Amy Elizabeth Terry v. Orleans Parish Justice Center, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: May 19, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02535
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AMY ELIZABETH TERRY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2535

ORLEANS PARISH JUSTICE CENTER, SECTION: “I”(5) ET AL.

PARTIAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and its employee, Dr. Andrea McMahon-Blake. (Rec. doc. 17). Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion. HavIi.n g revFieawcteuda tlh Bea pclkegadroinugnsd a n d the applicable law, the Court recommends as follows. in forma pauperis On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed her corrected Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five Defendants including Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and Dr. Andrea McMahon-Blake (collectively “MovantIds”.). (Rec. doc. 4). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”). ( ). She names Wexford as the medical provider forI tdh.e OJC and Wexfordi’nst eemr apllioayee, Dr. McMahon-Blake, as the Medical Director of the OJC. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges, , that she received inadequate medical treatment at the OJC. ( ). Specifically, she claims her insulin was discoIndt.inued upon processing into the facility, and that she has been denied medical treatment. ( ). Movants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so the claims in the Complaint as to Wexford and Dr. McMahon-Blake should be dismissed in accoIIr.d anceS twainthd aFredd eforarl aR Muloe toiof Cni vtoil DPrisomceidsus rUen 1d2e(rb )R(6u)le. 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but itA dshecmroafntd vs. Imqboarel than an unadorned, the-defendanBt-eulln Alatwl. Cfuolrlpy.- hv.a Trwmoemd-bmlye accusation.” , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must “‘giveT wthoem dbelfyendant fair notice of what Cthoen l.e .y . vc.l aGiimbs iosn and the grounds upon which it rests.’” , 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elemeInqtbsa olf a cause of action,” or “‘naTkweodm abslsyertions’ devoid of

‘further factual enhancement.’” , 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration omitted). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffIiqcibeanlt factual matter, accepted aTsw tormueb, ltyo ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” , 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court tIod . draw theT wreoamsobnlyable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing , 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate to probability, but raItdh.er “it asTksw ofomrb lmyore than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (citing , 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability,I dit. ‘stops shoTrwt oomf bthlye line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting , 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts pleaded in the complaint “do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconducItd, .the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motioTnw too mdbislmy. i sCsl offoerr fva.i Cluornen tiock state a claim, a court employs the two-pronged approach used in appeal dismissed , Civ. A. No. 23-6268, 2024 WL 4855475, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2024), , No. 25- 30139, 2025 WL 2020968 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025). The court “can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conIcqlbuasilons [unsupported by factual allegations], are

not entitled to the assumption of truth.” , 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veIdr.acity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a leBgoadllyy bcyo gCnoiozka,b Ilnec c. lva. iSmta tthea Fta irsm p lMauusti.b Aleu,t on.o Itn tso evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success.D’”o e ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist ., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting ., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012)). A court's review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents

attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC complaint.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing pro se , 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). Courts “liberallpyr oco snestrue briefs of litigants and apply leGsrsa nsttr vin. Cgueenltl asrtandards to parties proceeding than to parties represented by counsel.” , 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). This does not mean, however, that a court “will invent, out of whole

cloth, novel argumenJtosn oens vb. eAhlfarlef dof a pro se plaintiff in the absence of meaningful, albeit imperfect, briefing.” , 353 F. App'x 949, 952 (5th Cir. 2009). Even a liberally- construed Jporhon ssoen c ovm. Aptklaiinnst “must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granIItIe.d .” Law and Analys, i9s9 9 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must showW tehsat tv t. hAet kailnlesged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” , 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). Inmates do not have a ConstitutiSoenea lB raiugghht mtoa tnh ev. mGaerdciicaal treatment they prefer or to the best medical treatment available. , 254 F. Supp. 2d 848, 988 (S.D. Tex. 2017. And prisonId o.fficials “arMea nyowt eraetqhueirr evd. F toot iprovide treatment that is ‘the best that money could buy[.]’” (quoting , 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992)). An inmate's disagreement with the treatment provided does not amount to a violation of the inmate's Constitutional rights, and a provider's exerSceies eN oorft omn evd. Diciaml ajuzadngament therefore likewise cannot give rise to Ya oCuonngs tvi.t uGtriaoynal violation. , s1e2e2 T Fij.3erdi n2a8 6v,. S2t9a2n l(e5yth Cir. 1997) (citing , 560 F.2d 201, 201 (5th Cir. 1977));

