Amos Jackson v. Pat Horn

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2023
• Docket: 21-55849
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMOS JACKSON, No. 21-55849 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. v. 2:18-cv-00325-GW-DFM Central District of California, Los Angeles/ PAT HORN,

Respondent-Appellee. MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 5, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner-appellant, Amos Jackson, appeals the district court’s denial of his

habeas petition challenging his state court conviction. Jackson asserts that his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his Batson1

challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strike of the only African-American

juror on the venire. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the facts of the case and do not

discuss them in detail here.

“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a

defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a

trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).

Ruling on a Batson challenge invokes a three-step process: (1) a defendant must

make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was exercised on the

basis of race; (2) if such a showing is made, the prosecution must offer a race-

neutral reason for the strike; and (3) in light of the response, the trial court must

determine whether the defendant has shown that the prosecution’s race-neutral

reasons masked purposeful discrimination. United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d

1003, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558,

565 (9th Cir. 2015)).

We review a district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge for clear error

when, as here, the district court properly utilized the three-step process. Id. at 1028

1 “Batson/Wheeler” is a shorthand description of a claim that a juror was stricken for an improper racial reason. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 538 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).

2 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)). Because Jackson’s federal

habeas petition seeks review of a state court’s denial of relief, we consider it

pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). Jackson must show either that the state court’s decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented at the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–

98 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). As the California Supreme Court

summarily denied review, the California Court of Appeal’s decision is the

“relevant state-court decision.” See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 379–80

(2010).2

1. Jackson argues that the California Court of Appeal erred by finding that the

record does not support a prima facie Batson challenge because striking the only

African-American juror on the venire, when Jackson and his codefendants are also

African-American, is enough to establish discriminatory intent. See People v.

Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 905 (Cal. 1994), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 16,

2 “Under AEDPA, we review the last reasoned state-court decision. When a state court does not explain the reason for its decision, we ‘look through’ to the last state-court decision that provides a reasoned explanation capable of review.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

3 1995) (holding that a party’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse all members

of a group supports an inference of discriminatory intent, especially when the

defendant is a member of the same group).

Jackson conflates excusing all the members of a racial group on a venire

with excusing a single juror who is the sole member of a racial group on a 69-

person venire. See United States v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2009);

Crittenden, 885 P.2d at 905. We have held that striking the only African-

American juror in the jury pool “renders mathematical trends and patterns

meaningless.” Collins, 551 F.3d at 921. Thus, in this case, striking the only

African-American juror on the 69-person venire does not, in itself, constitute a

prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose.

2. Jackson also argues that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were not

sufficient to defeat his Batson challenge. However, the trial court only ruled that

there was no prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose and did not rule on the

reasons the prosecutor voluntarily offered for the challenge. As Jackson failed to

make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, we need not reach the second

or third prongs of the Batson process. See United States v. Guerrero, 595 F.3d

1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th

Cir. 2008)).

4 3. Even if we were to consider the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for the

challenge—that Juror 42 would not make eye contact with the prosecutor during

voir dire and stared at the defendants—Jackson has not shown that those race-

neutral reasons masked purposeful discrimination, thus failing to show they are

contrary to clearly established Federal law or are unreasonable determinations of

fact.

The district court’s denial of Jackson’s habeas petition is AFFIRMED.