1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2
3 IN RE:
4 ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS CASE NO. 07-05185 BKT 5 RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO CHAPTER 13
6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 12-00053
7 ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS 8 RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO
10 Plaintiff
11 MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND FILED & ENTERED ON 05/11/2012 12 COUNSELORS AT LAW
13 Defendant(s)
14 ORDER 15 This proceeding is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to shorten terms of discovery 16 17 (Dkt No. 10), and Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt No. 16) of the Order allowing the 18 limited discovery proposed by Defendants (Dkt No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ 19 motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 20 21 I. Procedural background 22 On April 10, 2012, Defendants sought leave of Court to shorten the response period on a 23 limited discovery comprising two (2) interrogatories and two (2) requests for production of 24 25 documents, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. (Dkt No. 10). Defendants argued that said discovery request was needed to properly answer the complaint. On April 19, 2012, this Court entered an order granting Defendants’ unopposed motion and reducing the period for Plaintiffs to answer the interrogatories to fifteen (15) days. (Dkt No. 12). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on April 27, 2012 (Dkt No. 16), stating that Defendants’ request to shorten the period to answer to 1 discovery should have been denied as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ arguments are threefold. First, that 2 Defendants’ cannot use discovery means to answer a complaint, because they are to admit or deny 3 statements in the complaint without using extrinsic evidence. Second, that discovery procedures 4 5 cannot begin until the parties have conferred, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), or otherwise ordered 6 by the court. Finally, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or rule upon this discovery matter 7 until the parties have addressed the controversy without the Court’s intervention, pursuant to Fed. R. 8 9 Civ. P. 26& 37, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026 & 7037. 10 II. Discussion 11 A. Expedited discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) 12 13 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R. 14 Bankr. P. 7026, parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 15 16 any party’s claim or defense.” The limitation with respect to the scope of discovery under Rule 17 26(b)(1) is that the matter sought to be discovered is not privileged, “[o]ther than that, discovery 18 may be obtained with respect to any matter relevant to the claims or defenses of any party.” 10 19 20 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9020.01(16th ed.). 21 Although a party ordinarily may not commence discovery until the parties hold the discovery 22 conference required by Rule 26(f), the parties may engage in discovery earlier, however, if the court 23 24 has issued an order authorizing the discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Consequently, a party must 25 obtain leave of court if the party seeks to commence discovery before the time specified in Rule 26(d), given the parties have not agreed otherwise. The majority of Courts, including within the First Circuit, have applieda “good cause” or “reasonableness” standardwhen considering request for expedited discovery. See Momenta Pharms., 1 Inc. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. Ltd., 765 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 (D.Mass.2011); see also 6 Moore's Federal 2 Practice § 26.121 (2011).In a “good cause” analysis, a court must examine the discovery request on 3 the entirety of the record and the “reasonableness” of the request in light of all the surrounding 4 5 circumstances.Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 385, 386 (E.D. Wis. 2009);St. 6 Louis Group, Inc. v. Metals and Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Good 7 cause for expedited discovery may be found when the need for the expedited discovery outweighs 8 9 the prejudice to the responding party.Edgenet, Inc.,259 F.R.D. at 386; Moore's Federal Practice § 10 26.121.The party seeking expedited discovery has the burden of establishing the need for early 11 discovery and the burden of showing good cause.St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240, citing 12 13 Qwest Commc'n Int'l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003); 14 Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121. Finally, in allowing expedited discovery, the courts seek that the 15 subject matter related to requests for expedited discovery are narrowly tailored in scope. St. Louis 16 17 Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240; Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250 F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 18 In the present case, Defendants have in fact, narrowly tailored the discovery purportedly 19 needed to answer Plaintiffs’ claims and bring forth their defenses. Once the need for expedited 20 21 discovery was established by Defendants, and upon Plaintiffs’ failure to raise a timely opposition 22 that outweighed Defendants’ request, the Court found good cause to grant Defendants’ reasonable 23 request for the limited expedited discovery. 24 With regards to Plaintiffs’ allegations that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this 25 discovery matter because the parties failed to confer, or attempted to confer, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26& 37, this Court finds that nothing in the cited statues precludes this Court from entertaining Defendants’ motion for expedited discovery. Rule 26(c)(1) & Rule 37(a)(1), require that, prior to requesting that the court issue a protective order or an order to compel discovery, the movant must 1 attempt to secure the discovery by making a good faith effort to confer with the recalcitrant party. 2 That is not the controversy before this Court. 3 B. Relief from a Judgment or Order 4 5 Plaintiffs’cite no legal authority for their request for reconsideration. However, Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 6o, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 9024, affords six categories 7 8 of reasons or grounds on which to base a motion seeking relief from a final judgment, order, or 9 proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeks to balance the interest in the stability of judgments with the 10 interest in seeing that judgments not become instruments of oppression and fraud. 10 Collier on 11 12 Bankruptcy ¶9024.03 (15th ed. rev.). “[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, 13 order, or proceedings for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed R. Civ. P. 14 60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief "for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed R. Civ. P. 15 16 60(b)(6). 17 Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions invoking that rule should be 18 granted sparingly. Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002). Such relief is 19 20 available in our jurisdiction only when exceptional circumstances exist to justify this extraordinary 21 relief. In re Rodriguez Camacho, 361 B.R. 294 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Simon v.
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2
3 IN RE:
4 ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS CASE NO. 07-05185 BKT 5 RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO CHAPTER 13
6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 12-00053
7 ANA CAROLINA DE LA ROSA MACAS 8 RAFAEL TORRES LAUREANO
10 Plaintiff
11 MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND FILED & ENTERED ON 05/11/2012 12 COUNSELORS AT LAW
13 Defendant(s)
14 ORDER 15 This proceeding is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to shorten terms of discovery 16 17 (Dkt No. 10), and Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt No. 16) of the Order allowing the 18 limited discovery proposed by Defendants (Dkt No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ 19 motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 20 21 I. Procedural background 22 On April 10, 2012, Defendants sought leave of Court to shorten the response period on a 23 limited discovery comprising two (2) interrogatories and two (2) requests for production of 24 25 documents, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. (Dkt No. 10). Defendants argued that said discovery request was needed to properly answer the complaint. On April 19, 2012, this Court entered an order granting Defendants’ unopposed motion and reducing the period for Plaintiffs to answer the interrogatories to fifteen (15) days. (Dkt No. 12). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on April 27, 2012 (Dkt No. 16), stating that Defendants’ request to shorten the period to answer to 1 discovery should have been denied as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ arguments are threefold. First, that 2 Defendants’ cannot use discovery means to answer a complaint, because they are to admit or deny 3 statements in the complaint without using extrinsic evidence. Second, that discovery procedures 4 5 cannot begin until the parties have conferred, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), or otherwise ordered 6 by the court. Finally, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or rule upon this discovery matter 7 until the parties have addressed the controversy without the Court’s intervention, pursuant to Fed. R. 8 9 Civ. P. 26& 37, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026 & 7037. 10 II. Discussion 11 A. Expedited discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) 12 13 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R. 14 Bankr. P. 7026, parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 15 16 any party’s claim or defense.” The limitation with respect to the scope of discovery under Rule 17 26(b)(1) is that the matter sought to be discovered is not privileged, “[o]ther than that, discovery 18 may be obtained with respect to any matter relevant to the claims or defenses of any party.” 10 19 20 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9020.01(16th ed.). 21 Although a party ordinarily may not commence discovery until the parties hold the discovery 22 conference required by Rule 26(f), the parties may engage in discovery earlier, however, if the court 23 24 has issued an order authorizing the discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Consequently, a party must 25 obtain leave of court if the party seeks to commence discovery before the time specified in Rule 26(d), given the parties have not agreed otherwise. The majority of Courts, including within the First Circuit, have applieda “good cause” or “reasonableness” standardwhen considering request for expedited discovery. See Momenta Pharms., 1 Inc. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. Ltd., 765 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 (D.Mass.2011); see also 6 Moore's Federal 2 Practice § 26.121 (2011).In a “good cause” analysis, a court must examine the discovery request on 3 the entirety of the record and the “reasonableness” of the request in light of all the surrounding 4 5 circumstances.Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 385, 386 (E.D. Wis. 2009);St. 6 Louis Group, Inc. v. Metals and Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Good 7 cause for expedited discovery may be found when the need for the expedited discovery outweighs 8 9 the prejudice to the responding party.Edgenet, Inc.,259 F.R.D. at 386; Moore's Federal Practice § 10 26.121.The party seeking expedited discovery has the burden of establishing the need for early 11 discovery and the burden of showing good cause.St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240, citing 12 13 Qwest Commc'n Int'l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003); 14 Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121. Finally, in allowing expedited discovery, the courts seek that the 15 subject matter related to requests for expedited discovery are narrowly tailored in scope. St. Louis 16 17 Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240; Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250 F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 18 In the present case, Defendants have in fact, narrowly tailored the discovery purportedly 19 needed to answer Plaintiffs’ claims and bring forth their defenses. Once the need for expedited 20 21 discovery was established by Defendants, and upon Plaintiffs’ failure to raise a timely opposition 22 that outweighed Defendants’ request, the Court found good cause to grant Defendants’ reasonable 23 request for the limited expedited discovery. 24 With regards to Plaintiffs’ allegations that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this 25 discovery matter because the parties failed to confer, or attempted to confer, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26& 37, this Court finds that nothing in the cited statues precludes this Court from entertaining Defendants’ motion for expedited discovery. Rule 26(c)(1) & Rule 37(a)(1), require that, prior to requesting that the court issue a protective order or an order to compel discovery, the movant must 1 attempt to secure the discovery by making a good faith effort to confer with the recalcitrant party. 2 That is not the controversy before this Court. 3 B. Relief from a Judgment or Order 4 5 Plaintiffs’cite no legal authority for their request for reconsideration. However, Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 6o, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 9024, affords six categories 7 8 of reasons or grounds on which to base a motion seeking relief from a final judgment, order, or 9 proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeks to balance the interest in the stability of judgments with the 10 interest in seeing that judgments not become instruments of oppression and fraud. 10 Collier on 11 12 Bankruptcy ¶9024.03 (15th ed. rev.). “[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, 13 order, or proceedings for . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed R. Civ. P. 14 60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief "for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed R. Civ. P. 15 16 60(b)(6). 17 Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions invoking that rule should be 18 granted sparingly. Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002). Such relief is 19 20 available in our jurisdiction only when exceptional circumstances exist to justify this extraordinary 21 relief. In re Rodriguez Camacho, 361 B.R. 294 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Simon v. Navon, 116 22 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1997)). A party who seeks relief under Rule 60(b) must persuade the Court, at a 23 24 bare minimum, that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the 25 judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted. Rodriguez Camacho, supra (citing Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002)). Except for the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ motion for relief, none of the above factors have been 1 || demonstrated.Plaintiffs’ have failed to allege details showing excusable neglect under a Rul 2 60(b)(1), or “any other reason justifying relief’ under a Rule 60(b)(6). The Court concludes tha 3 4 || Plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration is meritless. 5 WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Debtors’ motion for reconsideration shall be, and 1 6 hereby is, DENIED. 7 3 SO ORDERED. 9 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11 day of May, 2012. 10 An 12 Brian K. Tester U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25