Amortibanc Inv. Co. v. Shaw

83 F.2d 50, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 2438
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 11, 1936
DocketNo. 1390
StatusPublished

This text of 83 F.2d 50 (Amortibanc Inv. Co. v. Shaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amortibanc Inv. Co. v. Shaw, 83 F.2d 50, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 2438 (10th Cir. 1936).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

The Bankers Mortgage Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Kansas. At all times hereinafter mentioned, the amount of its paid up capital exceeded $100,000. It is authorized to issue savings bonds and deal in mortgages and other securities.

It issued three types of bonds:

1. Installment bonds on which the purchaser made an initial payment and payments at stated times thereafter.

2. Single payment bonds on which the purchaser made a payment on the date of issue, sufficient when compound interest was added to the date of maturity, to equal the amount of the bond.

3. Coupons bonds for which the purchaser paid the full amount of the bond and was entitled to draw interest as provided in the coupons attached to the bond.

The bonds contained' tables of cash surrender and loan values available after certain specified amounts had been paid thereon.

Due to a threatened investigation by the state of the company’s affairs, its directors, on May 3, 1933, directed that no further applications for purchase of bonds should be accepted.

On May 27,1933, a receiver was appointed in an equity proceeding brought by two of the bondholders in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The facts relating to that proceeding were stated in Bankers’ Mortgage Company of Topeka v. Rupp (C.C.A. 10) 66 F.(2d) 992.

The order appointing the receiver, in part read as follows:

“Now, Therefore, It Is Ordered; that the application of the plaintiffs for the appointment of a receiver for the defendant corporation be sustained and that C. B. Dodge and N. J. Ward be and they are hereby appointed receivers of said defendant corporation to take charge and possession of the offices of said defendant corporation, its books, record's, accounts and assets and to manage in all respects the affairs of said corporation, its properties and assets, and continue the business of the corporation until the further order of this court or the judge thereof.”

On June 15, 1933, the court entered an order in the receivership proceeding which in part read as follows:

“It is, further, ordered that said receivers not pay any maturities or demands for cash surrenders or loans or other liabilities upon bonds until further order of court.”

On May 18, 1935, the trial court approved an involuntary petition filed under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 207) and on May 20, 1935, appointed Campbell trustee. This court affirmed the two orders last mentioned in Humphrey v. Bankers Mortgage Company of Topeka, Kansas (C.C.A.10) 79 F.(2d) 345.

These appeals involve the rights of three classes of claimants.

Class one comprises a large group of bondholders who, prior to May 27,1933, had made sufficient payments to entitle them to cash surrender values on their bonds. The payments made on each of these bonds, except in a relatively few instances, in the aggregate exceed the cash surrender value thereof. The total of the cash surrender values of these bonds is now $1,075,146.90.

Class two comprises a large group of bondholders who, prior to May 27, 1933, had made substantial payments, but not sufficient to entitle them to cash surrender values on their bonds. All the members of this group had paid installments within a period of two years immediately prior to May 27, 1933, and were then entitled to the reinstatement privilege provided for by the following provision in their bonds:

“Reinstatement. At any time within two years from the date of default the holder hereof may reinstate this Bond by resuming payments. Interest will not be allowed hereon while in default, and in case of such reinstatement the maturity hereof and the due date of the remaining payments, respectively is extended for a period equal to the time the default continued.”

[52]*52Certain members of this class had made their installment payments regularly up to May 27, 1933.

Class three comprises a group of bondholders who had made some payments on their bonds, but had been in default for more than two years prior to May 27, 1933. Their rights, if any, rest on a nonforfeiture provision in their bonds reading as follows:

“Non-Forfeiture Clause. Notwithstanding that default has continued for two years or more, the rights of the second party are not forfeited, but said second party, so long as the company is engaged' in issuing like Bonds, upon the resumption of payments and upon written request and surrender of this Bond and the payment of a reissuance charge of $1.00 shall be entitled to a new installment Bond of the kind and rate then being issued and all payments made hereon shall be credited on said new Bonds, provided that no part thereof shall be construed to be advance payments. Provided, further, that such new Bond shall be the same in its terms and conditions as other Bonds then being issued on original applications except that after all payments have been made and said new Bond would otherwise mature, -the maturity date of such new Bond and the time when said Company shall be required to pay same, shall be postponed for one year, the amount to be paid, however, not being increased by such postponement. ' Provided', further, that if this Bond has not attained a paid-up bond option and default continues for a period of two years, then except as to the right to receive a new Bond with payments credited thereon, all rights of the second party shall cease and determine and this Bond shall be of no further force and effect”

None of the members of this class had complied or offered to comply, with the requirements of such clause prior to May 27, 1933.

The company has not been engaged in issuing bonds like those held by members of this class at any time since May 3, 1933.

Respecting the financial condition of the company, the trial court found:

“A thorough and painstaking appraisal of the assets of the Bankers Mortgage Company and its property has been made by a competent appraiser whose appointment was agreed to by the parties, and whose appraisement was made under instructions of the court, likewise agreed to. That appraisement included an inspection of all property upon which the company held a mortgage, by competent appraisers in the community where the property is located, together with a study of the property and present or prospective earnings. Dun & Bradstreet have made a special report upon the responsibility of the various mortgagors. In computing values of mortgages of the company, men long in the mortgage loan business have been consulted' and the benefit of their opinions obtained. This appraisal took three months and was completed at considerable expense. It has been as accurately and fairly done as could be. I therefore find the fair value of the assets of The Bankers Mortgage Company to be as reported in the appraisement, to-wit, $887,169.26.
“The minimum indebtedness of the company under any possible theory of law is:
Surrender value of bonds outstanding... $1,075,146.90
General indebtedness ..................... 34,042.00
Estimated cost of ancillary receiverships and main receivership, including allowances unpaid ....... 50,000.00

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Bluebook (online)
83 F.2d 50, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 2438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amortibanc-inv-co-v-shaw-ca10-1936.