Amy Lynn Childress v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 2207233
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien, Lorish and Senior Judge Humphreys UNPUBLISHED

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

AMY LYNN CHILDRESS MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 2207-23-3 PER CURIAM MARCH 24, 2026 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CITY OF LYNCHBURG F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge

Amy Lynn Childress, pro se.

(Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Ryan Beehler, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.

The circuit court held Amy Lynn Childress in direct contempt for “[m]isbehavior in the

presence of the court” under Code § 18.2-456(A)(1) and fined her $250. On appeal, Childress

challenges the contempt finding and argues that the court “violated [her] Sixth Amendment right

to counsel and protections under the [Americans with Disabilities Act],” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to

12213 (“ADA”). Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing

party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, we discard any evidence that

conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence and regard as true all the credible evidence

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that can be fairly drawn therefrom. Cady,

300 Va. at 329.

In 2023, Childress sought certification of a written statement of facts for an appeal from a

charge that had been nolle prossed. The Commonwealth objected, and the court convened a

hearing. The court “set the ground rules” for the hearing and instructed Childress not to interrupt

the court. Childress immediately interrupted, stating, “I shouldn’t be here without counsel[,] and

it is improper for me to be here as a criminal defendant without counsel. I am not mentally

well.” Childress then accused the court of purposely denying her counsel and stated, “I already

hear[d] your little rumors that you want to . . . hold me in contempt. That’s what your goal is

today.”

The court warned Childress that she would “force the [c]ourt to start contempt

proceedings” if she interrupted again. As the court explained the procedural posture of the case,

Childress repeatedly interrupted. The court warned Childress that “[i]f you interrupt me again

we will start contempt proceedings” and asked Childress if she understood. Childress answered,

“Deal, yes, a hundred percent.”

When the court explained that a statement of facts was not required because there was a

transcript, Childress interjected, “[W]hat you’re saying is not right.” The court then held

Childress in contempt for “continuously interrupting the [c]ourt after being notified and advised

[not] to do so.” It explained that Childress was “not entitled to counsel” for an adjudication of

“summary contempt for contemptuous conduct in the presence of this [c]ourt” after she had been

“told repeatedly not to interrupt.” When asked if she understood why she was being held in

contempt, Childress stated that she did not understand and that she was undergoing a “mental

competency evaluation” because there had “been a question of [her] competency” in other

-2- proceedings. When Childress kept interrupting, the court imposed a $250 fine “for [the]

contemptuous conduct.”

The court explained that Childress was not entitled to counsel for her motion to certify a

statement of facts because she faced “no possibility of a jail sentence” for a “charge that had

been nol[le] prossed.” Further, the court declined to certify a statement of facts “because there

[was] a transcript in the file.” Childress said that she did not “feel comfortable” or “safe” and the

court was “giving [her] a panic attack.” Although the court released her, Childress remained in

the courtroom and continued to interrupt. Ultimately, she was escorted from the courtroom.

ANALYSIS

I. The trial court’s direct contempt finding is supported by the evidence.

“It has long been recognized and established that a court is invested with power to punish

for contempt.” Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 442 (2010) (quoting Higginbotham v.

Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291, 294 (1965)). “[W]e review the exercise of a court’s contempt

power under an abuse of discretion standard.” Orndoff v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___

(Sept. 25, 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethical Treatment

of Animals, Inc., 273 Va. 700, 706 (2007)). “The abuse of discretion standard draws a line—or

rather, demarcates a region—between the unsupportable and the merely mistaken, between the

legal error . . . that a reviewing court may always correct, and the simple disagreement that, on

this standard, it may not.” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1, 10-11 (2019) (alteration in

original) (quoting Reyes v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 133, 139 (2019)). “[W]hen evaluating

whether the evidence supports a contempt finding, we have held that a court’s judgment when

exercising its contempt power is presumed correct and will not be overturned unless it is clearly

erroneous or lacks evidentiary support.” Orndoff, ___ Va. at ___; see Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273

Va. 385, 408 (2007).

