Anderson v. Comm'r

2008 T.C. Memo. 37, 95 T.C.M. 1148, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 37
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedFebruary 21, 2008
DocketNo. 22417-05
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2008 T.C. Memo. 37 (Anderson v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Comm'r, 2008 T.C. Memo. 37, 95 T.C.M. 1148, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 37 (tax 2008).

Opinion

ALBERT ANDERSON, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Anderson v. Comm'r
No. 22417-05
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2008-37; 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 37; 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1148;
February 21, 2008, Filed
*37
Albert Anderson, Pro se.
Charles E. Buxbaum, for respondent.
Thornton, Michael B.

MICHAEL B. THORNTON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THORNTON, Judge: Respondent determined a $ 2,406 deficiency in petitioner's 2004 Federal income tax. The issues for decision are whether petitioner is entitled to claim his son as a dependent and whether he is entitled to the earned income credit.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year at issue.

BACKGROUND

Some facts have been stipulated and are so found. When he petitioned the Court, petitioner resided in New Jersey.

In December 2003 petitioner married Angela Whitted (Ms. Whitted). Petitioner and Ms. Whitted remained married throughout 2004 but never lived together.

On May 15, 2004, petitioner had a son by Ms. Cynthia Adjin-Tettey (Ms. Adjin-Tettey). Petitioner did not live with Ms. Adjin-Tettey; she and their infant son lived a 10- or 15-minute drive away.

In 2004 petitioner held two jobs. From 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., he worked as a gas station attendant at Sam's Club, and from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., he worked as a room service attendant at the Tropicana Casino in Atlantic City.

On his 2004 Federal income tax return *38 petitioner reported wage income of $ 7,062. He claimed head of household filing status and a dependency exemption deduction for his and Ms. Adjin-Tettey's son. Petitioner also claimed an earned income credit of $ 2,406.

In the notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner was entitled to no dependency exemption deduction and that his proper filing status was single. Respondent also disallowed the earned income credit.

DISCUSSION

The $ 2,406 deficiency arises from respondent's disallowance of the earned income credit of the same amount. The amount of the deficiency appears to be unaffected by respondent's changing petitioner's filing status; consequently, we need not address that issue. 1 See LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589, 594-595 (1975); Cohen v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 647, 648 (1930). Similarly, respondent's disallowance of the dependency exemption deduction for petitioner's son does not appear to affect directly the amount of the deficiency. As discussed below, however, the dependency issue is relevant in assessing petitioner's entitlement to the earned income credit. For that reason, we address the dependency issue before considering petitioner's entitlement *39 to the earned income credit.

1. Dependency Exemption Deduction

A taxpayer is allowed a dependency exemption deduction for each dependent. Sec. 151(c)(1). To qualify as the taxpayer's dependent, an individual must, among other things, receive (or be treated as receiving) over half of his or her support from the taxpayer. Sec. 152(a). In the case of a child whose parents live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year, a special rule generally treats the child as receiving over half of his or her support from the parent having custody for the greater portion of the year. See sec. 152(e)(1); sec. 1.152-4(b), Income Tax Regs. This special rule applies only if the child both: (1) Receives over half of his or her support during the year from his or her parents; and (2) is in the custody of one or both parents for more than half *40 the year. Sec. 152(e)(1).

Petitioner claims that his infant son lived with him in 2004. He acknowledges that his son's mother, Ms. Adjin-Tettey, lived at a different address. According to petitioner's testimony, each morning a friend would drive Ms. Adjin-Tettey (who was unemployed) and the infant son from her residence to petitioner's, where mother and son would remain until petitioner came home from his day job so that they would be with him while he slept a couple of hours. Then, according to petitioner's testimony, on his way to his night job he would drop Ms. Adjin-Tettey and his son off at her own residence, where mother and son would spend the night before repeating the routine the next day.

Petitioner's testimony strains credulity, but even if we were to assume his testimony is true, petitioner cannot prevail on this issue. In the first instance, he has not shown that he or Ms. Adjin-Tettey, or the two together, provided over half the child's total support during 2004. 2

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Related

LTV Corp. v. Commissioner
64 T.C. 589 (U.S. Tax Court, 1975)
Cohen v. Commissioner
20 B.T.A. 647 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 T.C. Memo. 37, 95 T.C.M. 1148, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-commr-tax-2008.