, 804 F. App'x 277, 278 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that medical records established that prisoner received treatment, reducing his claim to a disagreement about the treatment provided). Additionally, a “jail's medical department is not necessarily obligated to implement aMllo anstpgeocmtse oryf cva. Lreo gpsrdeosncr, ibed or recommended by an outside medical provider or specialist.” r eport and recommendatiCoinv .a Ad. oNpot.e 2d0-756, 2021 WL 4138361, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2021), , Civ. A. No. 20-756, 2021 WL 4133552 (E.D.

La. Sept. 10, 2021). In this case, the crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Wexford and Dr. McMahon-Blake is that her insulin was discontinued. (Rec. doc. 4). The Complaint sets forth no other facts as to the Movants. The Complaint is also devoid of any purported injury to Plaintiff resulting from the alleged discontinuation. In fact, Plaintiff receives continued treatment by the Movants for diabetes. (Rec. doc. 1701). At best, the allegation shows that Movants exercised medical judgment, and Plaintiff disagrees with the treatment provided to her. However, mere disagreement with the treaSteme eYnotu pnrgo vided does not amount to a violation of the

inmate's constitutional rights. , 560 F.2d at 201. Thus, without sufficient allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails on its face to state a claim against Movants as she fails to allege any Constitutional violation by Movants regarding any medical treatment provided to her. A . Dr. McMahon-Blake

Medical malpracSteiec eE dstoeelsle n vo.t Gbaemcobmlee a Constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. , 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissioInd.s sufficiently harmful to

demonstrate deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of seriousF baormdielyr vh.a Brmre nannadn he disregards that risk by fasileien ga ltsoo tRaekeev reesa vs.o Cnoallbinles measures to abate it.” , 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); , 27 F.3d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1994). Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does aS eper iBsoannuere'lso sd vis. aMgcrFeaermlaenndt with his medical

treatment, abseVnat renxacdeop tvio. Lnyanl acuirgchumstances. H,a 4ll1 v F. T.3hdo m23a2s, 235 (5th Cr. 1995); Stewa, r9t2 v0. MFu.2rdp h3y20, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); , 190 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1999); , 174 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1999). “Furthermore, the decision whether Dtoom pinroov vi.d Tee xa.d Ddeipti'ot noaf lC rtirmea. tJmuset.nt ‘is a classic example of a matter for medicEasl tjeuldlegment.’” , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting , 429 U.S. at 107). A showing of deliberate indifference requires the prisoner to submit evidence that prison officials “‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any simila r cIodn. duct that

wJoohunlsdo nc lve.a rTlrye eenvince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” (quoting , 759 F.2d 1236, 1Id238se e( 5atlhso C Hire.r n1a9n8d5e)z) .v . T“Dexe.l iDbeepr'att oef iPnrdoitfefecrtievnec &e R‘iesg aunl. Seexrtrves.mely high standard to meet.’” .; , 380 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the test of deliberate indifference is a significantly high burden for plaintiffs to overcome.). Plaintiff has failed to allege any acts or omissions by Dr. McMahon-Blake sufficiently harmful to suggest deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as required to support her Section 1983 claim. Plaintiff merely alleges that her insulin was discontinued. Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not at all address any deliberate indifference by Dr. McMahon-Blake. In fact, Plaintiff fails to allege that the discontinuation of her insulin caused her serious harm or that Dr. McMahon-Blake had subjective intent to cause Plaintiff serious harm by the discontinuance. Plaintiff does not set forth any facts to show that Dr. McMahon-Blake had subjective knowledge that discontinuing Plaintiff’s insulin was substantially certain to cause Plaintiff serious harm. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not meet the basic pleading

requirements to establish any claim against Dr. McMahon-Blake. As described above, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only one allegation – that her insulin was discontinued – which alone is insufficient to allege a violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not “clearly establish” that she has a right to her preferred medical treatment. Further, Plaintiff filed no opposition to Movants’ motion to dismiss and thus offered no additional facts or argument to overcome the Movants’ defenseBs.. Wexford

