Anastasia Rose v. Patrick Richard.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 29, 2026
• Docket: 24-P-1220
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1220

ANASTASIA ROSE

vs.

PATRICK RICHARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This case concerns medical malpractice claims arising from

dental procedures the defendant performed on the plaintiff in

2020. The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of her complaint

for failure to post a bond after not timely submitting an offer

of proof. The plaintiff claims that the motion judge's decision

denying her leave to file an untimely offer of proof was

arbitrary and capricious, and that she was denied a full

hearing. We affirm.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant

in January 2023, alleging that the defendant performed dental

work on her without her consent and that those procedures

adversely impacted her physical and mental health and required remedial work. On May 30, 2023, the Superior Court issued a

"notice of tribunal waived," stating that the plaintiff did not

timely file an offer of proof. The notice required the

plaintiff to post a bond of $6,000 within thirty days, pursuant

to G. L. c. 231, § 60B, to pursue her claim in court.1 The

plaintiff subsequently filed a "motion to accept late filing of

an offer of proof or decrease bond" on the grounds that the

plaintiff was indigent and self-represented. The motion judge

denied the motion on December 21, 2023, following a hearing. On

January 26, 2024, judgment entered dismissing the complaint for

failure to file the required bond.

When a medical malpractice action is brought against a

health care provider, a plaintiff is required to "present an

offer of proof to a 'tribunal consisting of a single justice of

the superior court, a physician licensed to practice medicine in

the commonwealth . . . and an attorney authorized to practice

law in the commonwealth.'" DosSantos v. Beth Israel Deaconess

Hosp.-Milton, Inc., 497 Mass. 34, 44-45 (2026), quoting G. L.

c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal has the "narrow task" of

determining whether the offer of proof "is sufficient to raise a

legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial

1 The bond amount of $6,000 is set by G. L. c. 231, § 60B, sixth par.

2 inquiry" (citation omitted). DosSantos, supra at 44. Where, as

here, a plaintiff does not file an offer of proof, there is

nothing on which a tribunal can determine whether the evidence

presented is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of

liability.

Our review is limited by the plaintiff's failure to provide

reasoned appellate argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A),

as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). In her brief, the

plaintiff quotes numerous legal authorities without sufficiently

explaining how those authorities support her claims of error.

See Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993)

(briefs that include general "bald assertions of error" devoid

of legal arguments do not "rise[] to the level of appellate

argument"). The rule requires that the brief filed by the

plaintiff contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect

to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which

the appellant relies." Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A). See

Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 1003

(2011). Rule 16 (a) (9) "is more than a mere technicality. It

is founded on the sound principle that the right of a party to

have this court consider a point entails a duty; that duty is to

assist the court with argument and appropriate citation of

3 authority" (quotation and citation omitted). Cameron v.

Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 85-86 (1995).

In her brief, the plaintiff states that the motion judge

discriminated against her based on her indigency and was "vulgar

and unprofessional," and that the decision denying her request

to decrease the bond amount was "abrasive, unprofessional and

unethical." Although the plaintiff cites legal authority, she

does not articulate how it supports her claims. The plaintiff's

reply brief suffers from a similar shortcoming; it contains no

citations to the record and cites legal authority without

engaging in argument beyond broad assertions of error. While

the plaintiff's claims do not rise to the level of appellate

argument, we note that there is nothing in the record to suggest

that the motion judge was anything but professional in deciding

the plaintiff's motion. Finally, the plaintiff raises several

arguments for the first time in her reply brief, which we do not

consider. See Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass.

596, 605 n.21 (2010) (argument raised for first time in reply

4 brief is not properly before appellate court). Accordingly, we

treat the plaintiff's claims as waived.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Grant, Brennan & Smyth, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: April 29, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.