Anderson-Tully Company v. Franklin

307 F. Supp. 539, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedDecember 18, 1969
DocketDC 6729
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 307 F. Supp. 539 (Anderson-Tully Company v. Franklin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson-Tully Company v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621 (N.D. Miss. 1969).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ORMA R. SMITH, District Judge.

This case has been tried to the Court, without a jury, and is submitted on the evidence introduced at the hearing, as shown by the reporter’s notes, the entire record herein, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by counsel.

The action was instituted by plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Delta Division. Plaintiff Anderson-Tully Company is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, and has its principal place of business in the City of Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. The other plaintiffs are Leo H. McGee, Dorothy McGee Taylor and Julia McGee, adult resident citizens of the State of Mississippi.

The defendants are Willis Franklin and W. W. Dark, adult resident citizens of the State of Arkansas.

Plaintiff Corporation claims to be the owner in fee of all of fractional Section 5, Township 24 North, Range 8 West, Bolivar County, Mississippi, and accretions thereto. The remaining plaintiffs claim to be the owners of Lot 15 and accretions thereto and the accretions to Lots 16 and 22 in Section 4, Township 24 North, Range 8 West, in Bolivar County, Mississippi.

The defendants, Franklin and Dark, claim to be the owners of the following described land said to be situated in Desha County, Arkansas, to-wit:

East half of the Southwest quarter (EV2 SW%) of Section 30, Township 8 South, Range 1 East.
Frl. East half (Frl. E.y2) of Section 30, Township 8 South, Range 1 East. Frl. Northwest quarter (Frl. NW%) of Section 30, Township 8 South, Range 1 East.

Defendant Franklin claims to be the owner of the following described land said to be situated in Desha County, Arkansas:

Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter (NEj4 NEy,) of Section 25, Township 8 South, Range 1 West.

The land involved is situated along the Mississippi River as it runs between the States of Arkansas and Mississippi.

The Government’s original survey shows the Mississippi land to be situated east of the river and the Arkansas land to be situated west of the river.

*541 The shifting of the thalweg of the river, at the place where the land is situated, has brought about a dispute between the parties as to the ownership of a mass of land presently situated at the distal end of a peninsula, known as “Smith Point”. The bend in the river at this point is known as “Scrubgrass Bend”. Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to the land in dispute.

The parties have stipulated that if the land is located within the territorial limits of the State of Mississippi, as plaintiffs contend, the land belongs to plaintiffs, otherwise it belongs to defendants.

The issue thus presented is whether the boundary line between the States of Mississippi and Arkansas runs along the thalweg of the river as it presently runs, as plaintiffs contend, or whether the line runs along a depression said to be the old river run, which traverses Smith Point from Northwest to Southeast some distance East of the distal end of Smith Point, as defendants contend.

The defendants contend that the West bank on the Arkansas side of the river washed away and caved during the period 1935 to 1942, in the area including Section 30, Township 8 South, Range 1 East, Desha County, Arkansas, in such a rapid, violent and perceptible manner as to constitute an avulsion; that the boundary line between the two states remained the same as before the avulsion, i. e., the center of the thalweg of the river as it existed in 1937, that the thalweg of the river in 1937 ran along the depression aforesaid, and that the said land, being West of the depression, is situated within the State of Arkansas.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the land became a part of Smith Point by the gradual process of erosion on the Arkansas side of the river and accretion on the Mississippi side thereof and is therefore situated within the State of Mississippi.

Defendants concede that if the land is situated within the State of Mississippi they have no title to the land.

Plaintiffs concede that if the land is situated within the State of Arkansas they have no title thereto.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to determine the true boundary line between the States of Mississippi and Arkansas at Smith Point and Scrub-grass Bend.

There is no dispute in regard to the substantive law applicable to the case. The parties are in agreement with regard thereto.

The governing rules of substantive law applicable to the case are:

1) The boundary line between the State of Mississippi and the State of Arkansas is “fixed at the middle of the main navigable channel, and not along the line equidistant between the banks”, Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39, 39 S.Ct. 422, 63 L.Ed. 832, 834. See also Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 239, 37 L.Ed. 55; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 408, 50 L.Ed. 913; New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 54 S.Ct. 407, 78 L.Ed. 847.

2) Where there has been a change in the course of the river by avulsion, the applicable rule of law “requires the boundary line to be fixed at the middle of the channel of navigation as it existed just previous to the avulsion”, Arkansas v. Mississippi, supra, at page 835, 39 S.Ct. at page 424, 63 L.Ed. 832; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 1918, 246 U.S. 158, 38 S.Ct. 301, 62 L.Ed. 638; Missouri v. Nebraska, 1904, 196 U.S. 23, 25 S.Ct. 155, 49 L.Ed. 372.

3) “Avulsion is a change in a boundary stream so rapidly or so suddenly made, or in such a short time, that the change is distinctly perceptible or measurably visible at the time of its progress. Or to state it otherwise, so far as concerns practical purposes, when the change is not by accretion, it is by avulsion.” Sharp v. Learned, 1943, 195 Miss. 201, 14 So.2d 218, 220. In Missouri v. Nebraska, 1904, 196 U.S. 23, 25 S.Ct. 155, 49 L.Ed. 372, 375, the Supreme Court of the United States said: “In the latter *542 case, the court, after referring to the rule announced in New Orleans v. United States, [10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573], and citing prior cases in which that rule has been recognized, said: ‘It is equally well settled that where a stream which is a boundary, from any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it was, in the center of the old channel, although no water may be flowing therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law, avulsion.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
307 F. Supp. 539, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-tully-company-v-franklin-msnd-1969.