Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Johnson

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 25, 2010
DocketCivil Action No. 2009-0098
StatusPublished

This text of Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Johnson (Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Johnson, (D.D.C. 2010).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANACOSTIA RIVERKEEPER, INC. and FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 09-0098 (JDB) LISA JACKSON, in her official capacity as Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is [13] the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") motion for

partial dismissal and partial remand without vacatur. In this action, plaintiffs challenge certain

pollution limits promulgated by EPA for the waters of the District of Columbia as inconsistent

with the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. These limits, called total maximum daily

loads ("TMDLs"), define the maximum amount of a pollutant that can enter a segment of water

and still permit that water to meet water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). The

pollutant limits must be expressed as "daily" limits. See Friends of the Earth v. Envtl. Prot.

Agency, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs assert that the TMDLs at issue here are expressed improperly as "seasonal" or

"annual" limits, and therefore are invalid under Friends of the Earth. EPA now concedes that the

"holding in Friends of the Earth extends to the [pollutant limits] that are the subject of Plaintiffs'

complaint." Def.'s Mot. for Partial Dismissal and Partial Remand ("Def.'s Mot.") [Docket Entry

13], at 1. Hence, the only question for the Court "is the appropriate remedy for this legal deficiency." Id.1

EPA contends that the deficient TMDLs should be remanded to the agency but not

vacated. See id. at 9. Plaintiffs, for their part, argue that the Court must vacate the deficient

TMDLs, but should stay vacatur "to allow a reasonable time for EPA to revise the TMDLs." Pls.'

Opp'n at 8-10. Plaintiffs also requested that the Court "direct the parties to file submissions with

the Court regarding the appropriate duration of [a] stay [of vacatur] needed to allow EPA a

'reasonable opportunity' to revise the challenged TMDLs." Id. at 12. The Court agreed with that

request, and ordered the parties to submit their proposals regarding the appropriate length of a

stay. See Apr. 21, 2010 Order [Docket Entry 21]. The parties have now provided their

submissions on this issue, which propose vastly different periods for a stay of vacatur.

The Court concludes that the proper remedy here is to vacate the challenged rules, but

stay vacatur in order to permit EPA an opportunity to correct the deficient TMDLs. In Friends of

the Earth, which the parties agree resolves plaintiffs' substantive challenges here, the D.C. Circuit

remanded similarly-deficient TMDLs to the district court "with instructions to vacate EPA's

approvals." 446 F.3d at 148. Recognizing, however, that neither the Friends of the Earth nor the

EPA "wants the Anacostia River to go without . . . TMDLs," the court indicated that "the parties

may move to stay the district court's order on remand to give" EPA an opportunity to amend its

1 The parties agree that because EPA has superceded two of the TMDLs challenged in plaintiffs' complaint with new TMDLs that conform to Friends of the Earth, plaintiffs' claims as to these two TMDLs are moot. See Def.'s Mot. at 7-9; Pls.' Mot. for Mediation and Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [Docket Entry 15], at 2, 7-8; see also Fund for Animals v. Hogan, 428 F.3d 1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (subsequent agency action superceding purported defects in earlier action moots challenge to earlier action). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss as moot the challenges to the TMDL referenced in paragraph 24e of the complaint and the polychlorinated biphenyls limits in the TMDL referenced in paragraph 24b. The remaining limits in the paragraph 24b TMDL cannot be dismissed because they have not been superceded.

-2- TMDLs. Id. The D.C. Circuit suggested this remedy despite the fact that the parties raised the

possibility, albeit briefly, of remand without vacatur. See Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss [Docket Entry 16], at 4, 7. The D.C. Circuit's remedial conclusion in the analogous

situation presented by Friends of the Earth persuades this Court that it should adopt the same

remedial approach here.

Moreover, although EPA is correct that a district court has discretion to order a remand

without vacatur, see, e.g., La. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n. v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075,

1085 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146,

150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993), that remedy is unavailable given the deficiencies in the TMDLs here.

"The decision whether to vacate depends on [1] 'the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and

thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive consequences

of an interim change that may itself be changed.'" Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150-51 (quoting

Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967

(D.C. Cir. 1985)).

Here, EPA's erroneous conclusion that it could express TMDLs in terms of annual or

seasonal pollutant limits is unquestionably a material deficiency in the regulation. As EPA

acknowledges, the error requires it to develop entirely new TMDLs, based on several years of

new data collection. See Def.'s Status Report [Docket Entry 21], Ex. 1 (Second Decl. of Helen

Drago ("Second Drago Decl.")), at ¶¶ 11, 13. Quite simply, EPA will be unable to justify the

challenged TMDLs "in a manner that is consistent with the statute." Milk Train, Inc. v.

Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429,

434 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remand without vacatur appropriate where "non-trivial likelihood" that

-3- agency would be able to justify rule on remand); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns

Comm'n, 280 F.3d 1027, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacatur appropriate where rule is

"irredeemable"), reh'g granted on other issues, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the

first Allied-Signal factor does not support remand without vacatur. See Heartland Reg'l Med.

Ctr. v. Sebelius, 566 F.3d 193,198 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("When an agency may be able readily to

cure a defect in its explanation of a decision, the first factor in Allied-Signal counsels remand

without vacatur.").

On the other hand, the second Allied-Signal factor -- the disruptive effect of vacatur --

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