Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
February 11, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 59728-4-II
AMY ELIZABETH ATHERTON,
Petitioner, UNPUBLISHED OPINION v.
JASON RAY ATHERTON,
Respondent.
PRICE, J. — Jason Atherton and Amy Atherton divorced after about 14 years of marriage.1
Following a dissolution trial and as part of its final orders, the trial court ordered Jason to pay Amy
$3,000 per month in spousal maintenance for 5 years.
Jason appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory factors
for spousal maintenance and, accordingly, abused its discretion in entering the amount and
duration of its maintenance award.
We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
Jason and Amy were married in 2008. In 2022, Amy petitioned for dissolution. Jason and
Amy had four children together during the marriage and owned two homes. In addition to the two
1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect. No. 59728-4-II
homes, Jason and Amy owned other assets, including, among other things, bank accounts, cars,
and consumer electronics. Prior to trial, the court entered preliminary orders that required Jason
to pay Amy $3,600 per month in temporary spousal maintenance and $1,576 per month in
temporary child support.
II. TRIAL
The dissolution trial focused on three main issues—property division, spousal
maintenance, and child support. Amy was the first witness to testify.
In addition to the facts set forth above, Amy testified about her educational background
and her decision to leave the workforce. She explained that she had earned a bachelor’s degree as
well as a master’s degree from the University of Washington in education with a teaching
certificate. Amy initially worked as a teacher early in the marriage but stopped working after she
became pregnant with their second child in 2012. At that point, Amy stayed home and took care
of the children, eventually having a total of four children. Amy was not employed in full-time
work outside the home until after the parties had separated.
Amy testified that after the parties separated, she returned to work as a teacher for a private
school, earning a salary of $51,000 per year. Amy explained that this teaching position was the
only job that she was offered after applying to at least 50 positions. Amy was 41 years old at the
time of her testimony.
With respect to the value of their real property, Amy testified that the couple purchased
their first home in 2018. In 2020, they purchased a second home (a “nice home in the north end
of Tacoma”) into which they eventually moved with the children. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP)
at 63. The second home, where Amy and the four children resided at the time of trial, had an
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appraised value of $625,000. Amy testified that she paid $4,141.46 per month for the second
home’s mortgage, taxes, and insurance. The first home was rented to tenants who offered to buy
it for $500,000.
As for their standard of living, Amy testified that beyond the ownership of the homes, the
family had been on a few vacations and the children did extracurricular activities which were
expensive. Amy also explained that she anticipated incurring additional childcare costs after the
dissolution of the marriage.
Another topic of Amy’s testimony was Jason’s income. Amy explained that Jason owned
and operated a company that conducted fundraising called “Atherton Scale Company.” VRP at
29. Amy testified that Jason would do one or two fundraising campaigns per year that brought in
about $30,000-$60,000 of income. Amy also testified that Jason received one or two bonuses from
his employer, Best Buy, in the amount of $30,000-$50,000 per year.
Amy requested that the trial court award her spousal maintenance of $3,000 per month for
three years.
Jason took the stand next. He testified that he had been employed by Best Buy since 2021
and had a current salary of approximately $140,000. Jason also testified that his gross monthly
income was $13,476 and that he had $4,930.51 in deductions from his paycheck. Jason
acknowledged that he had a high income, but testified that the family was living “paycheck to
paycheck” due to high amounts of spending. VRP at 206. Despite Jason’s high income, he had
testified that he only worked two hours per day (although he denied he had capacity to fill work
hours with other employment). With respect to his separate business, Atherton Scale, Jason
testified that the company was not profitable, made little income, and had no contracts for 2023
3 No. 59728-4-II
and 2024. He said that he did not expect to continue operating the company because it was “a lot
of work for very little pay.” VRP at 230. As for bonuses, Jason said that he received a one-time
bonus from Best Buy based on the company’s performance as a whole during the pandemic, but
that the bonuses were not recurring. Jason did not contradict Amy’s testimony about the monthly
payments associated with the second home, but he added that the rental home’s mortgage was
approximately $2,000 per month.
III. TRIAL COURT’S ORAL RULING
Following the testimony and evidence, the trial court issued its decision with a lengthy oral
ruling. First addressing property division, the trial court found that each party had a 50 percent
community property interest in both homes. The trial court awarded the first home (the rental
property) to Jason minus Amy’s community property interest, and the second home (where Amy
and the children resided at the time of trial) to Amy minus Jason’s community property interest.
The trial court also divided up the parties’ other assets and debts, including various bank accounts,
cars, and personal property. The trial court listed the assets and put them in two groups for
allocation to each party, but it did not assign specific values to each asset.
Following the trial court’s property division decision, the trial court discussed Jason’s
income for the purposes of calculating child support. The trial court excluded potential future
bonuses from Best Buy because it decided that these bonuses were beyond Jason’s control. The
trial court also excluded any potential income from Jason’s business, Atherton Scale, because it
found Jason’s testimony credible that suggested he did not intend to pursue the business any
further.
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After excluding these potential sources of income from Jason’s income for the purposes of
calculating child support, the trial court switched to addressing spousal maintenance. During this
part of its oral ruling, the trial court appeared to track each statutory factor relevant to imposing a
maintenance award.2
Among the factors that the trial court must consider is the financial resources of the person
requesting maintenance. The trial court observed that Amy testified that she had been out of the
job market for many years when she stayed at home to care for the children. From the testimony
that Amy unsuccessfully applied for many jobs, the trial court noted that Amy had to take anything
that was offered because of the length of time that she had been out of the workforce. Accordingly,
the trial court found that it was likely that Amy’s income was lower than if she had remained in
her profession. The trial court also found that Amy’s income was significantly lower than Jason’s
income.
After addressing Amy’s financial resources, the trial court evaluated the time necessary for
Amy to acquire sufficient education or training to enable her to find employment appropriate to
her skills, interest, style of live, and other attendant circumstances. The trial court found that “it
will take time for [Amy] to catch up in her profession and get a higher-paying position” despite
her high degree of education. VRP at 361. Referencing Amy’s difficulty in finding a job, the trial
court then remarked that Amy’s lengthy time out of the job market was detrimental to Amy’s
earning capacity because of changes in the teaching profession. The trial court stated,
Being absent for such a long period, about [10] years, all sorts of things change in education, teaching. Technology changes; teaching methods change. And so the
2 As set forth below, RCW 26.09.090 provides for a nonexclusive list of six factors for the trial court to consider for awarding spousal maintenance.
5 No. 59728-4-II
[c]ourt is considering Ms. Atherton’s testimony that it was a real detriment to her when she began applying for jobs, and there was, I think—there was evidence about the number of jobs that she applied for and it was substantial, the number, and she basically had to take what she could get which is her current position; and so she really does have some making up to do.
VRP at 361-62.
The trial court next addressed the parties’ standard of living and duration of the marriage.
The trial court found that the parties had a “high standard of living.” VRP at 362. The trial court
noted that Jason and Amy owned two homes in “a nice part of town,” which had “good value,”
and it also noted that the family was able to go on vacations. VRP at 362. With respect to the
duration of the marriage, the trial court found that their roughly 14 years of marriage was a
“medium-length marriage.” VRP at 362.
The trial court moved on to address Amy’s age, physical and emotional condition, and
financial obligations. The trial court found that Amy was young, appeared to be in good health,
but she had “significant financial obligations, including paying her mortgage and providing for her
four children.” VRP at 363.
Finally, the trial court addressed the ability of Jason to meet his needs and financial
obligations while meeting Amy’s needs and financial obligations. The trial court first addressed
Jason’s ability to meet his needs. The trial court noted that
Mr. Atherton is resourceful and intelligent, and he has the good fortune of having a good job that pays well; and he has—his income is significantly more than the petitioner’s income.
VRP at 363. Based on this resourcefulness and intelligence together with the parties’ income
disparity, the trial court determined that Jason had the ability to pay spousal maintenance while
still meeting his own needs and financial obligations.
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Following its discussion of all these different considerations, the trial court ordered Jason
to pay Amy $3,000 per month in spousal maintenance for five years (two more years than Amy
had requested).
Immediately after the trial court issued its spousal maintenance award, the trial court
switched back to the topic of Jason’s income, returning again to its consideration of child support.
The trial court observed that Jason’s counsel had submitted a child support worksheet that showed
that his gross monthly income was $13,476.67 per month and his net monthly income was $7,406.
Neither Jason nor his counsel suggested that the income listed on the worksheet was incorrect or
incomplete. The trial court adopted Jason’s proposed income from the worksheet, finding that
$13,476.67 for gross monthly income was a “fair figure.” VRP at 364. The trial court also found
that Amy’s income was $4,250 per month based on the agreement of the parties.
Following the trial court’s oral ruling, the hearing for presentation and final orders was set.
