions for default judgment. Petitioner did not appear at the Seattle, Washington trial session. Respondent filed the motions for default judgment. Petitioner has not responded to the motions.

Discussion

We now consider*80 whether to grant respondent's motions for default judgment where petitioner has failed to comply with the Court's orders and Rules. SeeRule 123. We turn now to the standard by which a party can be held in default.

The Court may hold a party in default if he or she fails to plead or otherwise proceed as provided by our Rules or as required by the Court. Rule 123(a). We have construed Rule 123 to permit default or dismissal consistent with our sound *81 discretion and the interests of justice. See Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 693, 706 (1985), aff'd without published opinion, 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986). We have invoked this Rule where a taxpayer has failed to stipulate undisputed facts, comply with Court-ordered discovery or appear at trial. See Tucker v. Commissioner,

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Related

Wheeler v. Commissioner
521 F.3d 1289 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Donald G. Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
926 F.2d 1470 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Tucker v. Comm'r
2014 T.C. Memo. 51 (U.S. Tax Court, 2014)
HIGBEE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
116 T.C. No. 28 (U.S. Tax Court, 2001)
Wheeler v. Comm'r
127 T.C. No. 14 (U.S. Tax Court, 2006)
Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner
61 T.C. No. 73 (U.S. Tax Court, 1974)
Stringer v. Commissioner
84 T.C. No. 46 (U.S. Tax Court, 1985)
Smith v. Commissioner
91 T.C. No. 66 (U.S. Tax Court, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2014 T.C. Memo. 77, 107 T.C.M. 1403, 2014 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-commr-tax-2014.