Filed 8/28/26 Amirtalesh v. Beverly Hills Properties CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
SHAHNAZ AMIRTALESH, B339916 Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
23STCV17972
BEVERLY HILLS PROPERTIES, LLC, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Cherol J. Nellon, Judge. Affirmed.
Shahnaz Amirtalesh, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Paul Kujawsky and Paul Kujawsky for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Klinedinst, Greg A. Garbacz, Robert M. Shaughnessy and Suzanne L. Schmidt for Defendants and Respondents Beverly Hills Properties, LLC, et al.
Law Offices of Adrianos Facchetti and Adrianos Facchetti for Defendants and Respondents David Lenhardt et al.
Law Offices of Robert R. Shiri and Stacey Friedman, in pro.
per. and for Defendants and Respondents Stacey Friedman et al.
This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute. Representing herself, the tenant sued the owners and managers of her apartment building, their attorneys, and the tenant’s neighbor. The tenant did not prevail, and she filed five separate appeals. Four of the appeals have been consolidated for oral argument and decision. In this separate opinion, we consider the tenant’s fifth appeal from an order granting anti-SLAPP motions (special motions to strike). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.26.1) She raises numerous errors. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND There is considerable factual and procedural background in this case. We limit ourselves here to what is relevant to this appeal. A. 2019 Lawsuit In 2015, Shahnaz Amirtalesh sued the owners and managers of her apartment building claiming breach of warranty of habitability (2019 lawsuit). Named as defendants were owners Rochelle H. Sterling, individually and as trustee of the Sterling Family Trust and doing business as Beverly Hills Properties, LLC; and building manager Susan Robman. (Amirtalesh v. Sterling et al. (Nov. 13, 2025, B338011) [nonpub. opn.].) B. Small Claims Actions In July 2022, Amirtalesh filed two amended small claims actions. In the first action, Amirtalesh claimed Beverly Hills Properties, LLC had violated an eviction moratorium by serving her with a three-day notice to pay overdue rent or move out, even though she had applied for rental assistance under the COVID-19
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
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rent relief assistance program. Amirtalesh maintained she had provided her landlord with the required declaration of financial distress that would have forestalled the issuance of the notice to quit under the eviction moratorium. The small claims court found Amirtalesh failed to prove Beverly Hills Properties, LLC had received her financial declaration or knew of her acceptance by the program before issuing the notice to quit. The court ruled against Amirtalesh.
In the second small claims action, Amirtalesh added neighbor Humberto Gonzalez (Gonzalez) as a defendant. She alleged Gonzalez had indecently exposed himself in the building’s pool area and Beverly Hills Properties, LLC had failed to adequately respond when informed of the incident. Amirtalesh acknowledged she had not sent Beverly Hills Properties, LLC any photographs she had taken of Gonzalez at the time. Beverly Hills Properties did not have its own photographs of Gonazalez. Nor was his offending behavior recorded on any of the pool area’s video cameras. After examining the photographs, the court determined Gonzalez was not willfully exposing himself within the meaning of Penal Code section 314 and Beverly Hills Properties, LLC had no knowledge of the incident. The court observed one photograph had been used to portray the alleged multiple incidents. The court found Amirtalesh’s claims were without merit. C. Instant Lawsuit Representing herself, Amirtalesh filed the instant lawsuit in 2023. In her first amended complaint, Amirtalesh named as defendants owners Rochelle H. Sterling, individually and as trustee of the Sterling Family Trust and doing business as Beverly Hills Properties, LLC; building manager Arianne
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Newman; neighbor Gonzalez; their attorneys Douglas Walton, Gregory Garbacz, David Lenhardt, Fred S. Peters, Stacey Friedman; and the law firms of Klinedinst PC; Pyka, Lenhardt, Schnaider & Dawkins LLP; and Robert Shiri, APC.2 The first amended complaint alleged 12 causes of action:
(1) Fraud; (2) Violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106; (3) Violation of Business Professions Code section 12700 (California’s Unfair Competition Law); (4) Defamation; (5) False light; (6) Harassment; (7) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) Elder abuse; (9) Breach of COVID-19 rent relief assistance (80/20 Program); (10) Retaliation; (11) Intrusion of solitude; and (12) Public disclosure of private facts. Amirtalesh sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. D. Anti-SLAPP Motions In 2023, defendants and attorney defendants filed or joined in several special motions to strike the first amended complaint in its entirety.3 (§ 425.26.) Amirtalesh opposed the motions. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motions and dismissed the instant lawsuit against defendants and attorney defendants. For each motion the court found: Defendants and attorney defendants established the allegations in the first amended complaint arose from protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Amirtalesh failed to demonstrate the motions were barred by Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley). Further, the alleged conduct was
2 This opinion refers to Gonzalez by name and the remaining defendants collectively as “defendants” and their attorneys collectively as “attorney defendants.”
3 Gonzalez was not a moving party.
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protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code, § 47, subd. (c), and Amirtalesh had not met her burden to show a probability of success on the merits. The court also invoked the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, where applicable, to forestall Amirtalesh’s relitigation efforts.
Later, the trial court issued an order of dismissal without prejudice. Rather than refile, Amirtalesh appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law—the Anti-SLAPP Statute “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue’ ” includes written statements “in connection with an issue under consideration or review” by a “judicial body” and other conduct “in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2), (4).)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
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merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and in so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) We analyze the issues independent of the trial court’s reasoning, and if the decision is correct on any theory, we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the court reached its conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270, 287.)
Here, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the anti-
SLAPP motions as employing the wrong reason for the right result. (See Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) II. Step One: Protected Activity “Filing a lawsuit is an act in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition, regardless of whether it has merit.” (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1521; see Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1480 [“[S]ervice of the notice to quit was protected communicative activity under section 425.16.”].)
The trial court found all 12 causes of action in the first amended complaint were based on protected activity. From our independent review, we conclude nine of them were constitutionally protected: Claims for fraud, Business and Professions Code sections 6106 and 12700 violations, defamation, false light, elder abuse, breach of COVID-19 rent release assistance agreement, retaliation, and public disclosure of private
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facts that arose from the two small claims actions within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.
Amirtalesh argues the trial court ignored unprotected activity that would support her causes of action. She points to her allegations that certain attorney defendants, at defendants’ behest, improperly appeared in the actions, made false statements about her to the court, presented a deceptive notice of the COVID-19 rent assistance program and refused to honor her participation in it, wrongly served her with a 3-day notice to quit although she owed no unpaid rent, violated rent moratorium ordinances, altered and fabricated photographic evidence, and refused to give her copies of the video footage depicting Gonzalez naked in the pool area.
Citing Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, she argues attorney defendants “committed perjury, fraud and, specifically, committed a fraud upon the court [and] as officers of the court, their conduct was criminally illegal as a matter of law.” She also insists attorney defendants violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by making false statements and engaging in criminal acts during the first small claims action.
The narrow exception described in Flatley does not compel reversal. The plaintiff in Flatley sued an attorney for engaging in extortionate communications, and the attorney moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The California Supreme Court held the motion was properly denied. The anti- SLAPP statute is not available to strike a complaint when the moving defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the allegedly protected speech was illegal as a matter of law. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) This exception is generally limited to criminal, not merely illegal,
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conduct. (See Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 [illegal means a violation of criminal law].)
Amirtalesh has not established defendants and/or attorney defendants engaged in protected speech that was illegal, let alone criminal, as a matter of law. Defendants and attorney defendants do not concede their conduct was illegal, and Amirtalesh has submitted no evidence to prove illegality conclusively. Fraud, fraud on the court, and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged by Amirtalesh do not constitute crimes. Perjury and subornation of perjury, in contrast, are crimes. (Pen. Code, §§ 118, subd. (a), 127.) However, her repeated allegations notwithstanding, Amirtalesh presented no evidence of perjury. Amirtalesh has failed to show Flatley’s “narrow circumstance” exists in this case. III. Second Step: Probability of Success4 A. Litigation Privilege The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that “it may present a substantive
4 Amirtalesh’s opening brief failed to fully address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, Amirtalesh has forfeited any argument supporting the probability of prevailing on her claims. (Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or abandoned.”].) However, in her reply brief, Amirtalesh argues at length that certain claims were not precluded by the litigation privilege and she has a probability of success on others. We requested and received supplemental briefing on these issues from defendants and attorney defendants. For the reasons set forth, we conclude
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defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323.) The privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasijudicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action. (See People v. Potter Handy, LLP (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 938, 947.) It is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterward. (Ibid.) The privilege is absolute, applying to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness (ibid.), and it applies to all torts except malicious prosecution. (Id. at p. 950.)
Amirtalesh disputes the trial court’s reliance on the litigation privilege to bar some of her claims. She contends the privilege did not apply to the third cause of action for violating the California Unfair Competition Law against Beverly Hills Properties, LLC and Rochelle Sterling. Amirtalesh argues they violated the statute by sending tenants a “deceptive” notice of the rent assistance program and then refusing to forgive the agreedupon 20 percent of her rent payment under the program. Amirtalesh argues the litigation privilege is inapplicable because the notice was “not in anticipation of or otherwise connected to litigation.” We disagree. The notice was logically connected to the small claims action. The litigation privilege barred the cause of action.