IV. PRESENTATION HEARING
At the presentation hearing, Jason orally moved for reconsideration with respect to the trial
court’s spousal maintenance award. Jason argued that the amount of spousal maintenance awarded
to Amy was too high because he expected a decrease in his income and because of the impact of
what he was ordered to pay in child support. Jason also argued that the duration of spousal
maintenance awarded to Amy was too long because he had already paid temporary spousal
maintenance of approximately $43,000.
The trial court denied Jason’s oral motion for reconsideration. The trial court explained
that it “thought a lot about” the spousal maintenance award and that the years Amy had been out
of the workforce required the award. VRP at 400. The trial court explained,
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The spousal support is something that I thought a lot about. My main concern was that Ms. Atherton had been out of the workforce for about [10] years, and that’s a long absence that sets a person back in many ways; and her testimony was when she applied for a job, she sent out a lot of applications. And she took—she really did not have bargaining power; she took the job that was offered to her, not that it wasn’t a job that she would enjoy, but she really didn’t have options because she’s been out of the workforce for so long. There is a great disparity in their incomes, and the [c]ourt took that into account.
VRP at 400.
The trial court also explained that the amount and duration of its award was fashioned, in
part, on the children’s interests. The trial court stated that it wanted to increase the likelihood that
Amy would be able to keep the home for the children’s benefit. The trial court further explained
that it felt its spousal maintenance award was reasonable because of the disparity between Jason
and Amy’s incomes and since Amy was “going to have bills to pay.” VRP at 400. The trial court
acknowledged that Jason felt that the duration of the award was too long, but reiterated that the
award was in the children’s best interests.
V. WRITTEN ORDERS AND APPEAL
Following the presentation hearing, the trial court entered final written orders consistent
with its oral rulings, including that Jason was required to pay spousal maintenance in the amount
of $3,000 per month for five years. The trial court’s child support order stated that Jason’s net
monthly income was $7,406 and the attached child support worksheet stated that Jason’s gross
monthly income was $13,704.76.3 From these amounts, the trial court ordered Jason to pay Amy
$1,646.13 per month in child support.
3 The child support worksheet in our record provides a slightly different figure for Jason’s gross income ($13,704.76) from what the trial court orally found was Jason’s gross income ($13,476.67).
8 No. 59728-4-II
The trial court did not expressly incorporate its oral ruling with respect to its lengthy
consideration of the statutory factors for spousal maintenance into its final written orders.
Jason appeals.
ANALYSIS
Jason challenges the trial court’s spousal maintenance award by arguing that the trial court
abused its discretion because it failed to give adequate consideration to several of the statutory
factors relevant to spousal maintenance. We disagree.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court exercises “broad discretionary powers in awarding [spousal]
maintenance . . . .” In re Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d 507, 517, 553 P.3d 614 (2024). The trial
court’s disposition will not be overturned on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. “A
trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds or untenable reasons.” In re Marriage of Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d 555, 563, 446 P.3d 635
(2019). A trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is “outside the range of acceptable
choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard . . . .” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133
Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). A trial court’s decision is based on “untenable grounds” if
the factual findings are unsupported by the record, and a decision is based on “untenable reasons”
if it is based on “an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct
standard.” Id.
Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, the trial court’s findings will not be
disturbed on appeal so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of
Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1055 (2008).
9 No. 59728-4-II
“ ‘Substantial evidence exists if the record contains evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a
fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of
Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002)). We do “ ‘not substitute [our] judgment
for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.’ ” Id. (quoting In re
Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999)).
II. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE STATUTE
Spousal maintenance awards are governed by RCW 26.09.090. The statute includes a
nonexclusive list of factors for the trial court to consider in awarding spousal maintenance:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership . . . the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse or either domestic partner. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including but not limited to: (a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including separate or community property apportioned to [them], and [their] ability to meet [their] needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party; (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to [their] skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances; (c) The standard of living established during the marriage or domestic partnership; (d) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership; (e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance; and (f) The ability of the spouse or domestic partner from whom maintenance is sought to meet [their] needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance.
RCW 26.09.090 (emphasis added).
The trial court must consider the factors listed in RCW 26.09.090, but it need not make
specific factual findings on each factor. Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 564. Under the spousal
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maintenance statute, “ ‘the only limitation placed upon the trial court’s ability to award
maintenance is that the amount and duration, considering all relevant factors, be just.’ ” Wilcox,
3 Wn.3d at 520 (quoting In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn.2d 168, 178, 677 P.2d 152 (1984)).
The purpose of spousal maintenance is to be “ ‘a flexible tool by which the parties’ standard of
living may be equalized for an appropriate period of time.’ ” Id. (quoting Washburn, 101 Wn.2d
at 179). The trial court’s primary concern must be the parties’ economic situations after
dissolution. Id. at 520-21. But, in the end, it is an abuse of discretion to not give “fair
consideration” to the statutory factors. Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 564.
