Anderson Morales Thompson v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 11, 2026
Docket3:26-cv-02743
StatusUnknown

This text of Anderson Morales Thompson v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Anderson Morales Thompson v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson Morales Thompson v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al., (S.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDERSON MORALES THOMPSON, Case No.: 26-CV-2743 JLS (BJW)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of

the Department of Homeland Security, et 15 (ECF No. 6) al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Anderson Morales Thompson’s Amended 19 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 6). 20 Also before the Court are Respondents’ Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 (“Ret.,” ECF No. 8) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 9). For the reasons 22 set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner Anderson Morales Thompson, a native and citizen of the Dominican 25 Republic, alleges that he has been detained by the United States Department of Homeland 26 Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division at the Otay 27 Mesa Detention Center since October 17, 2025, when he went to an immigration hearing 28 in Boston. Pet. at 3. In 2009, when Petitioner was thirteen years old, he entered the United 1 States as a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 2. He has since lived in Boston. Id. In 2018 2 and 2019, Petitioner was convicted of drug-related offenses. Id.; Ret., Ex. 2. In 2021, 3 while returning to the U.S. from a vacation in the Dominican Republic, immigration 4 officials told Petitioner he was inadmissible on account of his criminal convictions. Pet. 5 at 2. At that time, immigration officials paroled him into the United States and initiated 6 removal proceedings. Id. An immigration judge terminated those proceedings on 7 November 26, 2024. Ret. at 2. On October 17, 2025, Petitioner was released from the 8 Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility after serving a sentence for selling drugs. 9 Id. ICE thereafter detained Petitioner and served him with a Notice to Appear. Id.; Pet. 10 at 3. On April 1, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed, a decision which 11 he appealed to the BIA. Pet. at 3. On April 2, 2026, an immigration judge denied 12 Petitioner’s request, finding that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention. Ret. at 3. 13 Petitioner now requests release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing on due process 14 grounds. See generally Pet. 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 17 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 18 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 19 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 20 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 21 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 22 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 23 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 24 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 25 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 26 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 27 2018) (citations omitted). 28 / / / 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Petitioner’s Detention 3 Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 4 § 1226(c) because of Petitioner’s drug-related convictions for possession of cocaine and 5 fentanyl. Ret. at 3; see also ECF No. 10 (“Suppl. Filing”), Ex. 2. According to 6 Respondents, because Petitioner’s state law convictions involve cocaine and fentanyl, 7 Schedule II controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6) and 812, § 1226(c) applies. 8 Ret. at 3–4. Petitioner responds that he is not subject to mandatory detention under § 9 1226(c) because Respondents have not shown that Petitioner was convicted for possession 10 of cocaine and fentanyl, which falls short of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s 11 requirement that the substance underlying an alien’s state law conviction for possession 12 must be covered by the Controlled Substances Act. Traverse at 2–3. 13 Section 1226(c) provides for the mandatory detention of a noncitizen who “is 14 deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 15 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.” Section § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) 16 provides for the removability of a noncitizen “who at any time after admission has been 17 convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a 18 foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), 19 other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 20 marijuana, is deportable.” 21 Here, Petitioner was convicted of felonies for possession of controlled drugs on 22 October 24, 2019. Suppl. Filing, Ex. 2 at 6. The controlled substances at issue were 23 fentanyl and cocaine. See id. at 9, 12. Fentanyl and cocaine are controlled substances 24 under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6) and 812. The Court is not persuaded by 25 Petitioner’s argument that Respondents have not shown Petitioner was in possession of 26 federally controlled substances, as the documents related to Petitioner’s conviction 27 explicitly state that he was in possession of cocaine and fentanyl. See Suppl. Filing, Ex. 2 28 1 at 9, 12. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 2 under § 1226(c). 3 II. Due Process 4 “Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance regarding 5 the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory detention becomes 6 unconstitutional.” Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025 7 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). However, “[n]early all district courts that 8 have considered [the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention] agree that 9 prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, 10 will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d 11 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (cleaned up) 12 (collecting cases).

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Related

Nadarajah v. Gonzales
443 F.3d 1069 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales
418 F.3d 1050 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Jennings v. Rodriguez
583 U.S. 281 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Alvarez v. Sessions
338 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (N.D. California, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Anderson Morales Thompson v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-morales-thompson-v-markwayne-mullin-secretary-of-the-department-casd-2026.