-3- “[T]here are two distinct types of contempt, direct and indirect.” Scialdone, 279 Va. at

442. A “direct contempt is one committed in the presence of the court,” while indirect contempt

“occur[s] outside the presence of the court.” Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 227

(2008). Direct contempt is “subject to summary adjudication” where “no evidence or further

proof is required because the court has observed the offense.” Id. at 227-28. The court is its

“own best witness of what occurred.” Scialdone, 279 Va. at 444 (quoting United States v.

Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1971)). Thus, for direct contempt, the court may “proceed

upon its own knowledge of the facts” and “punish the offender without further proof, and

without issue or trial in any form.” Id. at 442 (quoting Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838,

846 (1904)).

Conduct subject to summary adjudication and punishment as direct contempt includes

“[m]isbehavior in the presence of the court.” Code § 18.2-456(A)(1); see Bell v. Commonwealth,

81 Va. App. 616, 627 (2024). “We have never defined misbehavior in any definitive sense—nor

could we.” Parham v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 450, 459 (2012); see Ronald J. Bacigal,

Criminal Offenses & Defenses 457 (2025-26 ed.) (recognizing the term “cannot be fully

defined”). “It is assumed that reasonable people understand the line between good and bad

behavior, particularly when exhibited in open court in the presence of a judge.” Parham, 60

Va. App. at 459.

Childress argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her direct contempt

conviction. She contends that she was not disruptive or disrespectful to the court but made

“respectful, trauma-informed requests grounded in her denial of counsel and accommodations.”

The court repeatedly instructed Childress not to interrupt and advised that it would hold

her in contempt if she persisted. Despite the court’s clear warnings and Childress’s assurances

that she understood the consequences, she continued to interrupt the proceedings. When the

-4- court tried to address Childress’s concerns, Childress interjected with the accusation that the

court’s goal was to hold her in contempt. These interruptions reflected “defiance of, and disdain

for, the judiciary, while accomplishing absolutely nothing toward addressing [any] alleged error

that provoked [her] to misbehave in the first place.” Parham, 60 Va. App. at 459. And although

“misbehavior in the presence of the court may be summarily punished under Code

§ 18.2-456(A)(1) without a showing of an obstruction or interruption of justice,” id. at 461, we

note that each time Childress interrupted, she disrupted the court’s ability to conduct the hearing

on her request to certify a statement of facts.

Childress claims her behavior was justified because she was merely requesting counsel.

As the court explained, however, Childress was not entitled to counsel for a hearing on her

request to certify a statement of facts because (a) the charge had been nolle prossed, so she faced

no possibility of jail time; and (b) a transcript already existed, so no statement of facts was

necessary. Although “[n]o litigant is expected to cheerfully agree with an adverse judicial

ruling,” the court was right to insist that Childress heed warnings to maintain decorum and

“refrain from exhibiting contemptuous behavior in open court.” Id. at 459. Based on the record

before us, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of direct contempt.

II. Childress’s remaining challenges do not entitle her to relief.

Childress claims that “[t]he trial court violated [her] Sixth Amendment right to counsel

and protections under the ADA” because she appeared without an attorney and the court did not

make reasonable accommodations for her post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety.2 But

2 In support of her claims, Childress cites to documents not in the record and asks this Court to supplement the record. We deny this motion. An appellate court is “limited to the record of the proceedings which have taken place in the lower court and have been there settled and certified to us.” Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 39 n.3 (2007) (quoting Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 101, 107 (1941)). -5- Childress was not entitled to counsel for either the summary contempt adjudication or the

underlying request to certify a statement of facts, and she did not invoke the ADA at the hearing.

A. Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment did not provide Childress a right to counsel for the summary

contempt adjudication. “[W]hile contempt may be an offense against the law and subject to

appropriate punishment, . . . since the foundation of our government[,] proceedings to punish

such offenses have been regarded as sui generis and not ‘criminal prosecutions’ within the Sixth

Amendment or common understanding.” Porter v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 467, 477

(2015) (quoting Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1924)); see also Virk v. Clemens,

81 Va. App. 632, 661 (2024) (stating that a “summary contempt proceeding is not inherently

criminal in nature”). “Because criminal contempt proceedings are not ‘criminal prosecutions,’

the protections of the Sixth Amendment do not apply to such proceedings.” Gilman, 275 Va. at

228. Thus, the court did not violate Childress’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because that

right did not apply.

Additionally, Childress had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for her underlying

request to certify a statement of facts. She was attempting to appeal a charge that had been nolle

prossed. The Commonwealth objected to her statement of facts, and the court convened a

hearing as required by Rule 5A:8. See Rule 5A:8(d) (stating that a judge “must set a hearing

with notice to all parties” within 10 days after an “objection is filed” to a written statement of

facts). At the hearing, the court denied Childress’s certification request because a transcript

already existed for the proceeding in question. See Rule 5A:8(c) (addressing requests for a

statement of facts “in [l]ieu of [t]ranscript” (emphasis added)). We agree that Childress was not

entitled to a statement of facts under Rule 5A:8. And, more to the point, we agree that Childress

was not entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because she did not face the possibility

-6- of jail time for the nolle-prossed charge. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 794, 802

(1998) (stating that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment applies only to prosecutions

for which the defendant faces actual incarceration); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,

373-74 (1979). For these reasons, we conclude that the court did not violate Childress’s right to

counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

B. ADA accommodations

“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause

shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “The purpose of the

contemporaneous objection rule is to alert opposing counsel to the issue and to provide the trial

court an opportunity to intelligently rule on the issue,” Commonwealth v. Carolino, 303 Va. 399,

409 (2024), thus “avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals,” Brown v. Commonwealth, 279

Va. 210, 217 (2010).

The record on appeal does not show that Childress invoked the ADA or asked the court to

make a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Although Childress said that she was “not

comfortable” and “not safe,” she did not cite a disability as the cause. Childress never spoke of

the ADA during the hearing and offered no evidence that she had a disability recognized under

the ADA. When informed of her discomfort, the court gave her permission to leave. Rather than

accepting the court’s permission to exit, however, Childress remained and continued to interrupt.

Simply put, Childress made no ADA-specific request for accommodations. Thus, the court

could not know what “particular point [was] being made in time to do something about it.”

Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58

Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).

-7- Although Childress invokes the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18, she fails to

affirmatively argue that the “exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the denial of

essential rights.” Brittle v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 505, 513 (2009) (quoting Rowe v.

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 503 (2009)). The “‘ends of justice exception is narrow and is to

be used sparingly,’ and applies only in the extraordinary situation where a miscarriage of justice

has occurred.” Cornell v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 17, 31 (2022) (quoting Conley v.

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 658, 682 (2022)). To avail oneself of the exception, “[the

appellant] must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a

miscarriage might have occurred.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 199, 210 (2016) (en

banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 (1997)).

It is never enough for an appellant “to merely assert a winning argument on the merits—for if

that were enough[,] procedural default ‘would never apply, except when it does not matter.’”

Winslow v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 539, 546 (2013) (quoting Alford v. Commonwealth, 56

Va. App. 706, 710 (2010)).

An appellant has a “heavy” burden to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice has

occurred. Holt, 66 Va. App. at 210 (quoting Brittle, 54 Va. App. at 514). Childress has not

carried her burden. She has failed to “point . . . to a particular place in the record” affirmatively

establishing a manifest injustice or denial of essential rights. Brittle, 54 Va. App. at 517. We

find that her argument is waived, so we do not consider it. Rule 5A:18.

-8- CONCLUSION

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by summarily holding Childress in direct

contempt under Code § 18.2-456(A)(1), and it did not violate her Sixth Amendment rights.

Childress failed to preserve for appeal any issue concerning the ADA. Therefore, we affirm the

circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

-9-