; ; 4 h p s ~UPREL~IE ~ COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
PATSY J E A N ANDERSON, a s P e r s o n a l k e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e of ?IARIE SANDERS, d e c e a s e d ,
P l a i n t i f f , Cross-Appellant, and R e s p o n d e n t ,
LEO B . 3AKERr
Defendant, C S O S ~ - A P P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , and R e s p o n d e n t . MAR 2 1 1982 -- O R D E R OF SUPREME COURT -- PER CUR1A:II:
Patsy Jean Anderson, as personal representative of
t h e e s t a t e of M a r i e S a n d e r s , d e c e a s e d , t h e p l a i n t i f f , cross-
appellant and respondent, has filed herein a petition for
rehearing. Leo B. Baker, defendant, cross-appellant, and
respondent has filed objections thereto. The Court has
examined and c o n s i d e r e d t h e same.
I T I S ORDERED:
1. The final paragraph of the majority opinion I
a p p e a r i n g on page 280 o f 39 S t a t e R e p o r t e r , i s s t r i c k e n and t h e following paragraph s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e f o r :
" R e v e r s e d and remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r e n t r y . of judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f and c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t A n d e r s o n i n t h e p r i n c i p a l sum o f $ 2 6 , 1 8 2 . 3 5 p l u s a c c r u e d i n t e r e s t on t h e two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t a n d s a v i n g s a c c o u n t from J u l y 3 0 , 1 9 7 8 t o November 3 0 , 1 9 7 8 , t o bo c a l c u l a t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , together gith i n t e r e s t a t the statutory r a t e o n t h e f o r e g o i n g t o t a l sum from November 30, 1.978 t o d a t e o f j u d g m e n t , and c o s t s . "
2. As so modified, the petition for rehearing is aeilled.
3. i'he C ? e r r < 1s c l i r e c t e c i to 111ail t r u e copy of this
order t o counsel of record f o r t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s and t o
t h e C l e r ~o f t n e District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
Districtl of the S t a t e of Montana, i n and for t h e County o f
Yellowstone.
DATED t n i s day of March, 1982.
24 A d .S k . . d 4 Chief J u s t i c e
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. S i l e e h y a n d Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k £3. Morrison, J r . , do n o t j o i n i n t h i s o r d e r . No. 80-420 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982
PATSY JEAN ANDERSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marie Sanders, Deceased, Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant and Respondent, -vs- LEO B. BAKER, Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowst~ne,The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record: For Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant and Respondent: Holmstrom, Dunaway & West, Billings, Montana Vicki Dunaway argued, Billings, Montana For Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent: Hauf.and Forsythe, Billings, Montana John Hauf argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: November 30, 1981 :fEe ~ecided j Igpl
..
Clerk' M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e Court.
T h i s is a n a p p e a l and c r o s s - a p p e a l from a summary j u d g m e n t
i n a claim and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t of
Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y awarded e a c h p a r t y o n e - h a l f o f t.he m n i e s i n a
s a v i n g s a c c o u n t and two c e r t i f i c a t e s o f d e p o s i t i n a s a v i n g s and
loan association. We reverse.
The u n c o n t r a d i c t e d f a c t s d i s c l o s e t h a t M a r i e S a n d e r s , who
l i v e d on a f a r m n e a r B a l l a n t i n e , M o n t a n a , o p e n e d a s a v i n g s
a c c o u n t and two c e r t i f i c a t e s o f d e p o s i t i n 1 9 7 2 and 1 9 7 4 a t
S e c u r i t y F e d e r a l S a v i n g s and Loan i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. On
O c t o b e r 28, 1 9 7 5 , t h e name o f h e r s o n , Leo B. B a k e r , who was
b u y i n g t h e f a r m f r o m S a n d e r s , was added a s a j o i n t t e n a n t . t o t h e
t h r e e a c c o u n t s which, by J u l y 30, 1978, ( t h r o u g h v a r i o u s d e p o s i t s
and i n t e r e s t a c c u m u l a t i o n ) had come t o t o t a l $ 2 6 , 1 8 2 . 3 5 .
The s i g n a t u r e c a r d s f o r t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s , s i g n e d by
B a k e r and S a n d e r s c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e :
" ... I t i s a g r e e d by t h e s i g n a t o r y p a r t i e s w i t h e a c h o t h e r and by t h e p a r t i e s w i t h t h e A s s o c i a t i o n t h a t a n y f u n d s p l a c e d i n o r added to t h e a c c o u n t by a n y o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s is and s h a l l be c o n c l u s i v e l y i n t e n d e d t o be a g i f t and d e l i v e r y a t t h a t t i m e of such f u n d s t o t h e s i g n a t o r y p a r t y o r p a r t i e s t o t h e e x t e n t . of h i s or t h e i r pro r a t a i n t e r e s t i n the account ." The f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t Mrs. S a n d e r s d i d n o t i n t e n d to g i f t a n y
p o r t i o n o f t h e s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s to B a k e r and t h a t h i s name w a s
p l a c e d on t h e a c c o u n t so he c o u l d w i t h d r a w money f o r h e r
expenses, i f needed. Also, a bank o f f i c e r ' s a f f i d a v i t i n d i c a t e d
t h a t i n 1 9 7 8 , t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r B a k e r ' s name had b e e n p l a c e d
o n t h e a c c o u n t s , B a k e r t o l d t.he o f f i c e r t h a t t h e f u n d s i n t h e
a c c o u n t s b e l o n g e d t o h i s m o t h e r and were n o t h i s money.
I n 1 9 7 5 , Mrs. S a n d e r s g a v e t h e p a s s b o o k and c e r t i f i c a t e s
t o Baker. I n May, 1 9 7 8 , M r s . S a n d e r s was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r a b o u t
a week i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, a t which t i m e h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r ,
P a t s y J e a n A n d e r s o n , came f r o m A r i z o n a to v i s i t h e r . In e a r l y
J u n e , a f t e r Mrs. S a n d e r s had b e e n r e l e a s e d from t h e h o s p i t a l s h e w e n t t o A r i z o n a t o see h e r g r a n d d a u g h t e r .
On J u n e 29, 1 9 7 8 , Mrs. S a n d e r s e x e c u t e d h e r w i l l , g i v i n g
t h e b u l k o f h e r e s t a t e t o A n d e r s o n ( e x c e p t f o r a few c a s h b e q u e s t s ) and named A n d e r s o n as h e r p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . On
J u l y 7 , S a n d e r s , t h r o u g h h e r a t t o r n e y i n B i l l i n g s , made a w r i t t e n demand o n B a k e r f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e p a s s b o o k and c e r t i f i c a t e s
so s h e c o u l d w i t h d r a w t h e money. B a k e r r e f u s e d and o n A u g u s t 3 , 1978, Sanders f i l e d t h e i n s t a n t s u i t f o r t h e i r r e t u r n .
T h u s Marie S a n d e r s commenced t h i s a c t i o n o n A u g u s t 3 , 1 9 7 8 , a l l e g i n g t h a t h e r s o n , L e o B a k e r , was w r o n g f u l l y r e t a i n i n g
t h e two c e r t i f i c a t e s of d e p o s i t and p a s s b o o k . She a s k e d f o r t h e i r r e t u r n and t h a t B a k e r ' s name be removed t h e r e f r o m . In the
a l t e r n a t i v e , s h e a s k e d f o r t h e t o t a l sum of $ 2 6 , 1 8 2 . 3 5 in
d a m a g e s , i f t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s o f d e p o s i t and p a s s b o o k were n o t
returned. B a k e r f i l e d a n a n s w e r o n O c t o b e r 20, a s s e r t i n g t h a t h e had t h e r i g h t t o r e t a i n t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s o f d e p o s i t and p a s s b o o k and
f u r t h e r a l l e g i n g t h a t S a n d e r s was i n c o m p e t e n t and a c t i n g u n d e r c o e r c i o n and undue i n f l u e n c e . On November 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 , M r s . Sanders d i e d i n A r i z o n a and o n November 30, B a k e r w i t h d r e w a l l t h e money from t h e t h r e e accounts. Af t e r S a n d e r s death the personal representative, Patsy J e a n A n d e r s o n , was s u b s t i t u t e d as p l a i n t i f f . On March 5, 1 9 7 9 , t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a n amended a n s w e r , r a i s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l
d e f e n s e s o f s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , l a c h e s and e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l . A f t e r a s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t , b o t h s i d e s moved
f o r summary j u d g m e n t , e a c h s e e k i n g t h e t o t a l amount o n d e p o s i t . On J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t g r a n t i n g each of t h e p a r t i e s one-half of t h e t o t a l f u n d s on deposit. B a k e r now a p p e a l s , c o n t e n d i n g he is e n t i t l e d t o a l l of t h e a c c o u n t s as t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t . Anderson cross-appeals, c l a i m i n g t h a t s h e , as r e s i d u a r y l e g a t e e of
S a n d e r s , is e n t i t l e d t o t h e f u l l b a l a n c e . The i s s u e s on a p p e a l c a n be s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s : 1. Is p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e f u n d s were
- i n t e n d e d a s a g i f t by S a n d e r s t o B a k e r ? not
2. Is S a n d e r s ' s u i t b a r r e d by t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s , laches, o r equitable estoppel?
3. Is t h e p l a i n t i f f e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t e d from
t h e d a t e Baker w i t h d r e w a l l f u n d s from t h e t h r e e bank a c c o u n t s ?
W r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n g r a n t e d summary judgment i n h e r c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n .
With r e g a r d t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , Baker a r g u e s t h a t S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. Cole ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 2 2 Mont, 9 , 1 9 5 P.2d 989,
and C a s a g r a n d a v. Donahue ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 479, 5 8 5 P.2d 1286,
are controlling. I n C o l e , t h e d e c e d e n t c r e a t e d f i v e j o i n t bank
a c c o u n t s b e t w e e n h e r s e l f and v a r i o u s r e l a t i v e s , a l l w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s of h e r d e a t h . After the decedent's death, the t r i a l court
imposed an i n h e r i t a n c e t a x measured by o n e - h a l f of t h e v a l u e of t h e accounts. The q u e s t i o n s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l i n c l u d e d w h e t h e r t h e s t a t e was e n t i t l e d t o a n i n h e r i t a n c e t a x on t h e f u l l amount of
t h e j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s , o r j u s t o n e - h a l f of t h e a c c o u n t s , The court, in finding t h a t the half-interest i n t h e bank a c c o u n t
w h i c h t h e j o i n t t e n a n t s r e c e i v e d was t a x a b l e a s a t r a n s f e r i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n of d e a t h , made t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t s : " O f c o u r s e i f t h e t r a n s f e r by t h e d o n o r t o t h e j o i n t a c c o u n t be r e g a r d e d a s a g i f t i t h a s t o s a t i s f y a l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of a v a l i d g i f t i n t e r vivos. The e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e s of a g i f t i n t e r v i v o s a r e d e l i v e r y , accompanying i n t e n t , and a c c e p t a n c e by t h e d o n e e . (Citing cases.) "The f i r s t q u e s t i o n is t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r - t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t . ( 5 M i c h i e , Banks & B a n k i n g , p. 1 0 1 , s e c . 46.) Such i n t e n t i o n was d i s c u s s e d i n H i l l v. B a d e l j y , 1 0 7 Cal.App. 598, 605, 290 P. 6 3 7 , 640, where t h e c o u r t d e c l a r e d , ' T h e q u e s t i o n i n v o l v e d i n c a s e s of t h i s c h a r a c t e r is t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t , and where s u c h i n t e n t i o n is e v i - d e n c e d by a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t , a s was d o n e i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h i s q u e s t i o n of i n t e n t i o n c e a s e s t o be a n i s s u e , and t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e w r i t t e n agreement.' The a b o v e q u o t a t i o n was c i t . e d and a p p r o v e d by t h i s c o u r t i n Ludwig v . Montana Bank & T r u s t Co., 1 0 9 Mont. 477, 5 0 2 , 9 8 P.2d 377, 379.
"The Montana c o u r t a l s o s a i d , q u o t i n g from 9 C.J.S., Banks & B a n k i n g , s e c . 286, 'Where no o t h e r e v i d e n c e o f i n t e n t is a v a i l a b l e , t h e f o r m of t h e d e p o s i t may c o n t r o l ; b u t when s u c h i n t e n t is e v i d e n c e d by a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t , t h e q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n ceases t o be a n i s s u e and t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e a g r e e m e n t . ' Ludwig v. Montana Bank & T r u s t C o . , s u p r a , a t p a g e 502 o f 1 0 9 Mont., a t p a g e 389 o f 98 P.2d.
" I n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e s i g n i n g of t h e signa- t u r e c a r d c o n t a i n i n g a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e depo- s i t w a s p a y a b l e t o e i t h e r of t h e c o - d e p o s i t o r s o r t h e s u r v i v o r s e t t l e d t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e d o n a t i v e i n t e n t . o f t h e d o n o r to make a g i f t i n j o i n t tenancy. S e e I n re S u l l i v a n ' s E s t a t e , 1 1 2 Mont. 519, 1 1 8 P.2d 383." 1 2 2 Mont. a t 14-15, 1 9 5 P.2d a t 992.
I n C a s a g r a n d a , s u p r a , t h e d e c e d e n t p l a c e d f u n d s i n two
s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s , naming h i m s e l f and t-he d e f e n d a n t as j o i n t
t e n a n t s with t h e r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . After h i s death, the
e x e c u t r i x b r o u g h t s u i t . t o q u i e t t i t l e i n t h e a c c o u n t s and t h e
c o u r t awarded t h e money t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , as t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t
tenant.
The c o u r t e l a b o r a t e d on t h e Cole h o l d i n g w i t h t h e
following language :
"Cole stood f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , i n Montana, s i g n i n g a s i g n a t u r e c a r d c o n t a i n i n g an a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e d e p o s i t is p a y a b l e t.o e i t h e r o f t h e c o - d e p o s i t o r s or t h e s u r v i v o r s e t t l e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f d o n a t i v e i n t e n t t o make a j o i n t tenancy. Appellant. cites an Arizona d e c i s i o n , O ' H a i r v. O ' H a i r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 0 9 A r i z . 236, 508 P.2d 6 6 , w h e r e i n it was h e l d t h a t t h e mere form of a b a n k a c c o u n t is n o t r e g a r d e d as s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i n t e n t o f t h e d e p o s i t o r to g i v e a n o t h e r a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n or o w n e r s h i p of i t . W e f i n d t h e Montana r u l e r e p r e s e n t s a more re1 i a b l e manner f o r d e t e r m i n i n g q u e s t i o n s con- c e r n i n g t h e o w n e r s h i p o f j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s . T h i s s h o u l d n o t be m i s t a k e n l y u n d e r s t o o d to mean w e h a v e no c o n c e r n f o r t h e d e p o s i t o r ' s intentions. I n t e n t - i o n is c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d on t h e f a c e o f t-he s i g n a t u r e c a r d . Addit-ional evi- d e n c e is u n n e c e s s a r y . 5 8 5 P.2d a t 1 2 8 8 . . ." 1 7 8 Mont. a t 483-484,
However, w e d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i n s t a n t case from C o l e and
Casagranda f o r the following reason. In n e i t h e r Cole nor
C a s a g r a n d a was t h e r e a n y a t t e m p t made d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of t-he donor-depositor, a s t h e r e was h e r e , t o d i v e s t t h e o t h e r j o i n t
t e n a n t of h i s o r h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c c o u n t . I n s p i t e of t h e
c o n c l u s o r y g i f t l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n e d on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s i g n e d by Baker and S a n d e r s , t h e u n c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e h e r e shows t h a t no g i f t was i n t e n d e d , i.e., Baker was named a s a j o i n t t e n a n t f o r
convenience purposes only. The l e g a l e f f e c t of S a n d e r s ' c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n , f i l e d d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e , was t o e s t a b l i s h j u d i c i a l l y her e x c l u s i v e ownership t o t h e funds i n t h e account c u t t i n g o f f B a k e r ' s r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p and t o a l l o w Baker t o t a k e , s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n e d on t h e s i g n a -
t u r e c a r d , would r e s u l t i n a s u b s t a n t i a l m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e . W t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t where, a s h e r e , a d e p o s i t o r d u r i n g e h i s o r h e r l i f e t i m e r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of o w n e r s h i p of f u n d s i n a j o i n t t e n a n c y a c c o u n t , t h e s t a t e m e n t s on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d a r e n o t c o n c l u s i v e and a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e may be examined t o a s c e r -
t a i n t h e t r u e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . W are especially cognizant e o f t h e f a c t t h a t many e l d e r l y p e o p l e , whose means of t r a n s p o r -
t a t i o n is l i m i t e d o r whose p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n is d e t e r i o r a t i n g ,
e x e c u t e t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a younger r e l a t i v e s o t h e y o u n g e r p e r s o n may make w i t h d r a w a l s a t t h e o t h e r ' s
direction. W a r e a l s o mindful t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s a r e forms e
c o n t a i n i n g l a n g u a g e d r a f t e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n . While
t h e l a n g u a g e t h e r e o n may v e r y w e l l d e s c r i b e t h e a g r e e m e n t s b e t - ween t h e d e p o s i t o r and t h e d e p o s i t o r y , i t c a n h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d
t o a c c u r a t e l y e x p r e s s t h e i n t e n t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n
the joint tenants a b o u t which t h e d e p o s i t o r y t y p i c a l l y h a s l i t t l e , i f a n y , knowledge. Where t h e d o n o r - d e p o s i t o r , a s in the i n s t a n t s u i t , i n d i c a t e s d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e t h a t h e r i n t e n t is o t h e r t h a n t h a t r e v e a l e d on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d , w e h o l d s u c h e v i - dence admissible. O t h e r c o u r t s h a v e s t a t e d t h i s same t h o u g h t i n a s i m i l a r
manner. For e x a m p l e , i n H a r r i n g t o n v. Emmerman (D.C. Cir. 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 8 6 F.2d 7 5 7 , w h i c h i n v o l v e d two f e m a l e j o i n t t e n a n t s , it
was s a i d :
"To be s u r e , t h e d e p o s i t a g r e e m e n t d e s c r i b e d t h e t w o women as j o i n t o w n e r s ' and p r o v i d e d t h a t e i t h e r might draw on t h e a c c o u n t ; b u t t h e a g r e e m e n t was o n a p r i n t e d f o r m s u p p l i e d by t h e b u i l d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n , p r e s u m a b l y f o r i t s own p u r p o s e and p r o t e c t i o n . Some s u c h f o r m p r o b a b l y would h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d by i t t o s a f e g u a r d i t s own i n t e r e s t s e v e n had Miss Emmerman t h e n s t a t e d t h e a r r a n g e m e n t was m e r e l y f o r t h e c o n v e n i e n c e o f Mrs. C a r l i n . The w r i t i n g was c o n c l u s i v e as b e t w e e n t h e two women o n t h e o n e hand and t h e b u i l d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n o n t h e o t h e r , b u t was n o t c o n c l u s i v e b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s as t o w h e t h e r a p r e s e n t g i f t had b e e n i n t e n d e d ." 1 8 6 F.2d a t 761.