RCW 26.09.090 does not expressly require written findings. In general, “when specific
findings are not required by the statute[,] we review the record to determine whether the court
engaged in the appropriate analysis.” In re Marriage of Morris, 176 Wn. App. 893, 906-08, 309
P.3d 767 (2013) (rejecting the argument that the trial court’s consideration of factors under RCW
26.09.090 require written findings). And when a trial court’s “written findings of fact do not
clearly reflect a consideration of the statutory factors, resort can be made to the court’s oral ruling.”
In re Marriage of Murray, 28 Wn. App. 187, 189, 622 P.2d 1288 (1981) (oral ruling considered in
the context of statutory factors of child custody).
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO ITS SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE AWARD
Jason argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $3,000 per month in
spousal maintenance to Amy for five years because it did not give fair consideration to four (of
the six) factors of RCW 26.09.090. Specifically, Jason contends the trial court was deficient in its
consideration of the following factors: the first factor, RCW 26.09.090(1)(a) (the financial
11 No. 59728-4-II
resources of the party seeking maintenance); the second factor, RCW 26.09.090(1)(b) (the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training for the party seeking maintenance); the fifth
factor, RCW 26.09.090(1)(e) (the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations
of the party seeking maintenance); and the sixth factor, RCW 26.09.090(1)(f) (the ability of the
party from whom maintenance is sought to meet their needs and financial obligations while
meeting those of the party seeking maintenance).
A. AMY’S FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Jason first argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it is “impossible” to
determine whether the trial court adequately considered the first factor, which is focused on the
financial resources of the party seeking maintenance. Br. of Appellant 20. According to Jason, it
is unclear that the trial court gave fair consideration to Amy’s financial resources because the trial
court did not assign values to bank accounts, cars, and other personal property in either its oral
ruling or its written divorce order. We disagree.
The trial court made two factual findings with respect to Amy’s financial resources. The
trial court found that it was likely that Amy’s income was lower than she could be making if she
had remained in her profession instead of leaving the workforce to raise children in the home. The
trial court also found that Amy’s resulting income was significantly lower than Jason’s income.
Jason does not appear to challenge these findings. Instead, he faults the trial court for not
assigning values to certain assets, including the accounts, cars, and other personal property. Jason
is correct that the trial court did not assign specific values to these assets. But while it may have
been preferable if the trial court had attempted to assign dollar values to all of Amy’s possible
assets, the trial court did focus on Amy’s principle source of income—her job earnings—and
12 No. 59728-4-II
generally considered the value of the remaining assets as a whole as it grouped them for allocation
to each party.
Jason cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to do more; that is,
he cites no authority that suggests the trial court should have assessed in detail all potential assets
with the presumption that they be liquidated to provide income resources beyond Amy’s job
earnings. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where
no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out
authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”). It is possible,
of course, that under other circumstances, a passive asset could be valuable enough such that the
trial court would have to consider it as a resource relevant to potential income under this first
statutory factor, but Jason makes no such argument about any particular asset here. Thus, we
conclude Jason has failed to show an abuse of discretion with respect to this first factor of RCW
26.09.090.
B. TIME NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE SUFFICIENT EDUCATION OR TRAINING
Jason next argues that the trial court failed to give fair consideration to the second factor
of RCW 26.09.090, which is focused on the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training. Jason argues that the trial court’s statement that “it will take time for [Amy] to catch up
in her profession and get a higher-paying position” was unsupported by the evidence at trial. Br.
of Appellant at 21. Jason contends that Amy never claimed that there were any changes to the
teaching profession from when she was previously in the workforce or that she struggled to adapt
to any such changes. Jason further argues that there was no testimony about Amy seeking better
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employment, which undermines the trial court’s concern about Amy being able to get a higher
paying position in the future.4 Jason’s arguments are unpersuasive.
Jason is correct that Amy did not testify about changes in the teaching profession from
when she was previously in the workforce. Jason is also correct that there was no testimony about
Amy seeking better employment since she secured her private school teaching job. But Amy did
testify that she stopped working after she became pregnant with her second child in 2012. And
after about 10 years out of the workforce, Amy testified that she applied to at least 50 jobs before
receiving her only offer of employment—a private school position that paid $51,000 per year.
