IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
AMINA JANE CONDEL, No. 86967-1-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION FRANK GARRETT CONDEL,
Respondent.
BUI, J. — Amina Condel challenges the superior court’s orders granting
revision and vacating the renewal of the domestic violence protection order
(DVPO) protecting her from her former husband. RCW 7.105.405(4) presumes
renewal of a protection order unless the respondent makes two separate
showings by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the superior court
misapplied the law and relied on findings of fact that were not supported by
substantial evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of renewing the
DVPO, we reverse.
FACTS
Amina and Frank “Garrett” Condel married in 1999 and have four children.
Garrett 1 filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage in December 2021. In
March 2022, Amina filed a petition for a DVPO for herself and three of their
children who were minors. She alleged several incidents of abuse, including
1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect. No. 86967-1-I/2
violent acts against herself and the children. The court granted a temporary
DVPO and set a hearing date for a permanent restraining order. The trial court
linked, but did not consolidate, the DVPO and dissolution cases.
In May 2022, a commissioner entered a one-year DVPO protecting Amina
and the three minor children with an order to surrender weapons. The DVPO
ordered that Garrett “shall participate in treatment and counseling as follows:
domestic violence perpetrator treatment program approved under RCW
26.50.150 or counseling at: state certified Domestic Violence Batterers
Treatment Program” and “parenting classes at: state certified DV Dads Program.”
Garrett filed a motion for reconsideration of the DVPO, which the commissioner
denied. Garrett then moved for revision. The superior court denied the request
for revision, finding that Amina had met her burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Garrett had perpetrated acts of domestic violence as
alleged. Garrett appealed to this court.
The dissolution trial occurred in January 2023. On April 6, 2023, the court
issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law about the marriage and entered
orders dissolving the marriage, establishing the parenting plan, and setting child
support. The court found that Garrett “has a history of domestic violence
pursuant to [the DVPO case].” However, the court did not impose any RCW
26.09.191 restrictions on either Garrett’s decision-making authority or residential
time with the children. According to the trial court, “the instances alleged which
resulted in the order were isolated events which, while found to be domestic
violence by the prior court as defined by the statute, do not demonstrate a history
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of domestic violence for the purposes of RCW 26.09.191.” The court did not find
Amina’s allegations of domestic violence credible “specifically as it relates to the
children.” The court expressed concern about Amina’s behavior and found that
her behavior “is exposing the children to conflict and potentially damaging their
relationship with their father in the process.” The court made no RCW 26.09.191
findings against Amina but ordered mental health evaluation and treatment.
While the court did not terminate the DVPO, it ordered modification to remove the
children. Amina appealed the entry of the court’s parenting plan to this court. 2
After entry of the orders in the dissolution case, Amina filed a motion for
renewal of the DVPO. A commissioner found that, while Garrett established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would not resume acts of domestic
violence against the protected parties, he had not proven “that there ha[d] been a
substantial change in circumstances as provided in RCW 7.105.405(5)” and
renewed protection for Amina for one year. The commissioner complied with the
dissolution court’s order to modify the DVPO to remove the minor children and
allow the parents to communicate information about the children. The
commissioner did not modify the requirement that Garrett undergo domestic
violence treatment.
Garrett moved for revision of the commissioner’s decision, claiming that
the “isolated” and “de minimis” incidents did not demonstrate a history of
2 See Condel v. Condel, No. 85311-2-I, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/853112.pdf. Pursuant to GR 14.1 we cite and discuss Condel v. Condel, No. 85311-2-I, as the procedural history of that case is directly related to the issues presented in this appeal.
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domestic violence and that his adult children should be removed as protected
parties. The court granted revision in part, affirming renewal of the DVPO but
ordering the adult children removed as protected parties. The superior court
stated that it “agrees with the Commissioner that the most relevant factor in
assessing whether there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of
this case is RCW 7.105.405(5)(e): whether Respondent has acknowledged
responsibility or successfully completed certified treatment or counseling.” The
court noted, “[t]he domestic violence assessment along with Respondent’s
briefing and arguments indicate Respondent generally has not acknowledged
responsibility,” nor had Garrett completed treatment as ordered.
In July 2023, this court issued an opinion in Garrett’s appeal, affirming the
original entry of the DVPO. See Condel v. Condel, No. 84310-9-I, slip op. at 1
(Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/
opinions/pdf/843109.pdf. In the appeal, this court disagreed with Garrett’s claim
that the two incidents mentioned in the DVPO hearing did not constitute domestic
violence as a matter of law. Condel, No. 84310-9-I, slip op. at 11. Additionally,
this court determined that substantial evidence supported the DVPO court’s
findings that Garrett presented a credible threat to Amina and the children had
been exposed to domestic violence. Condel, No. 84310-9-I, slip op. at 14-16. The
opinion also notes that “the incidents alleged here are certainly not de minimis or
isolated. Rather, the record demonstrates a history of domestic violence
spanning several years.” Condel, No. 84310-9-I, slip op. at 17-18. This court
concluded that the DVPO court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Garrett to
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participate in domestic violence intervention treatment. Condel, No. 84310-9-I,
slip op. at 20. Finally, we awarded Amina attorney fees. Condel, No. 84310-9-I,
slip op. at 22.