Amirtalesh also asserts the litigation privilege did not apply to the fourth cause of action for defamation as to Doe 1
Amirtalesh has failed to show she satisfied the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
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(Gonzalez’s alleged son). It rests on allegations that the small claims court was alerted by an unknown individual that a single photograph had been used to simulate multiple incidents of Gonzalez’s nudity in the pool area. To the extent this claim survives the litigation privilege, it has no bearing on the moving defendants in this case.
Amirtalesh argues she demonstrated a probability of success in her 12th cause of action for public disclosure of private property. However, we agree with the trial court that it was barred by the litigation privilege. The cause of action alleges defendants and certain attorney defendants caused “a tenant ledger/financial statements” displaying a “false amount” of past due rent to be “openly posted” “monthly” on Amirtalesh’s front door. Because the documents were posted in connection with the first small claims action, the litigation privilege bars her 12th cause of action. (See Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1486–1487.)
B. Probability of Prevailing After finding the litigation privilege barred all causes of action, the trial court then determined Amirtalesh failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Amirtalesh challenges these findings as to the causes of action for harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intrusion of solitude.
With respect to the harassment cause of action, Amirtalesh argues she demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Beverly Hills Properties, LLC, Rochelle Sterling, and Arianne Newman. Amirtalesh alleged she was harassed in two respects: by the first small claims action as previously asserted and by the conduct of the resident manager, Arianne Newman, an employee
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of defendant Sterling. This claim reflects a so-called mixed cause of action that rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) As discussed, any alleged activity arising from the small claims actions is constitutionally protected. But Newman’s behavior as pleaded is not. Amirtalesh alleged Newman, who resided directly above her, engaged in “menacing conduct” that interfered with Amirtalesh’s quiet enjoyment of the premises and created a reasonable apprehension of harm in violation of Civil Code section 1940.2. Newman purportedly was “interfering with [Amirtalesh’s] health and welfare with constant, deliberate disturbing and annoying noises”— “dragging and dropping [a] heavy object on the floor, dragging furniture in the bedroom [in the] middle of the night, running [a] child[’s] stroller back and forth [in the] middle of [the] night,” blaming Amirtalesh for bringing home an insect that bit Amirtalesh on the leg, and unsuccessfully encouraging neighbors to report Amirtalesh to Beverly Hills Properties, LLC for making noise.
“Civil Code section 1940.2 makes it unlawful for a landlord to commit certain specified acts ‘for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling.’ ” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1300.) The statute is intended to prohibit a landlord’s use of “ ‘ “constructive” self-help eviction’ ” techniques, “such as theft, extortion, interference with a tenant’s quiet enjoyment, or trespass” (id. at p. 1301) for “the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)).
The cause of action fails as a matter of law. Amirtalesh presented no evidence that Newman’s alleged activities were for
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the purpose of influencing her to vacate her apartment. Nor is there any evidence that either Rochelle Sterling or Beverly Hills Properties, LLC was aware of such conduct, let alone demanded or sanctioned it.
Next Amirtalesh argues she showed a probability of prevailing on the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Beverly Hills Properties, LLC, Rochelle Sterling, and Arianne Newman.
This is another mixed cause of action. Amirtalesh rested her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the protected activity arising from the first small claims action and Newman’s unprotected conduct as her upstairs neighbor as alleged in the harassment cause of action. Newman’s alleged conduct fails to satisfy the necessary element of “outrageous activity” to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. To be outrageous, the conduct “ ‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) “Severe emotional distress means ‘ “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” ’ ” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.)
Amirtalesh further argues she demonstrated a probability of success on her claim of intrusion of solitude. This 11th cause of action alleged Gonzalez harassed her “[e]very afternoon” in the pool area, which is outside the bedroom window of her apartment. Amirtalesh asserted Gonzalez sunbathed next to her window, eavesdropped on her private conversations, moaned, sang, played loud music, used the speaker option to talk on his
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cellphone, and stared into her bedroom window. Amirtalesh alleged Gonzalez’s behavior was offensive and caused her pain and suffering while recovering from cancer treatment. Amirtalesh was unable to open her window, freely change her clothes, sleep, or talk on the phone without Gonzalez invading her privacy. However, Amirtalesh failed to identify any evidence of knowledge or conduct by defendants or attorney defendants that would form the basis of this claim.
In sum, based upon our independent review, we conclude the trial court properly granted the anti-SLAPP motions and dismissed the instant lawsuit against defendants and attorney defendants.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Amirtalesh is to bear costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.