Looking at Amy’s testimony as a whole, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
factual findings on this factor. A reasonable inference from Amy’s testimony, especially her
difficulty in finding a job in her profession while having excellent credentials, is that the time she
took to raise the children meant her past teaching experience was outdated and that it would take
time before she could secure a higher-paying position. As a result, the record contains evidence
of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the trial court’s
findings with respect to this statutory factor. See Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242. Because
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact with respect to this second factor
of RCW 26.09.090, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
4 Although Jason couches his argument as the trial court’s failure to give fair consideration to this factor, it appears that his argument is more appropriately characterized as whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding.
14 No. 59728-4-II
C. AMY’S AGE, PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL CONDITION, AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Jason next argues that the trial court did not give fair consideration to the fifth factor listed
in RCW 26.09.090 related to Amy’s age, physical and emotional condition, and financial
obligations. Jason argues that Amy “will have many years and opportunities to make the most of
her stellar credentials.” Br. of Appellant at 22. We disagree that the trial court erred in its
consideration of this factor.
Amy testified about her considerable expenses with the mortgage, taxes, and insurance, as
well as the expensive extracurricular activities for the four children. From this testimony, the trial
court found that although Amy was young and appeared to be in good health, she had “significant
financial obligations, including paying her mortgage and providing for her four children.” VRP at
363. And even if Jason is correct that Amy has “many years and opportunities” ahead of her, the
maintenance award already accommodates these “many years” of future productivity because
Jason’s maintenance obligation sunsets in five years. Not only does substantial evidence support
the trial court’s finding on this factor, but the record shows that it gave fair consideration to this
factor. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.5
5 In Jason’s opening brief, he stated that “Amy may assert that she is owed more in maintenance because she has the four children to support, and she has them the majority of the time per the parenting plan.” Br. of Appellant at 23. Although Jason observed that the purpose of spousal maintenance is not to support children, he did not expressly argue that the trial court improperly based its maintenance award on supporting the children. In his reply brief, however, Jason argues for the first time that the trial court improperly based its maintenance award on the best interests of the children.
We decline to consider Jason’s argument first made in his reply brief. RAP 10.3(c); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (explaining that we need not address arguments first raised in a reply brief). Nevertheless, in our review of the record, we see no error with the trial court’s reference to the interests of the children when it contemplated
15 No. 59728-4-II
D. JASON’S ABILITY TO MEET HIS NEEDS AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS WHILE MEETING THOSE OF AMY’S
Finally, Jason argues that the trial court did not give fair consideration to the sixth factor
of RCW 26.09.090, which is focused on Jason’s ability to meet his needs and financial obligations
while meeting those of Amy’s.
Related to this factor, Amy testified that her salary was $51,000, while Jason testified that
his salary was about $140,000, even though he only worked a few hours per day. The parties also
testified about Jason’s past experience in running his own business, Atherton Scale. From this
evidence, the trial court reasoned that Jason was resourceful, intelligent, and had a high-paying job
that paid significantly more than Amy’s teaching job and, thus, that Jason had the ability to pay
his expenses and the ability to pay Amy spousal maintenance.
Jason makes two main arguments related to this factor. First, Jason contends that in its
sequence of consideration, the trial court improperly determined spousal maintenance before
determining child support and when it did, it failed to identify his income prior to announcing the
maintenance award. Second, Jason complains that the trial court erred in settling on a monthly net
income calculation of $7,406 and concluding that Jason had sufficient resources to pay the amount
of the maintenance award. We disagree.
a spousal maintenance award. Maintenance of a caregiving spouse is unquestionably interrelated with the interests of the minor children in the care of that spouse. We view the trial court’s comments merely as a recognition of this close relationship, rather than as an impermissible assignment of a particular expense to spousal maintenance that would be more properly considered under an award of child support.
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Jason’s first argument is that the trial court improperly determined spousal maintenance
before determining child support. Jason argues that the spousal maintenance statute requires the
trial court to calculate the need for spousal maintenance only after it has determined the parties’
child support obligations.
Jason relies on In re Marriage of Wilson, 165 Wn. App. 333, 342, 267 P.3d 485 (2011). In
Wilson, this court remarked that the spousal maintenance statute “directs a trial court to calculate
the need for spousal maintenance only after it has determined the parties’ child support
obligations.” Id. The Wilson court arrived at this interpretation based on language from RCW
26.09.090(1)(a) regarding the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance. 6 Id. The
Wilson court interpreted the statute’s language “the extent to which a provision for support of a
child living with the party includes a sum for that party” to require the trial court to calculate any
need for spousal maintenance only after it has determined child support obligations. Id.
This aspect of Wilson is not universally accepted. For example, in In re Marriage of
Condie, Division One disagreed with the Wilson court’s conclusion that the trial court must
determine child support before spousal maintenance. 15 Wn. App. 2d 449, 457, 475 P.3d 993
(2020). Division One explained that in practice neither the spousal maintenance statute nor the
child support statute “precludes a trial court from simultaneously looking at various scenarios for
6 Restated again, this factor provides that the trial court should consider, The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including separate or community property apportioned to [them], and [their] ability to meet [their] needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party[.] RCW 26.09.090(1)(a) (emphasis added).
17 No. 59728-4-II
maintenance and child support” before arriving at a final decision. Id. The court observed that
the trial court “is not beset with an endless loop of mechanical computations.” Id. at 458.
Here, it is true that the trial court announced its decision on spousal maintenance before its
decision on child support and it did not expressly identify Jason’s income until it addressed child
support. But a careful review of the record demonstrates that the trial court was considering child
support and spousal maintenance concurrently. In the sequence of its oral ruling, the trial court
first explained that it was not including Jason’s bonuses and income from Atherton Scale into its
calculations of Jason’s income. Then the trial court switched to spousal maintenance and provided
a detailed analysis of the statutory factors before issuing its spousal maintenance decision. And
immediately following the trial court’s spousal maintenance decision (seven lines later in the
transcript), the trial court switched back and stated that it was adopting Jason’s proposed figure for
his gross monthly income for the purposes of child support.
We agree with Condie that the trial court is not tied to a rigid sequence for consideration
of these issues and that it is not precluded from simultaneously considering spousal maintenance
and child support. 15 Wn. App. 2d at 457-58. Here, as seen by the way the trial court alternated
between aspects of Jason’s income and the spousal maintenance statutory factors, the trial court
was clearly considering the child support and spousal maintenance issues concurrently as it
explained its detailed oral ruling. It strains reason to assume that the trial court did not have Jason’s
income figures determined until after its decision on the maintenance award. Finding error on the
part of the trial court merely for announcing those income numbers seven lines after the
maintenance award would essentially elevate mechanics over substance, contrary to the logic of
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Condie. Under these circumstances, we are unpersuaded that the sequencing of the trial court’s
comments amounted to an abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion.
Jason’s second argument regarding the trial court’s consideration of the sixth factor of
RCW 26.09.090 is the trial court erred in adopting a net monthly income for Jason of $7,406 per
month. Jason argues that the trial court’s assessment of his income ignores the fact that a $2,000
per month mortgage payment for rental property was imposed on Jason. Amy responds that
Jason’s complaints about potential financial hardship resulting from the trial court’s maintenance
award are not supported by the evidence and ignore other financial resources, like income from
the rental home Jason will receive. We see no error in the trial court’s exercise of its discretion.
Jason’s complaints about his financial difficulties resulting from the maintenance award
run squarely into the trial court’s broad authority to balance the financial capabilities and needs of
both parties to arrive at an award that is “ ‘just.’ ” See Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d at 520 (quoting Washburn,
101 Wn.2d at 178). The trial court heard the evidence and (as evident from the length of its oral
ruling) clearly considered the multifaceted aspects of the parties’ current and future financial
prospects, and it arrived at a facially reasonable maintenance award. While Jason invites us to
closely scrutinize the trial court’s math, we decline the invitation. Indeed, Amy’s response that
Jason’s complaints suffer from a lack of detail (because, for example, rental income is excluded
from his calculations) and a lack of support in the record, underscores exactly why an appellate
court should tread carefully before disturbing the exercise of a trial court’s considerable discretion
in this context. Jason may feel the award is too high and other trial courts might have agreed, but
after our review of the entire record, including the trial court’s lengthy consideration of the
statutory factors, we are unable to say this award is “outside the range of acceptable choices.” See
19 No. 59728-4-II
Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47. Thus, we conclude that the trial court gave fair consideration to this
factor.
CONCLUSION
A careful review of the record shows that the trial court gave fair consideration to the RCW
26.09.090 factors in determining its spousal maintenance order and substantial evidence supports
its findings, especially given the trial court’s “broad discretionary powers in awarding [spousal]
maintenance . . . .” See Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d at 517. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it awarded Amy $3,000 in spousal maintenance for five years.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J. We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
MAXA, J.