Anderson & Kerr v. State Industrial Com.

1932 OK 6, 7 P.2d 902, 155 Okla. 137, 1932 Okla. LEXIS 93
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 19, 1932
Docket21985
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1932 OK 6 (Anderson & Kerr v. State Industrial Com.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson & Kerr v. State Industrial Com., 1932 OK 6, 7 P.2d 902, 155 Okla. 137, 1932 Okla. LEXIS 93 (Okla. 1932).

Opinion

SWINDADD, J.

This is an original proceeding instituted in this court by the petitioners above named against the respondents above named to vacate an award made by the State Industrial Commission on the 14th day of November, 1930, as modified by a subsequent order made by the State Industrial Commission on the 1st day of December, 1930.

The facts disclosed by the record are briefly as follows: On the 20th day of September, 1930, the respondent, Bill Sloan, was employed as a rotary helper by the petitioners, Anderson & Kerr, in the drilling of an oil well in the Oklahoma City field. He was an experienced oil field worker and had been in the employment of Anderson & Kerr off and on for the past three years. He drew a dally wage of $6.50 and was a member of a crew of six men working twelve hours a day from 11 -.30 p. m. to 11:30 a. m. The man in charge of the crew is known as the driller and in this particular instance was J. A. Jackson. Jackson testified that the driller had charge of the men and drilling operations and as such was foreman (R. 4). On the morning of September 20, 1930, Jackson left his place at the throttle while the machinery was-rnnning and seeing the claimant, Bill Sloan, sitting on the derrick floor reading a paper, playfully picked up a sample sack and threw it at Sloan. Sloan threw the sack back and as a result Jackson and Sloan engaged for about ten minutes in frolicking and playing with two sample sacks. Finally the claimant Sloan cornered both sacks. When Sloan was in possession of both sacks Jackson commenced running to the boiler and Sloan pursued him and when Jackson got there he saw a gun lying on the work bench and picked up the gun to scare Slorn and Sloan started to run and Jackson shot down into the ground and the bullet glanced and hit Sloan about the spinal column somewhere in the small of the back partially paralyzing Sloan. The gun belonged to a man by the name of Pryor, a member of the crew. The sample hags were used to keep samples of the cuttings 'or sand pierced by the bit for the purpose of keeping a record of the well drilled. There was apparently no ill will between Sloan and Jackson and they had each worked for Anderson & Kerr for about three years, connected with the drilling of oil wells in the Oklahoma City field. Jackson testified that Anderson & Kerr knew him “pretty well” and knew about what he did “pretty well,” and that Mr. Anderson had run a rig a whole lot himself and knows something about it, and that it was a common custom in the oil field for the employees engaged in this line of work to engage in scuffling and other frolicking for pastime and recreation. It appears from the record that when the drilling machine and the drill are working smoothly that there is not much for the crew to do except remain on the job to be in readiness to pull the casing and change bits when necessary and perform any other work that may he necessary to the proper carrying on and conducting of the drilling operations. Both the driller and the crew were required to remain on duty for twelve hqurs. . .

It is the contention of the petitioners herein, who were the respondent and insurance carrier respectively before the State Industrial Commission, that the claimant was not entitled to receive compensation for the reason that under the undisputed facts the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Law, but rather arose by reason of the fact that the claimant himself stepped aside from his employment and engaged actively In frolicking and what is commonly referred to as “horseplay” foreign to his work. We have been furnished very helpful briefs by counsel for the respective parties. The authorities are not in harmony relative to the right *138 of an injured employee to recover compensation in such cases, many courts holding that the injured employee cannot recover compensation for the reason that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the. employment. Several states hold that where scuffling, frolicking, “horseplay,” and “skylarking” by employees for pastime and recreation while on duty have been permitted by an employer or ácquiesced in by it or its foreman having charge of the employees and the work until such frolicking has 'become a custom in the work, then the injured employee may recover compensation under AVorkmen’s Compensation Laws very similar to the laws of this state now under consideration. The former decisions of this court commit us to the latter rule. Willis v. State Industrial Commission, 78 Okla. 216, 190 P. 92; Stasmos v. State Industrial Commission, 80 Okla. 221, 195 P. 762; Marland Refining Co. v. Colbaugh, 110 Okla. 238, 238 P. 831. It appears to us from a careful, examination of the record and authorities cited that under the environment of work of this nature, where the employees of Anderson & Kerr engaged in scuffling and throwing these samples bags for recreation and amusement, and the driller, who was foreman, was the aggressor in the frolicking or “horseplay”’ indulged in at the time the respondent Bill Sloan received a serious accidental personal injury, that the same is compensable. AVhile it was true that on prior occasions when frolicking and scuffling and throwing sample bags had been indulged in by members of the crew, a pistol or revolver had not been used, yet, the driller who was foreman on this job injected this wild west feature into the “horseplay” or frolicking and had it not been for his course of conduct the serious accidental injury to Sloan would never have resulted. AVe do not feel that, in accordance with reason and justice, Anderson & Kerr should be permitted to employ a foreman who has supervision and control over the crew and who becomes the aggressor in frolicking and play and while so frolicking he discharge firearms into the ground which results in a serious accidental injury to an employee and then be relieved ■ of liability upon the ground that the “horseplay” engaged in by Jackson and Sloan was not such an act as could have be»n reasonably, contemplated by their employer as a risk naturally incident to the nature of. their employment. AVhen they permit scuffling, throwing sample bags, and acts of that character for recreation of employees on duty, and the foreman takes one step further and discharges a pistol in the ■ground and a Bullet glances and injures an employee ■ who engages in the frolic at the invitation of the foreman, it would not be in harmony with the rule that the AVorkmen’s Compensation Law must be liberally construed to hold that under such circumstances the injured employee could not recover compensation.

A servant is deemed in his master’s service whenever present to perform his duties and subject to orders, though at the given moment he may not be actually engaged in the performance of any given work. The general rule as to injuries during intermissions from labor, especially where the accident occurs on the employer’s premises, is formulated from the decisions as follows in Honnold on AVorkmen’s Compensation, vol. 1, p. 381:

“Acts of ministration by a servant to himself, such as quenching his thirst, relieving his hunger, protecting himself from excessive cold, performance of which while at work is reasonably necessary to his health and comfort, are incidents to his employment and acts of service therein within the AVorkmen’s Compensation Acts, though they are only indirectly conducive to the purpose of the employment.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Virgin
1990 OK CIV APP 53 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1990)
City of Oklahoma City v. Alvarado
1973 OK 12 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1973)
McKenzie v. Brixite Manufacturing Co.
166 A.2d 753 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1961)
Eagle-Picher Company v. McGuire
1957 OK 28 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1957)
Shoemake Station v. Stephens
1954 OK 353 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1954)
Horn v. Broadway Garage
1940 OK 81 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1940)
Slick v. Boyett
1932 OK 743 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1932)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1932 OK 6, 7 P.2d 902, 155 Okla. 137, 1932 Okla. LEXIS 93, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-kerr-v-state-industrial-com-okla-1932.