1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANA MARIA OROSCO DIAZ, No. 1:26-cv-03454-DJC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. RELEASE ORDER 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), in which 18 Petitioner seeks release from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 19 (“ICE”). For the reasons stated below, the Petition is granted. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States in July 2023 and was 22 detained by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol shortly thereafter. (Pet. (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 3– 23 4.) Petitioner was then released on her own recognizance. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) 24 In October 2025, Petitioner was cited in Utah for an incident at a local retailer. 25 (Id. ¶ 10.) Petitioner pled guilty to a violation of the offense of unauthorized 26 possession of property in connection with this incident. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) When 27 Petitioner “reported to the Utah County Jail for the administrative book-and-release 28 process,” ICE officers detained her. (Pet. ¶ 65.) 1 Petitioner then filed the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court. 2 (ECF No. 1.) Briefing on this matter is now complete. (Pet. (ECF No. 1); Opp’n (ECF 3 No. 10); Reply (ECF No. 11).) The Court ordered this matter submitted without oral 4 argument. (See ECF No. 5.) 5 DISCUSSION 6 Respondents assert Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which 7 mandates the detention of an individual who is “charged with, is arrested for, is 8 convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute 9 the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law 10 enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury 11 to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). According to Respondents, 12 Petitioner’s Utah offense of “unauthorized possession of property” constitutes 13 “larceny,” and Respondents are thus statutorily required to detain her. (Opp’n at 3.) 14 In ascertaining whether the state offense Petitioner pled guilty to qualifies as 15 “larceny,” the Court finds the approach used to determine if a crime triggers 16 mandatory detention under other provisions of section 1226(c) instructive. In general, 17 when assessing whether a criminal offense matches a crime identified in the 18 Immigration and Nationality Act, courts often apply the categorical approach. “Under 19 this approach [courts] look not to the facts of the particular prior case, but instead to 20 whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the 21 generic federal definition of a corresponding” offense. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 22 184, 190 (2013) (quotation omitted). Courts have utilized this approach specifically to 23 assess whether a crime qualifies as one of “moral turpitude,” as required to trigger 24 mandatory detention under a different subsection of section 1226(c). See, e.g., 25 Vasquez Cruz v. Barr, No. 19-cv-05251-LHK, 2019 WL 6327576, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26 26, 2019) (using categorical approach to determine if a noncitizen was properly 27 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), which requires detention of a noncitizen 28 who “is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1 1182(a)(2)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which covers crimes “involving 2 moral turpitude”). 3 However, the subsection at issue here, section 1226(c)(2), explicitly directs 4 courts to give the listed offenses the meanings they have “in the jurisdiction in which 5 the act occurred.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). Therefore, the Court cannot look to the 6 generic federal definition of the listed offenses as Petitioner suggests. (See Pet. 7 ¶¶ 149–50.) Rather, the Court applies the categorical approach but must look, not to 8 the generic federal definition of the offense, but rather to how the qualifying offense is 9 defined within the state. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079, 1084–86 10 (9th Cir. 2015) (looking to state law to ascertain if a state offense qualified as a “crime 11 of violence” as required by federal sentencing guidelines). Accordingly, the Court will 12 assess whether the state statute defining the state offense categorically matches the 13 state’s definition of the section 1226(c)-qualifying offense. 14 Applying this approach, the Court must assess whether the statutory definition 15 of “unauthorized possession of property” criminalizes the same or a broader range of 16 conduct than does the offense of larceny under Utah law. “Unauthorized possession 17 of property” occurs when an individual “obtains or exercises unauthorized control 18 over another person's property, without the consent of the property's owner or legal 19 custodian, and with the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property 20 or to temporarily deprive the property's owner or legal custodian of possession of the 21 property.” Utah Code § 76-6-404.5(2). 22 The Court finds this crime does not match any definition of larceny under Utah 23 law. First, the Utah legislature has eliminated the statutory crime of larceny. “In 1973, 24 the Utah Legislature enacted a consolidated theft statute, which subsumed offenses 25 that had been known under prior Utah law as larceny, embezzlement, extortion, false 26 pretenses, and receiving stolen property.” State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975, 977 n.2 (Utah 27 Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also Utah Code § 76-6- 28 1 403. Accordingly, as Utah does not recognize a crime of “larceny,” this Court cannot 2 delineate what constitutes larceny under Utah law. 3 Second, even Utah’s pre-1973 definitions of larceny would not match 4 Petitioner’s offense. Petitioner’s offense of unauthorized possession of property 5 specifies a mens rea broader than that required for the historical offense of larceny. 6 Unauthorized possession of property occurs specifically when the individual acts “with 7 the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily 8 deprive the property's owner or legal custodian of possession of the property.” Utah 9 Code § 76-6-404.5(2). In contrast, the offense of larceny historically required a 10 narrower mens rea: the intent to steal. Under Utah’s prior criminal code, enacted in 11 1917, to convict an individual of larceny, the individual had to have taken “the 12 property with a felonious intent, that is, with the intent to steal it.” State v. Allen, 189 P. 13 84, 87 (Utah 1920). Similarly, prior to 1917, to convict an individual of larceny, it was 14 “necessary to find that the intent to steal existed at the time of the taking.” People v. 15 Miller, 11 P. 514, 514 (Utah 1886). To “steal,” is to take something “illegally with the 16 intent to keep it unlawfully.” Steal, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Therefore, 17 Utah’s larceny offense historically required the intent to permanently deprive the 18 property’s owner of the property.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANA MARIA OROSCO DIAZ, No. 1:26-cv-03454-DJC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. RELEASE ORDER 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), in which 18 Petitioner seeks release from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 19 (“ICE”). For the reasons stated below, the Petition is granted. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States in July 2023 and was 22 detained by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol shortly thereafter. (Pet. (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 3– 23 4.) Petitioner was then released on her own recognizance. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) 24 In October 2025, Petitioner was cited in Utah for an incident at a local retailer. 25 (Id. ¶ 10.) Petitioner pled guilty to a violation of the offense of unauthorized 26 possession of property in connection with this incident. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) When 27 Petitioner “reported to the Utah County Jail for the administrative book-and-release 28 process,” ICE officers detained her. (Pet. ¶ 65.) 1 Petitioner then filed the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court. 2 (ECF No. 1.) Briefing on this matter is now complete. (Pet. (ECF No. 1); Opp’n (ECF 3 No. 10); Reply (ECF No. 11).) The Court ordered this matter submitted without oral 4 argument. (See ECF No. 5.) 5 DISCUSSION 6 Respondents assert Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which 7 mandates the detention of an individual who is “charged with, is arrested for, is 8 convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute 9 the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law 10 enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury 11 to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). According to Respondents, 12 Petitioner’s Utah offense of “unauthorized possession of property” constitutes 13 “larceny,” and Respondents are thus statutorily required to detain her. (Opp’n at 3.) 14 In ascertaining whether the state offense Petitioner pled guilty to qualifies as 15 “larceny,” the Court finds the approach used to determine if a crime triggers 16 mandatory detention under other provisions of section 1226(c) instructive. In general, 17 when assessing whether a criminal offense matches a crime identified in the 18 Immigration and Nationality Act, courts often apply the categorical approach. “Under 19 this approach [courts] look not to the facts of the particular prior case, but instead to 20 whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the 21 generic federal definition of a corresponding” offense. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 22 184, 190 (2013) (quotation omitted). Courts have utilized this approach specifically to 23 assess whether a crime qualifies as one of “moral turpitude,” as required to trigger 24 mandatory detention under a different subsection of section 1226(c). See, e.g., 25 Vasquez Cruz v. Barr, No. 19-cv-05251-LHK, 2019 WL 6327576, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26 26, 2019) (using categorical approach to determine if a noncitizen was properly 27 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), which requires detention of a noncitizen 28 who “is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1 1182(a)(2)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which covers crimes “involving 2 moral turpitude”). 3 However, the subsection at issue here, section 1226(c)(2), explicitly directs 4 courts to give the listed offenses the meanings they have “in the jurisdiction in which 5 the act occurred.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). Therefore, the Court cannot look to the 6 generic federal definition of the listed offenses as Petitioner suggests. (See Pet. 7 ¶¶ 149–50.) Rather, the Court applies the categorical approach but must look, not to 8 the generic federal definition of the offense, but rather to how the qualifying offense is 9 defined within the state. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079, 1084–86 10 (9th Cir. 2015) (looking to state law to ascertain if a state offense qualified as a “crime 11 of violence” as required by federal sentencing guidelines). Accordingly, the Court will 12 assess whether the state statute defining the state offense categorically matches the 13 state’s definition of the section 1226(c)-qualifying offense. 14 Applying this approach, the Court must assess whether the statutory definition 15 of “unauthorized possession of property” criminalizes the same or a broader range of 16 conduct than does the offense of larceny under Utah law. “Unauthorized possession 17 of property” occurs when an individual “obtains or exercises unauthorized control 18 over another person's property, without the consent of the property's owner or legal 19 custodian, and with the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property 20 or to temporarily deprive the property's owner or legal custodian of possession of the 21 property.” Utah Code § 76-6-404.5(2). 22 The Court finds this crime does not match any definition of larceny under Utah 23 law. First, the Utah legislature has eliminated the statutory crime of larceny. “In 1973, 24 the Utah Legislature enacted a consolidated theft statute, which subsumed offenses 25 that had been known under prior Utah law as larceny, embezzlement, extortion, false 26 pretenses, and receiving stolen property.” State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975, 977 n.2 (Utah 27 Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also Utah Code § 76-6- 28 1 403. Accordingly, as Utah does not recognize a crime of “larceny,” this Court cannot 2 delineate what constitutes larceny under Utah law. 3 Second, even Utah’s pre-1973 definitions of larceny would not match 4 Petitioner’s offense. Petitioner’s offense of unauthorized possession of property 5 specifies a mens rea broader than that required for the historical offense of larceny. 6 Unauthorized possession of property occurs specifically when the individual acts “with 7 the intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily 8 deprive the property's owner or legal custodian of possession of the property.” Utah 9 Code § 76-6-404.5(2). In contrast, the offense of larceny historically required a 10 narrower mens rea: the intent to steal. Under Utah’s prior criminal code, enacted in 11 1917, to convict an individual of larceny, the individual had to have taken “the 12 property with a felonious intent, that is, with the intent to steal it.” State v. Allen, 189 P. 13 84, 87 (Utah 1920). Similarly, prior to 1917, to convict an individual of larceny, it was 14 “necessary to find that the intent to steal existed at the time of the taking.” People v. 15 Miller, 11 P. 514, 514 (Utah 1886). To “steal,” is to take something “illegally with the 16 intent to keep it unlawfully.” Steal, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Therefore, 17 Utah’s larceny offense historically required the intent to permanently deprive the 18 property’s owner of the property. As the conduct criminalized by the state statute 19 Petitioner pled guilty to is broader than that criminalized as larceny in Utah historically, 20 Petitioner has not pled guilty to a qualifying offense under section 1226(c) and that 21 section cannot justify Petitioner’s detention. 22 The Government’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. In arguing this 23 crime qualifies as larceny under Utah law, Respondents highlight that the phrase 24 “obtains or exercises unauthorized control” appears in the statutory definition of 25 unauthorized possession of property. (Opp’n at 2–3.) Utah’s criminal code defines 26 this phrase to mean “conduct originally defined or known as common-law larceny by 27 trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, or embezzlement.” Utah 28 Code § 76-6-401(4). However, although Respondents are correct that the 1 unauthorized possession of property criminalizes conduct originally defined as 2 larceny, it is well established that neither offense occurs through conduct alone. 3 Rather, each requires a particular mens rea and those do not match. Accordingly, the 4 Court concludes that Petitioner is not detained under the authority of section 1226(c). 5 For the reasons stated in this Court’s prior cases, Petitioner’s detention is 6 instead governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Garcia Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25- 7 cv-01744-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 3551700 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025); Ortega v. Noem, No. 8 1:25-cv-01663-DJC-CKD, 2025 WL 3511914 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Lopez v. Lyons, 9 No. 2:25-cv-03174-DJC-CKD, 2025 WL 3124116 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025). Therefore, 10 Petitioner is entitled to release. 11 CONCLUSION 12 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 13 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED as to 14 Counts 2, 5.1 15 2. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner Ana Maria 16 Orosco Diaz from their custody. Respondents shall not impose any 17 additional restrictions on Petitioner, unless that is determined to be 18 necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. Respondents are 19 permanently ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re- 20 detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, 21 which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice describing the 22 change of circumstances necessitating Petitioner’s arrest and detention, 23 and a timely hearing. At any such hearing, the Government shall bear 24 the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 25 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight, and 26 Petitioner shall be allowed to have their counsel present. This Order
27 1 In the interests of judicial economy, the Court declines to address the remaining grounds for relief in 28 the Petition. 1 does not address the circumstances in which Respondents may detain 2 Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final 3 order of removal. 4 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve the California City Immigration 5 Processing Center with a copy of this Order. 6 4. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to close this case and enter 7 judgment for Petitioner. 8 5. This Order resolves all pending motions. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 | Dated: _ July 2, 2026 “Daal J CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 | 5Jc7 - OroscoDiaz26cv03454.merits 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28