The W a s h i n g t o n Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d it t h u s :
" ... [TIh e s i g n a t u r e c a r d is i n v a r i a b l y i n a f o r m p r o v i d e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h h a s u n d o u b t e d l y d r a f t e d it t o p r o t e c t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n r a t h e r t h a n e x p r e s s t h e terms o f a n agreement between t h e d e p o s i t o r s . " In r e G u a r d i a n s h i p o f Matt ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 7 5 Wash.2d 1 2 3 , , 449 P.2d 413, 4 1 8 . When a d e p o s i t o r o p e n s a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t a t a n i n s t i t u -
t i o n h e m u s t a c c e p t t h e f o r m s d r a f t e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y and p r o -
f e r r e d him t o s i g n or go e l s e w h e r e . W e have held i n o t h e r
"take-it-or-leave-it" s i t u a t i o n s , where a d h e i s o n c o n t r a c t s are
i n v o l v e d , t h a t t h e terms a r e t o be c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t . t h e d r a f t e r
a n d a n y a m b i g u i t i e s a r e t o be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r of t h e p a r t y
h a v i n g no v o i c e i n a r r i v i n g a t t.he d o c u m e n t ' s terms, F i t z g e r a l d
v . A e t n a I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 1 8 6 , 577 P.2d 370. We feel
t h i s r e a s o n i n g a l s o s u p p o r t s o u r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of
t h e s i g n a k u r e c a r d s s i g n e d by B a k e r and S a n d e r s s h o u l d n o t be t h e
" o n l y word" on what t h e i r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p was i n t e n d e d by
them t o be.
F u r t h e r , t h e p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e r u l e i n Montana is n o t an
o b s t a c l e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n s i m p l y
t h e signature card language. S e c t i o n 28-2-90 5, MCA, provides i n
pertinent part:
"When e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t - -e c o n s i d e r e d . (1) w h e n e v e r t h e may b terms o f a n a g r e e m e n t h a v e b e e n r e d u c e d t o w r i t i n g by t h e p a r t i e s , i t is t o be c o n s i d e r e d a s containing a l l those terms. Therefore, there c a n be between t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r r e p r e s e n - t a t i v e s o r s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t no e v i d e n c e of t h e terms of t h e a g r e e m e n t o t h e r t h a n t h e con- t e n t s of t h e w r i t i n g e x c e p t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g cases:
" ( 2 ) T h i s s e c t i o n --t e x c l u d e o t h e r e v i - does no d e n c e - -e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which t h e of th a g r e e m e n t - - - - t o which i t r e l a t e s , - was made o r as d e s c r i b e d i n 1-4-102, o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i n a n e x t r i n s i c ambiguity o r t o e s t a b l i s h i l l e g a l i t y o r fraud." ( E m p h a s i s added .)
S e c t i o n 1-4-102, MCA, i n turn provides:
" C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g exe- cution. For t h e p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n i n s t r u m e n t , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which i t was made, i n c l u d i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t of t h e i n s t r u m e n t and of t h e p a r t i e s t o i t , may a l s o be shown s o t h a t t h e judge be p l a c e d i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e whose l a n g u a g e he is t o interpret."
The c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s were e x e c u t e d h e r e shows t h a t no g i f t was i n t e n d e d by S a n d e r s t o Baker when t h e
c a r d s were s i g n e d . I n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v i n g unambiguous l i e n w a i v e r s , p a r o l e v i d e n c e was h e l d a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of
t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r r e a l p u r p o s e i n e x e c u t i n g and r e c e i v i n g t h e l i e n waivers. F i l l b a c h v. I n l a n d C o n s t r u c t i o n Corp. (1978),
1 7 8 Mont. 374, 584 P.2d 1274. There a s u b c o n t r a c t o r signed a s e r i e s of l i e n w a i v e r f o r m s i n which he acknowledged r e c e i p t of s p e c i f i e d sums of money i n f u l l payment f o r l a b o r and m a t e r i a l s f u r n i s h e d by him t o a s p e c i f i e d d a t e and waived a l l r i g h t s t o f i l e mechanics l i e n s a g a i n s t t h e premises. N o n e t h e l e s s we h e l d
p a r o l e v i d e n c e a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h a t t h e l i e n w a i v e r s w e r e exe-
c u t e d t o e n a b l e t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r t o r e c e i v e money from t h e owner from t i m e t o t i m e and were n o t i n t e n d e d t o c o n s t i t u t e payment i n f u l l to the specified date as stated in the release. L i k e w i s e i n K u s s l e r v. B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n I n c . (1980),
Mont. , 6 0 6 P.2d 5 2 0 , 37 St.Rep. 240, w e a d o p t e d p r o s p e c t i v e l y t h e r u l e from R e s t a t e m e n t of T o r t s , S e c o n d , S e c . 8 8 5 , and h e l d t h a t i n t h e f u t u r e u n l e s s a g e n e r a l release form s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s o t h e r w i s e , p a r o l e v i d e n c e is a d m i s s i b l e t o show w h e t h e r
t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d t o release o t h e r p a r t i e s o r w h e t h e r t h e r e l e a s e was a c t u a l l y i n t e n d e d t o c o n s t i t u t e f u l l c o m p e n s a t i o n i n
t h e f a c e o f unambiguous l a n g u a g e t o t h a t e f f e c t i n t h e release
form. O t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e s i m i l a r l y e n d o r s e d t h e u s e of
p a r o l e v i d e n c e i n j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s i t u a t i o n s . I n Matt, s u p r a , t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d r a i s e d a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n o f j o i n t t e n a n c y and it would make li t - t l e
s e n s e t o r e f u s e p a r o l e v i d e n c e t.o r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n . In M u r r a y v . Gadsden ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 5 2 ) , 1 9 7 F.2d 1 9 4 , 33 ALR2d 5 5 4 , t h e c o u r t examined t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e e x c e p t i o n , which
a l l o w s an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e o b j e c t of t h e p a r t i e s i n e x e c u t i n g t h e i n s t r u m e n t , and a d m i t t e d t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e . See Annot., Par01 E v i d e n c e R u l e A s A p p l i e d t o D e p o s i t o f Funds i n Name o f D e p o s i t o r
a n d A n o t h e r ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 3 3 ALR2d 569. The case o f H a r r i n g t o n , s u p r a , i s s i m i l a r to t h e case a t bar. In Harrington, the donor-depositor continued t o treat t h e
j o i n t a c c o u n t as h e r own d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e a n d , s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e account, h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f i l e d s u i t
b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r j o i n t t e n a n t would n o t s u r r e n d e r t h e p a s s b o o k .
A f t e r a n a n s w e r had b e e n f i l e d , b u t b e f o r e a n y f u r t h e r a c t i o n was taken, the depositor died. The H a r r i n g t o n c o u r t found t h a t t h e f i l i n g of t h e s u i t by
t h e donor-depositor c u t o f f a n y s u r v i v o r s h i p r i g h t s of t h e o t h e r j o i n t t e n a n t and w h a t e v e r i n t e r e s t t h e d e p o s i t o r had p a s s e d to
h e r executor. The case was t h e n remanded f o r t h e s u r v i v o r to t.ry t o prove t.hat t h e d e c e d e n t i n t e n d e d a g i f t of a t l e a s t p a r t of t h e a c c o u n t t.o t h e s u r v i v o r . I n t-he case a t b a r , h o w e v e r , t h e r e i s u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e a p a r t from t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d t h a t
S a n d e r s n e v e r i n t e n d e d a g i f t o f a n y p a r t of t h e a c c o u n t s t o B a k e r , t h a t Baker was named a s a j o i n t t e n a n t f o r c o n v e n i e n c e
p u r p o s e s o n l y , and t h a t B a k e r u n d e r s t o o d t h i s . See a l s o Brennan v . Timrnins ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 0 4 N . H . 3 8 4 , 1 8 7 A. 2d 7 9 3 and B r e n n e n v .
Timrnins ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 0 5 N . H . 4 6 4 , 202 A.2d 229.
I n two cases w h e r e i n c o u r t s h a v e c o n s t r u e d l a n g u a g e almost.
i d e n t i c a l to t h a t a t i s s u e h e r e , a d d i t i o n a l evidence w a s allowed.
I n G r a v e s v . G r a v e s ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 42 I l l . A p p . 2 d 438, 1 9 2 N.E.2d 616,
t h e c o u r t examined e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n m e r e l y t h e words i n t h e
agreement, finding t h a t t h e record, i n addition t o the
a g r e e m e n t s , showed t h a t a g i f t was i n t e n d e d . I n E s t a t e of Macak
( 1 9 7 3 ) , 14 Ill.App.3d 261, 3 0 2 N.E.2d 436, the court similarly
l o o k e d a t t h e e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d , f i n d i n g n o e v i d e n c e to
r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o r of t h e s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t . e n a n t . It
s h o u l d be n o t e d t . h a t i n b o t h G r a v e s and Macak t h e r e was e v i d e n c e
t h a t the donor-depositor intended a g i f t t o the o t h e r joint.
tenant. I n t h i s case a t b a r , h o w e v e r , t h e e v i d e n c e is e x a c t l y to
the contrary. See Annot., C r e a t i o n o f J o i n t S a v i n g s Account. o - r
S a v i n g s C e r t i f i c a t e a s G i f t t o S u r v i v o r ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 4 3 ALR3d 9 7 1 ,
1018.
With r e g a r d t o t h e second i s s u e , S a n d e r s 1 a c t i o n is n o t
b a r r e d by t h e t w o - y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 27-2-207,
MCA. This s t a t u t e does not begin t o run u n t i l a f t e r t h e r e has
b e e n a demand and r e f u s a l o f d e l i v e r y . I n t e r s t a t e Manufacturing
Co. v . I n t e r s t a t e P r o d u c t s Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6 Mont. 449, 4 0 8 P.2d
478. Here, t h e s t a t u t e b e g a n t o r u n a t t h e t i m e S a n d e r s made
w r i t t e n demand on B a k e r f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e p a s s b o o k and
certificates, i . e . J u l y 7, 1 9 7 8 , and S a n d e r s f i l e d h e r s u i t l e s s
t h a n o n e month l a t e r , w e l l w i t h i n t h e r e q u i r e d t i m e .
The d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e p r e s e n t
case. L a c h e s r e q u i r e s n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a claim
a n d e x i s t s when t h e r e h a s b e e n a n u n e x p l a i n e d d e l a y o f s u c h
d u r a t i o n as t o r e n d e r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t.he r i g h t i n e q u i t a b l e .
B r a b e n d e r v. K i t M a n u f a c t u r i n g Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 6 3 , 67-68,
568 P.2d 547, 549. T h e r e is no e v i d e n c e h e r e t h a t Mrs. S a n d e r s
w a s n e g l i g e n t i n p r o s e c u t i n g h e r claim. A s s t a t e d above, she w a i t e d l e s s t h a n a month a f t e r h e r w r i t t e n demand was r e f u s e d
before f i l i n g s u i t .
S i m i l a r l y , e q u i t a b l e estoppel does not apply h e r e . This
p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t y c l a i m i n g i t r e l i e d on a r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o r p r o m i s e t o h i s d e t r i m e n t , C a r r o c c i a v. Todd ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
-- Mont. , 615 P.2d 2 2 5 , 37 S t . R e p . 1437. Baker h a s n o t shown
a n y r e l i a n c e t o h i s p r e j u d i c e , and t h u s c a n n o t h a v e a l e g i t i m a t e
d e f e n s e b a s e d on e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l .
With r e g a r d t o t h e t h i r d i s s u e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y
c a l c u l a t e d i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e t h a t t h e t h r e e a c c o u n t s w e r e
c l o s e d by Leo Baker and t h e p r o c e e d s c o n v e r t e d t o h i s own u s e ,
which was November 30, 1 9 7 8 , The a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e is s e c t i o n
27-1-320, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"Conversion o f p e r s o n a l property. (1) The d e t r i m e n t c a u s e d by t h e w r o n g f u l c o n v e r s i o n of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y is presumed t o b e :
" ( a ) t h e v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y a t t h e t i m e of i t s c o n v e r s i o n w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t from t h a t time, . ." A c c o r d , G a l b r e a t h v. Armstrong ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 1 Mont. 387, 1 9 3 P.2d
R e v e r s e d and remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r e n t r y of
judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f and c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t Anderson f o r t h e sum
o f $26,182.35, i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n a t t h e s t a t u t o r y r a t e from
November 30, 1978 t o d a t e of judgment, and c o s t s .
Chief J u s t i c e
W concur: e .............................. Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
I would affirm the decision of the District Court, which gave one-half of the joint deposits to each of the contending parties. I will first summarize my reasons for dissenting to the majority opinion, and then I will support my summary by a more extended discussion of the applicable law. Marie Sanders, by executing the unique depository instruments through a savings institution made a gift to her son, Leo B. Baker, of one-half of the funds deposited. By law, she could not revoke that gift. In addition, by the terms of the same depository instruments, she created a joint tenancy in the remainder of the funds, giving Leo B. Baker a right of survivorship to all of the deposit if she predeceased him. By the creation of the joint tenancy, Marie Sanders gave Leo B. Baker the power to acquire dominion over the entire account by withdrawing the same. Leo B. Baker could have acquired the whole account by withdrawal, or by surviving Marie Sanders while the joint tenancy was in full force and effect. The legal result of the depository instruments was that Baker owned one-half of the deposited funds by gift, and further interest as a joint tenant with right of survivorship in the other half of the deposits. This joint tenancy, like any other, depended upon the coexistence of the four unities of a joint tenancy: title, interest, time, and possession. A joint tenant's right of
survivorship is not irrevocably fixed upon the creation of the estate. The survivorship right becomes fixed only if the joint tenant survives, and then only if the four unities of the joint tenancy estate have continued to exist to the moment of survival. B e f o r e t h e d e a t h of any j o i n t t e n a n t , any a c t i o n by one
j o i n t t e n a n t which s e r v e s t o s e v e r o r t e r m i n a t e t h e j o i n t
tenancy d e s t r o y s t h e r i g h t of survivorship. Examples a r e :
a v o l u n t a r y conveyance by one p a r t y of h i s j o i n t i n t e r e s t ; a
p a r t i t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s ; o r , a s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e demand o r
a c t i o n by Marie S a n d e r s t o t e r m i n a t e t h e t i t l e i n j o i n t
tenancy.
When a j o i n t t e n a n c y i s s e v e r e d , t h e p a r t i e s h o l d t h e
p r o p e r t y a s t e n a n t s i n common. (A j o i n t t e n a n c y i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d
from a t e n a n c y by t h e e n t i r e t y by t h e f a c t t h a t a t e n a n c y by
t h e e n t i r e t y r e q u i r e s a f i f t h u n i t y , t h a t of p e r s o n . Husbands
and wives o n l y can h o l d a s t e n a n t s by t h e e n t i r e t y . ) Here,
Marie S a n d e r s t e r m i n a t e d t h e r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p a s t o
t h e funds r i g h t f u l l y belonging t o her. One-half of t h e
f u n d s , b e l o n g i n g t o h e r as a p a r t of h e r e s t a t e , are s u b j e c t
t o d i s t r i b u t i o n by h e r w i l l .
Thus, Baker i s e n t i t l e d t o one-half of t h e d e p o s i t e d
f u n d s by g i f t . H e would be e n t i t l e d t o one-half of t h e
remaining h a l f o f t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y f u n d s had s e v e r a n c e o f
t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y o c c u r r e d s i n c e he would t h e n be a t e n a n t
i n common. But b e c a u s e t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y w a s t e r m i n a t e d , n o t
s e v e r e d , d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of Marie S a n d e r s , h e i s n o t
e n t i t l e d t o any of t h e r e m a i n i n g h a l f of t h e f u n d s u n l e s s h e
p a r t i c i p a t e s as an h e i r i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of Marie's
estate.
The s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l i e s a g a i n s t t h e a c t i o n
of Marie t o s e t a s i d e t h e g i f t t o Leo Baker. The s t a t u t e
d i d n o t run a g a i n s t her r i g h t t o terminate t h e survivorship
i n t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y , s i n c e i n t h i s c a s e a l l t h e funds were
h e r s and s h e c o u l d t e r m i n a t e t h e r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p a t
any t i m e d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e . That is my summary. Following are my reasons: Marie Sanders made a gift at the time that she executed the signature documents with the savings and loan association. The instrument provides in significant part as follows: "It is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by the parties with the Association that any funds placed in ... the account ... shall be conclusively intended to be a gift and delivery at that time of such funds to the signatory party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata interest in the account . . ." A gift is a transfer of personal property made voluntarily and without consideration. Section 70-3-101, MCA. A gift, other than a gift in view of death, cannot be revoked by the giver. Section 70-3-103, MCA. The language in the depository agreement above goes much further than is necessary to establish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Section 70-1-307, MCA, defines a joint interest as "one owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy . . ." All that the law requires in a signature agreement establishing a joint tenancy bank account or deposit is an express declaration that the monies are held in joint tenancy. No more is required under section 70-1-307, MCA . I distinguish this depository agreement from what is
normally or usually required in the establishment of a joint tenancy account. A sample of sufficient language is found in Nichols, 2 Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, § 2.1422 (1978): "The account listed on reverse side of this signature card is a joint and several account. All funds now or hereafter deposited in account by either or any of depositors shall be the property of depositors jointly with right of survivorship. Each depositor shall have complete and absolute authority over account during joint lives of depositors and may withdraw any part of such funds on checks or other withdrawal orders signed by either or any of depositors and by survivor or survivors in case of death of any thereof." A comparison of the form set out in Nichols and that used by the savings and loan association in the case at bar demonstrates a vast difference: Nichols' form establishes a joint tenancy account; in the case at bar, the form established an absolute gift of one-half of the deposit in this case in addition to creating a joint tenancy. As a matter of legal effect, it is only when one of the joint tenants deposits a disproportionate amount in the account that the signature card here comes into play. If each of two joint tenants contributed equally to a joint tenancy account, the signature card would have no gift application. In State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 16, 195 P.2d 989, 993, we held that, for inheritance tax purposes, the mere creation of a joint tenancy account constituted a gift to a joint tenant of one-half of the deposit, even though the donor retained the right to exercise control over the deposited funds. The contention was made there that no gift occurred because the donor had not completely divested herself of the title transferred to the donee. This Court held that the creation of the joint tenancy was a completed gift transferring an interest in the deposit to the donee. The form of the depository or signature agreement is not set forth in Cole. The discussion of the court is in general terms with respect to the creation of a joint tenancy. Based on Cole, however, and buttressed by the additional language in the signature agreement which is before us in the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the legal effect of the deposit by Marie Sanders was to make a completed gift of one-half of the deposit to Leo B. Baker. We said: "If the intent was to confer upon the defendant a present right to draw upon the fund, either without limitation or for and to the extent of described purposes, the transfer was valid, notwithstanding the donor retained a right to draw upon the fund at will. She thereby completely divested herself of the title transferred to the defendant. It did not take effect upon her death, and was not enlarged by that event. Such title as the defendant had vested at the time of the entries upon the books. It was a present right and presently enjoyable." Cole, supra, 122 Mont. at 17, 195 P.2d at 993. As to the intent of Marie Sanders, we have no indication in this record that she intended any other thing but the gift and the joint tenancy interest that the signature form created. In Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 483-484, 555 P.2d 1286, 1288, we said: "Cole stood for the proposition that, in Montana, signing a signature card containing an agreement that the deposit is payable to either of the co- depositors or the survivor settles the question of donative intent to make a joint tenancy. Appellant cites an Arizona decision, OIHair v. O'Hair (1973), 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66, wherein it was held that the mere form of a bank account is not regarded as sufficient to establish the intent of the depositor to give another a joint interest in or ownership of it. We find the Montana rule represents a more reliable manner for determining questions concerning the ownership of joint bank accounts. This should not be mistakenly under- stood to mean we have no concern for the depositor's intentions. Intention is clearly expressed on the face of the signature card. Additional evidence is unnecessary." In Casagranda, supra, we set out the form of the signature card used by that institution. 178 Mont. at 484, 585 P.2d at 1288-1289. It merely established a joint tenancy, and had no language in it respecting the conclusive gift of one-half of the deposit. It is inescapable, therefore, that as to one-half of the deposit made by Marie Sanders, under the signature cards which she executed at the time, she made a conclusive gift of one-half of the deposit to her son, Leo B. Baker. She cannot revoke that gift. Section 70-3-103, MCA. The l e g a l e f f e c t a s t o t h e b a l a n c e of t h e d e p o s i t made
by Marie S a n d e r s , above t h e one-half g i f t e d , was t h a t i t was
d e p o s i t e d s u b j e c t t o a j o i n t t e n a n c y w i t h r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p
between h e r s e l f and Leo Baker. By t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d , s h e
gave Baker t h e power t o a c q u i r e dominion o v e r t h e e n t i r e
a c c o u n t by withdrawing t h e same. He c o u l d have a l s o a c q u i r e d
r i g h t t o t h e e n t i r e a c c o u n t i f s h e had p r e d e c e a s e d him
b e c a u s e t h e n t h e whole of t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y p r o p e r t y would
have v e s t e d i n him as o f t h e moment of h e r d e a t h .
I n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e what s h o u l d become of t h e one-
h a l f o f t h e d e p o s i t e d f u n d s under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , w e
s h o u l d examine t h e i n h e r e n t q u a l i t i e s of a j o i n t t e n a n c y .
W e have r e f e r r e d above t o s e c t i o n 70-1-307, MCA, which
s t a t e s t h a t a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i s one owned by s e v e r a l p e r s o n s
i n e q u a l s h a r e s . Our c o u r t h a s s a i d t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h a t
s t a t u t e i s t o i n c l u d e a l l o f t h e i n c i d e n t s of a j o i n t t e n a n c y
e s t a t e under common l a w . Hennigh v. Hennigh ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1
Mont. 372, 377, 309 P.2d 1022, 1025.
The c a s e s r e f l e c t two d i v e r g e n t views as t o t h e e f f e c t
of t h e ownership i n t e r e s t of a j o i n t t e n a n t . One view h o l d s
t h a t f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y , e a c h p a r t y owns
t h e u n d i v i d e d whole of t h e p r o p e r t y , and n o t a f r a c t i o n a l
part thereof. See M e r r i c k v . P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 25 Wash.App. 248,
606 P.2d 700, 706. The b e t t e r view i n Montana, i n view of
t h e language o f s e c t i o n 70-1-307, MCA, i s t h a t each j o i n t
t e n a n t owns an u n d i v i d e d e q u a l s h a r e of t h e j o i n t t e n a n c y
e s t a t e , w i t h a r i g h t t o s u r v i v e t o t h e whole of t h e j o i n t
t e n a n c y p r o p e r t y i f h e i s t h e u l t i m a t e s u r v i v o r . A s was
n o t e d i n I n R e E s t a t e s o f C a r l s o n ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 201 Kan. 635, 443
P.2d 339, 347, a " j o i n t t e n a n c y " e x i s t s where a s i n g l e
e s t a t e i n p r o p e r t y , r e a l o r p e r s o n a l , i s owned by two o r more persons, under one instrument or act of the parties; the grand incident of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, by which the entire tenancy on decease of any joint tenant remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor. Joint bank accounts, however, present a problem because either party can acquire dominion over the whole of the property by simply withdrawing the funds. This was noted in Cole, supra, 122 Mont. at 17-18, 195 P.2d at 993-994, where this Court said: "The California court has declared that the identical California statute created the same estate known as joint tenancy or common law . . . While the joint bank account does differ from other types of joint tenancies it has not been treated differently from other joint ownership . .. For example either co-tenant of a joint tenancy in real property could sever the estate by conveying his interest to a third party and as between the remaining co-tenant and the transferee the new estate became a tenancy in common. The special feature distinguishing joint tenancy from other joint interests was the attribute of survivorship. So long as both co-tenants remained alive any transfer by one co-tenant only resulted in a transfer of half the property. But either joint owner of a joint bank account by virtue of the special contract with the bank can acquire dominion over the entire account by drawing a proper order on the bank. This feature is a special attribute of a joint bank account. Nevertheless a-joint bank account is otherwise subject - - - to the same rules - otherjoint tenancies as . . ." (Emphasis added.) Where, as here, the joint owners of a bank account have not acted to withdraw the funds disproportionately, the joint tenancy account is subject to the same rules as any other joint tenancy. The rules of joint tenancy include the common law requirement that four unities are essential to an estate in joint tenancy: unity of interest, unity of time, unity of title, and unity of possession. Tenhet v. Boswell (1976), 133 Cal.Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330, 334. If an essential unity is destroyed, the joint tenancy is severed and a tenancy in common results. Tenhet, 331 P.2d at 334. Thus, in First westside Nat. Bank of Gr. Falls v. Llera (1978), 176 Mont. 481, 486, 580 P.2d 100, 103, we held that where one joint tenant in an automobile encumbered his interest in the automobile as security for a loan to the bank, and defaulted, the action of the bank in collecting its security through the automobile created a severance, with the result that the bank and the
other joint tenant became the owners of the automobile as tenants in common. In other words, the unity of interest, an essential of a joint tenancy estate, had been destroyed. A joint tenant can terminate the joint tenancy by any
act which is inconsistent with its continued existence. Shackelton v. Sherrard (Okla. 19631, 385 P.2d 598, 902. Ordinarily the inconsistent act will result in a destruction of one of
the four unities of a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common results. Here, however, Marie Sanders moved to end the joint tenancy because all of the funds which were in the joint tenancy portion of the deposit were hers. In other words, she moved to end the right of survivorship which was
enjoyed at that time by Leo B. Baker. Her effort was more than a severance, it was a termination of the joint tenancy by a party having a right to terminate because she was the true owner of the funds. Baker by his action recognized the her right to do so in his statements to the savings and loan association officers, and in not appearing to contest her deposition in Arizona. The legal effect therefore was to terminate the one-half portion of the deposit that was subject to the joint tenancy rules. As for the statute of limitations, it, of course, applies to the gift which was made by virtue of the execution of the signature agreements. Her gift could only be set aside for fraud or mistake, or incapacity, none of which appear here. Even so, the limitation on those grounds is two years under section 27-2-203, MCA. The statute was not tolled by section 27-2-301, relating to the accrual of an action, until she made demand. Her right, if any, to demand to set aside the gift portion accrued immediately upon the execution of the signature forms and the statute of limitations ran from the moment of the execution of those instruments. With respect to the joint tenancy portion of the deposit, however, the statute of limitations did not run or her action did not accrue until she made demand under section 27-2-301, MCA. Therefore, that portion of her claim is not outlawed. The action of the majority in resorting to parole evidence to set aside a written instrument is a good example of why courts should be chary in allowing extrinsic evidence to overcome the legal effect of a writing. Assuming that parole evidence should be allowed here, it would present a question of fact to intent. Yet the majority decides Marie Sander's intent as a matter of law, purportedly upon "uncontroverted" evidence. Marie Sanders' deposition, taken in Arizona in July 1978, is the only evidence available as to her - . & V I ~ * Z , She seems to be saying that the signature cards were never signed by her: "Q. Have you ever authorized him to appear on the savings certificates as a joint tenant with you? A. No. "Q. If the bank signature cards for these savings certificates shows your signature on there, would it be your position that those signatures would be forgeries? A. I don't know. I'd have to see it, look into them first. "Q. Am I correct, though, that you have no knowledge whatsoever of making him your joint tenant? Let me ask the question again. "Mrs. Sanders, am I correct that you have never authorized him to sign on those certificates? A. No, I have never. "Q. Have you ever given Leo B. Baker your general power of attorney? A. No." It is a better practice for appellate courts to leave the resolution of fact questions to the district courts. In my view of the case, however, it is not necessary to decide questions of fact at this level. The legal position of the
parties is determined, as I have said, by the language of the signature cards, and by Marie Sander's action to terminate the joint tenancy. For the foregoing reasons I would hold that, in this case, Leo B. Baker is entitled to summary judgment as to
one-half of the deposited funds; Patsy Jean Anderson is entitled to the remaining one-half of the funds as the Personal Representative of the estate of Marie Sanders. Again, for those reasons, I would affirm the ~istrictCourt.
Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k B. Morrison concurring:
I c o n c u r i n t h e dissent. n