A private company, such as Wexford, which has been hired to run the medical department at a parish jail is treated as a municipal or local governmental entity for the pMuornpeollses of SeMctoionnt g1o9m8e3r,y a, nd, therefore, claims against such a company are analyzed as claims. 2021 WL 4138361, at *3. In a similar case, Judge Van Meerveld referred to the words of United states District Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon who had previously explained:

“The test to determine liability for a private pArlifsroend -mv. aCnoargre.m Ceonrtp corporation under § 1983 is more or less identical to the teMsto neemllp vl.o Dyeepd' tt oof dSoecte. Srmerivnse municipal or local government liability.” ., 2009 WL 789649, at *2, n.1 (W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2009) (citing ., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (other citations omitted)). Thus, to establish CorrectHealth's liability under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must prove the existenSceee oDfu vaa llp vo. lDicaylml. Caknetyr, an official policy, and a violation oPf iotthreo wpsklai ivn.t Cifift'ys coof nHsotuitsu.tional rights for which the moving force was the policy or custom. ., Tex., 631 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2011); , 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). The requirement of a policymaker, an official policy, and the ‘moving force’ of the policy, serve to distinguish individual violatiPoinost rboyw sgkoivernment healthcare contractor employees from those that can be fairly considered actions of the government health Woodwcaorndt vra. Lctoopri nittsoelf. , 237 F.3d at 578.” accord Carter v. Gaut,r Ceiavu. xA. No. 18-4236, 2021 WL 1969446, at *5 (E.D. La. May 17, 2021); , Civ. A. No. 19-105. 2020 WL 6251186, at *2 (M.MD.o Lnael. lOct. 22, 2R0ic2h0a)r d(tsroenaPtilnagq uae cmlainimes aPgaari.n Dste tCeonrtrioenct CHtera.lth East Baton Rouge, L.L.C. as a claim); , Civ. A. No. 19-10926, 2020 WL 5217017, at *5 (MEo.Dn.e lLla. Aug. 1r2ep, o2r0t2 a0n) d( trreecaotminmg ean dclaatiimon aagdaoinpstte dCorrectHealth Plaquemines, L.L.C. as a claim), , 2020 WL 5209302 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2020). The Fifth Circuit has noted that in order to hold a municipality or a local government unit liable under Section 1983 for the misconduct of one of its employees, a plaintiff must initially alSlepgilel etrh av.t Cainty o offfi cTieaxl .p Coitliyc, yP oorli cceu sDteopm’t was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted. , 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997). To satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the custom or policy served as a moving force behind the Constitutional violatiIodn. at issue or that [his] injuries resulted from the execution of an official policy or custom. The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlyIidn.g Constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts. Further, “[a] plaintiff may not infer aC poollleic vy. mBrearezolys bCetcya.use harm resulted from some interactsieoen a wlsiot hW ae tgzoelv ev.r nPmeneznattaol entity.” , 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993); , 2009 WL 5125465, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 2009). Rather, he must identify the Speeo,l iec.yg ., oMr urcruasyto vm. T othwant oafl lMegaendsluyr acaused the deprivation of his ConstituTtrieoencael vr. iLgohutsis. i ana , 76 FW. eAtpzepl'x 547, 549 (5th Cir.

2003); , 74 F. App'x 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003); , 2009 WL 5125465, at *3. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that her Constitutional rightsS weee Mreo vnigoolamteerdy as a result of a policy or custom, much less identify such a policy or custoMmo. n ell , 2021 WL 4138361, at *3. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a proper claim against Wexford. Accordingly, the instant motion should be granted with respect to the Section 1983 claims agaiInVs. t WeRxefocrodm, amnde nthdoasteio cnla ims should be dismissed.

FITo rI Sth ReE fCoOreMgoMinEgN rDeEasDons, that Defendants’ MoGtiRoAn NtoT DEiDsmiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be , and that Plaintiff's federal DCoISnMstIitSuStEioDn Wal IcTlHai mPRs EbJrUoDuIgChEt .pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in relation to Movants be NO TICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the parDtyo uhgasla bsse evn. Usenritveedd Swtaitthe sn oAtuitcoe. tAhsast’ nsuch consequences will result from a failu re to object. , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 19th May

New Orleans, Louisiana, this ________ day of _________________________, 2026.

________________________________________________________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE