Ana P. Colon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Second Circuit

Ana P. Colon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

252 F.3d 662, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12153

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJune 12, 2001

Docket2000

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 252 F.3d 662 (Ana P. Colon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ana P. Colon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 252 F.3d 662, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12153 (2d Cir. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner-Appellant pro se Ana P. Colon timely appeals from a July 13, 2000 order (“the order”) of the United States Tax Court (Julian I. Jacobs, Judge ) granting Respondent-Appellee Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. For the reasons stated below, the order is affirmed.

The Tax Court is vested with discretion to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute. See Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court 123(b) (“[f]or failure of a petitioner properly to prosecute ... the Court may dismiss a case at any time and enter a decision against the petitioner”). We review the Tax Court’s exercise of that discretion for abuse. See Bauer v. Commissioner, 97 *663 F.3d 45, 48 (4th Cir.1996); Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir.1988); Crandall v. Commissioner, 650 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981). See generally Moretti v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 637, 642 (2d Cir.1996) (“The Tax Court’s ... application of its own procedural rules[ ] is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

To determine whether the Tax Court has abused its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute, we consider the same factors that we look to in determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute. See Cran-dall, 650 F.2d at 660. Those factors are:

1) the duration of [petitioner’s] failures or non-compliance; 2) whether [petitioner] had notice that such conduct would result in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the [respondent] is likely to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in managing its docket against [petitioner’s] interest in receiving an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less draconian than dismissal.

Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir.2000); see also Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that although a court need not consider these factors on the record, “a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the ... court’s reasoning”).

Applying those factors here, we conclude that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner-Appellant pro se Ana P. Colon timely appeals from a July 13, 2000 order (“the order”) of the United States Tax Court (Julian I. Jacobs, Judge ) granting Respondent-Appellee Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. For the reasons stated below, the order is affirmed.

The Tax Court is vested with discretion to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute. See Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court 123(b) (“[f]or failure of a petitioner properly to prosecute ... the Court may dismiss a case at any time and enter a decision against the petitioner”). We review the Tax Court’s exercise of that discretion for abuse. See Bauer v. Commissioner, 97 *663 F.3d 45, 48 (4th Cir.1996); Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir.1988); Crandall v. Commissioner, 650 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981). See generally Moretti v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 637, 642 (2d Cir.1996) (“The Tax Court’s ... application of its own procedural rules[ ] is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

To determine whether the Tax Court has abused its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute, we consider the same factors that we look to in determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute. See Cran-dall, 650 F.2d at 660. Those factors are:

1) the duration of [petitioner’s] failures or non-compliance; 2) whether [petitioner] had notice that such conduct would result in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the [respondent] is likely to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in managing its docket against [petitioner’s] interest in receiving an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less draconian than dismissal.

Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir.2000); see also Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that although a court need not consider these factors on the record, “a decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit of the ... court’s reasoning”).

Applying those factors here, we conclude that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

252 F.3d 662, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ana-p-colon-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca2-2001.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack