Amponsah v. Barr

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 11, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-04639
StatusUnknown

This text of Amponsah v. Barr (Amponsah v. Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amponsah v. Barr, (N.D. Ill. 2020).

Opinion

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

) MILLICENT AMPONSAH, )

) Plaintiff, )

) No. 20 C 4639 v. )

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall WILLIAM BARR, Attorney General of the ) United States, et al., ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Millicent Amponsah is challenging the denial of the I-130, Petition for Immediate Relative, she filed on behalf of her husband, Moses Kwabena Owusu. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) by taking an action that was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, failed to observe a procedure required by law, and that violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, the Court may only weigh in on an agency action that is “final” within the meaning of the law. Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has re-opened the adjudication of the petition and vacated its earlier decisions, and therefore there is no final agency for this Court to review. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 11] is granted without prejudice. BACKGROUND The following factual allegations are taken from Amponsah’s Complaint (Dkt. 1) and are assumed true for the purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). Millicent Amponsah is a United States citizen. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 1). She married Moses Owusu, a native and citizen of Ghana, on November 19, 2011 in Joliet, Illinois. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 14). On December 6, 2012, Amponsah filed an I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, on behalf of Owusu, to classify him as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. (Id. ¶ 15). Amponsah filed a number of supporting documents to her petition to show that Owusu was her lawful spouse. (Id. ¶ 16). Amponsah and Owusu also participated in interviews as part of their petition. (Id. ¶¶ 17–19). On

June 26, 2017, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (“NOID”) Petition for Alien Relative, denying the petition after two interviews and several site visits that included an interview with a co-tenant of the couple and anonymous neighbors who raised suspicion about whether the couple were living together. (Id. ¶¶ 22–29). The 2017 NOID also states that Amponsah and Owusu “did have some consistent testimony, on such topics as your respective employment and employment hours, where your respective wedding rings were purchased, the date you moved into the address of record, and how you celebrated the beneficiary’s last birthday,” but then noted nine alleged discrepancies between Amponsah and Owusu’s testimony at the second interview and finding a lack of evidence of a bona fide marriage. (Id. ¶ 33). On July 26, 2017, Amponsah, through counsel, timely responded to the NOID and rebutted the above NOID. (Id. ¶ 34). On March 28,

2019, then-Director Martha Medina issued a Decision to deny the petition, finding that Amponsah did not satisfactorily explain the discrepancies. (Id. ¶ 36). The couple then elected to withdraw their petition and file a Second I-130 petition (hereinafter “Second I-130 petition”). (Id. ¶ 37). On May 16, 2019, Amponsah, through counsel, filed their Second I-130 petition. (Id. ¶ 38). Amponsah and Owusu appeared for an interview at USCIS and brought numerous documents demonstrating the validity of their marriage. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41). On December 19, 2019, Acting Field Office Director Mike Klinger issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Alien Relative (hereinafter “2019 NOID”) that was largely reiterative of the 2017 NOID. (Id. ¶ ¶ 42–45). On January 17, 2020, Amponsah, through counsel, timely responded to the 2019 NOID, stating that the couple clearly met their burden of proof with the evidence submitted in connection with. Amponsah’s Second I-130 petition, “especially given that they already submitted four inches of evidence at their October 28, 2019 interview.” (Id. ¶ 50). On March 9, 2020, Field Office Director Kevin Riddle issued a Decision to deny Amponsah’s Second I-130 petition (hereinafter “2020

Denial”). (Id. ¶ 55). The 2020 Denial discredited the additional evidence of the bona fide nature of the marriage submitted in response to the Second NOID, and then includes the same language contained in the first NOID issued on June 26, 2017, specifically the language discussing the USCIS site visits on October 5, 2016 and October 24, 2016. (Id. ¶ 56). On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint, alleging that the 2020 Denial “constitutes final agency action.” (Id. ¶ 60). LEGAL STANDARD A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 843 F.3d 285, 289–90 (7th Cir. 2016). When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint “in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016). The complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). A party need not plead “detailed factual allegations,” but “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twonbly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that when “accepted as true . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

DISCUSSION

Arbitrary and capricious review is “highly deferential” and an administrative decision should be upheld “‘as long as the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned.’” Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 774 F.3d 383, 393 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Mt. Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 196 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir.1999)). Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is principally concerned with ensuring the Agency examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action. Id. (citing Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). This deferential judicial review is conducted “only over ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.’” Dhakal v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704).

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Bennett v. Spear
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Erickson v. Pardus
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
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Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
843 F.3d 285 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Arjun Dhakal v. Jefferson Sessions III
895 F.3d 532 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Bell v. City of Chicago
835 F.3d 736 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schumacher
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