Andersen v. Carver County Sheriffs Office

District Court, D. Minnesota·Decided June 16, 2023·No. 0:22-cv-03137·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Travis Clay Andersen, No. 22-cv-3137 (KMM/DJF)

Plaintiff,

v.

Carver County Sheriff’s Office, and Laura Lynn Zimmerman,

Defendants.

Travis Clay Andersen, No. 22-cv-3138 (KMM/DJF)

Ben Beyer,

Defendant.

ORDER

Travis Clay Andersen began these partially consolidated cases on December 15, 2022, in the District Court for Carver County, Minnesota. According to the records in the state court proceedings, Mr. Andersen filed an affidavit in each case in support of his request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Dkt. 29-1 at 2–3 (Index #6 for Case No. 10- CV-22-1104); Dkt. 29-1 at 6 (Index #6 for Case No. 10-CV-22-1103).] In each of those cases, a Carver County District Judge signed an Order granting Mr. Andersen’s application to proceed IFP pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 563.01. The Orders provided that “[a]ll necessary pleadings in this proceeding shall be served by the Sheriff of the appropriate county as requested without payment of any fees or costs.” [E.g., Dkt. 1-2.] However, Mr. Andersen, who is not a lawyer and has been representing himself throughout these proceedings,

apparently asked his parents to act as his process servers. [See Dkt. 30 ¶ 3; Dkt. 31 ¶ 3.] Mr. Andersen’s parents brought the summons and complaint into the Carver County Jail lobby and gave them to Commander Reed Ashpole, who then provided those documents to Defendants Laura Zimmerman and Ben Beyer. Mr. Andersen did not have anyone serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the Carver County Board Chair or the Carver

County Auditor. [Dkt. 32; Dkt. 33.] Defendants removed both cases on December 21, 2022. They filed Answers on December 28th, asserting among other defenses that the Complaints must be dismissed for insufficient service of process. [Dkt. 4 at 6.] Defendants again raised the issue of insufficient service of process in the parties’ Rule 26(f) Report dated February 27, 2023,

though Mr. Andersen maintained that service was proper and complied with Minnesota law. [Dkt. 19 at 2, 3.] United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order on March 6, 2023. On March 20, 2023, Mr. Andersen wrote to the Clerk of Court requesting a form application to proceed IFP in federal court and for an application for the U.S. Marshals to

serve the Complaints on the Defendants. [Dkt. 21.] In response, the Clerk provided Mr. Andersen a copy of a § 1983 form complaint and an IFP application form, but advised him that “the Defendants have already responded with the [4] Answer to Complaint and therefore marshal service is not necessary.” [Dkt. 22.] On May 15, 2023, the Clerk of Court docketed Mr. Andersen’s completed IFP application, and two days later, Judge Foster granted him IFP status. [Dkt. 24; Dkt. 25.] Judge Foster found that Mr. Andersen plainly qualifies financially for IFP status. In addition, Judge Foster noted that Mr. Andersen

would not owe a filing fee for these cases because Defendants paid the cost of removal and that “service of process has already been effected.” [Dkt. 25 at 1.] Accordingly, the Order granting Mr. Andersen IFP status did not include any provision for service of the Summons and Complaint in either case by the U.S. Marshal. On May 22, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss both cases for insufficient

service of process.1 [Dkt. 26.] Defendants argue that Minnesota law controls whether service was sufficient, and under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a), individuals may be served “by delivering a copy to the individual personally or by leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion residing therein.” Further, they argue that for Carver County to properly be served under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(e)(1), the

summons and complaint would need to be delivered “[t]o the chair of the county board or to the county auditor of a defendant county.” Because neither of those things have occurred, Defendants argue that they were not properly served, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over them, and both cases should be dismissed. [Dkt. 28 at 4–6.] Based on the Court’s review of record in these matters, it appears that Defendants

are correct that they have not received sufficient service of process at this time. However, as the discussion above should make clear, dismissal of these cases pursuant to Fed. R.

1 Mr. Andersen has not responded to the motion to dismiss, but the Court finds that Civ. P. 12(b)(5) would not be appropriate under the circumstances. Brown v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 8:16CV377, 2017 WL 1533386, at *2 (D. Neb. Apr. 26, 2017) (“Although a defect in service may result in the dismissal of the improperly served person,

a court has broad remedial power to correct the service, especially where justice demands and prejudice would not result to the improperly served parties.”) (quoting Mendoza v. Osterberg, No. 8:13CV6, 2014 WL 3784122, at *3 (D. Neb. July 31, 2014)). On two separate occasions, Mr. Andersen has satisfied a judicial officer that he qualifies to proceed IFP in this litigation. If the litigation had stayed in state court, Mr. Andersen would have

been entitled to rely on the sheriff of the appropriate county to achieve service of the pleadings, or for the payment of reasonable expenses of a private process server if the sheriff were unavailable. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 4. Had Mr. Andersen instead commenced these cases in federal court, he would have been entitled to have the U.S. Marshals Service complete service of process on the Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Mr. Andersen is a pro se litigant who is in custody and is untrained in the law. No doubt thinking that it would simply be easiest to do so, he asked his parents to serve the pleadings for him. But there is no indication in the record that that his parents are lawyers or professional process servers or otherwise have any experience with serving legal pleadings. And on two separate occasions since these cases were removed to federal court,

Mr. Andersen has received official communications telling him that the pleadings were served. [Dkt. 21, 25.] Thus, he may have been led to believe that service of process was no longer an issue. This progression of events demonstrates that although the Defendants have not been properly served, dismissing Mr. Andersen’s cases for insufficient service of process achieves nothing other than delay. Mr. Andersen could simply refile his cases in federal

court, apply for IFP, and obtain authorization for marshal service. That makes little sense here, when Mr. Andersen has already been granted IFP status in these very cases, and there is quite obviously good cause for Mr. Andersen’s failure to serve the pleadings within 90 days after they were filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing that the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period if there is good cause for failing to serve

within 90 days). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the Complaints pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and extends the time for service for an additional 90 days from the date of this Order. Moreover, because Mr. Andersen has been granted IFP status in these cases, he is entitled to have service of process completed by the U.S. Marshal. For these reasons, the

Court enters the following Order. However, given that Mr.

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