Amina petitioned for renewal of the DVPO in May 2024, requesting six
years of protection. She stated that she continued to be afraid of Garrett, and
Garrett could not prove a substantial change in circumstances as required to
avoid renewal of the DVPO. Specifically, Garrett had not complied with the
treatment requirements ordered by the earlier 2022 DVPO and had not shown
any accountability for his acts of domestic violence.
In response, Garrett cited the dissolution court’s findings that Amina was
not credible and the instances of domestic violence were isolated events. Garrett
also argued that he had completed a domestic violence (DV) assessment with
William Singer, Ph.D. of Northwest Evaluation Center who opined that Garrett did
not have abusive behaviors, concluded that domestic violence treatment was not
recommended, and accordingly, assigned a treatment level of 0. Instead, Dr.
Singer recommended Garrett “engage in 12 months of weekly individual therapy
with a therapist of his choosing. There should be an element of parenting in that
therapy as well as communication skills and anger management. He should also
enroll in 24 hours of anger management classes.”
As evidence of his compliance with treatment, Garrett provided a
certificate of completion for an anger management class issued December 2022
and a letter from a licensed therapist stating that Garrett began therapy in
October 2022. According to the therapist, “Garrett completed his 1 year of
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individual therapy as recommended by Dr. William Singer in his DV assessment
. . . . [and] has continued to voluntarily participate in his regularly scheduled
therapy sessions since that date.” Garrett also submitted an e-mail from the
domestic violence treatment organization that conducts DV Dads sent in
response to an inquiry from his attorney asking whether someone who was
assessed at level 0 could enroll in the program. Garrett relied on this e-mail to
argue “[h]e can’t get involved in a DV perpetrator program with a Level 0. . . .
[H]e can’t be in their domestic violence treatment program or DV Dads program
either.”
At a hearing on May 24, 2024, a commissioner granted the six-year DVPO
because Garrett had not acknowledged the harm he had caused to Amina.
Additionally, the commissioner noted Garrett had failed to engage in DV Dads or
the other treatment ordered. The order renewing the DVPO did not modify the
requirement that Garrett participate in domestic violence treatment.
Garrett moved for revision of the commissioner’s decision. He claimed that
the commissioner erred by concluding he did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he would not resume acts of domestic violence and there had
not been a substantial change in circumstances. He also asserted that the
commissioner erred by finding he had not acknowledged responsibility for acts of
domestic violence when he had immediately apologized to Amina after one
incident and fully complied with the terms of the DVPO by completing anger
management and counseling programs.
6 No. 86967-1-I/7
The superior court heard arguments from the parties on revision. Garrett
argued that “the substantial change of circumstances that is contemplated by this
statute is that the respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence.” The
superior court questioned Garrett’s failure to engage in the court-ordered DV
Dads treatment or move to modify the DVPO requirements based on Dr. Singer’s
assessment. As to Garrett’s lack of accountability for his actions, the court noted
that “an apology or an acknowledgement is really not particularly meaningful or
helpful unless it’s sincere.”
In reaching its decision, the court determined that Garrett “made a good-
faith effort to try to be in compliance to the strict letter of the protection order.”
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Garrett would not
commit acts of domestic violence and “that he has demonstrated a substantial
change of circumstances.” Additionally, the court opined that when someone
“has tried to, in good faith, undergo everything that was asked of him or directed
of him, that there should be a situation where it is envisioned that he can move
on from the protection order and not be required to remain on that indefinitely or
permanently.” The court entered written findings of fact that “there has been a
substantial change of circumstances since the Domestic Violence Protection
Order was entered on May 4, 2022, renewed on May 12, 2023, and extended on
May 10, 2024 and that he will not resume acts of domestic violence against the
petitioner or the parties’ children when the order expires.” The court concluded
that the commissioner had erred by finding that Garrett had not satisfied his
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burden and, therefore, granted revision, vacated the renewed DVPO, and
entered an order denying renewal.
Amina appeals.
DISCUSSION
A court commissioner’s decision is subject to revision by the superior
court. RCW 2.24.050. On a motion to revise, the superior court reviews the
commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the
issues and evidence presented to the commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody,
137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). The appellate court reviews the
superior court’s decision rather than that of the commissioner. Maldonado v.
Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017).
Standard for Renewal of a DVPO
Amina challenges the superior court’s orders granting revision and
reversing and vacating the 2024 renewal of the DVPO. She contends the court
“[f]ailed to identify a substantial change and improperly collapsed the two-prong
standard” as required to deny renewal of a DVPO. Additionally, she claims that
any finding of a substantial change was not supported by the record. In
response, Garrett argues the court’s findings that he would not resume acts of
domestic violence and that he obtained an assessment and completed the
recommended therapy were supporting evidence of substantial change intended
by RCW 7.105.405(4).
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1. Statutory Construction
The parties disagree as to the interpretation and application of RCW
7.105.405, which governs renewal of DVPOs. We consider statutory construction
as a question of law reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Watson, 132 Wn. App.
222, 230, 130 P.3d 915 (2006). “Our ‘fundamental objective in determining what
a statute means is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent.’ ” In re
Dependency of W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d 342, 358, 469 P.3d 1190 (2020)
(quoting Durant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 Wn.2d 1, 8, 419 P.3d 400
(2018)). Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain meaning,
discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the
statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. In re Marriage
of Ruff and Worthley, 198 Wn. App. 419, 424, 393 P.3d 859 (2017). If the statute
is clear on its face, we derive its meaning from the plain language alone and our
inquiry ends. Ruff, 198 Wn. App. at 424-25.
RCW 7.105.405 governs the renewal of protection orders, including
DVPOs. When petitioning for renewal, “[t]he petitioner bears no burden in proving
that he or she has a current reasonable fear of harm by the respondent.” RCW
7.105.405(3). The statute favors renewal, placing the burden of proof on the
respondent rather than the petitioner:
(4) The court shall grant the motion for renewal unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and the following:
(a) For a domestic violence protection order, that the respondent proves that the respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner. . . .
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RCW 7.105.405; see Prussak v. Prussak, 27 Wn. App. 2d 451, 460, 536 P.3d
199 (2023).
Amina argues that to deny renewal of a DVPO the court must make two
separate findings: (1) a substantial change in circumstances and (2) that the
respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence. The plain language of the
statute supports this interpretation. For all types of protection orders, RCW
7.105.405(4) requires the court to find that the respondent has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a change in circumstances.
In addition to the change in circumstances, the respondent must also prove an
additional element relevant to the type of protection order at issue. RCW
7.105.405(4)(a)-(e). For example, for a non-renewal of a stalking protection
order, the respondent must prove the additional element that they will not resume
acts of stalking against the petitioner or family and household members. RCW
7.105.405(4)(c). Similarly, for non-renewal of a sexual assault protection order,
the respondent must prove that they will not engage or attempt to engage in
physical or nonphysical contact with the petition. RCW 7.105.405(4)(b). To defeat
renewal of any protection order requires proof of the common element of a
“substantial change in circumstances” and a separate element relevant to type of
protection order at issue. In the case of a DVPO, the respondent must prove both
“that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that they will not
resume acts of domestic violence when the order expires.” Prussak, 27 Wn. App.
2d at 458.
10 No. 86967-1-I/11
Here, the superior court found that Garrett had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, “a substantial change of circumstances . . . that
he will not resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or the parties’
children when the order expires.” Based on this statement, the court relied on the
finding that Garrett would not resume acts of domestic violence as a substantial
change in circumstances. By merging the two required findings, the superior
court’s denial of the DVPO renewal was based on an erroneous interpretation of
the statute. The court misapplied the law and, therefore, abused its discretion.
2. Evidence of a Substantial Change in Circumstances
As an alternative argument to his claim that the court properly relied on
the finding that he would not resume acts of domestic violence as a substantial
change in circumstances, Garrett asserts that the court made other findings that
satisfy the requirements of RCW 7.105.405(4)(a). Specifically, Garrett argues
that Dr. Singer’s evaluation and his compliance with the recommended
treatment, that he had not engaged in new acts of domestic violence, and the
findings by the dissolution court all demonstrate the necessary substantial
change in circumstances. Amina argues that the superior court’s finding of
substantial change in circumstances is not supported by substantial evidence.
According to Amina, the record shows that Garrett had not completed the
treatment ordered in the initial DVPO, the court cannot properly consider that
Garrett committed no new acts of violence as a change in circumstances, and
the dissolution court’s findings are not relevant for the purpose of the DVPO.
11 No. 86967-1-I/12
The appellate court reviews a superior court’s findings of fact for
substantial evidence. Davis v. Arledge, 27 Wn. App. 2d 55, 64, 531 P.3d 792
(2023). Substantial evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational
person of the truth of the declared premise. Davis, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 64.
RCW 7.105.405(6) sets forth a list of reasons that the court may not
consider to deny a motion to renew a protection order. Among the listed reason
is the passage of time since the last incident of conduct giving rise to the DVPO
or evidence that the respondent has not violated the protection order. RCW
7.105.405(6)(f). Therefore, the fact that Garrett had not engaged in new acts of
domestic violence cannot satisfy his burden of proving a substantial change in
circumstances. Any reliance on this evidence by the trial court was an abuse of
discretion.
In addition to the prohibited factors, the statute allows the court to consider
several unweighted factors to assess whether a respondent has proven a
substantial change in circumstances. RCW 7.105.405(5); Prussak, 27 Wn. App.
2d at 458. Pertinent here, the court may consider “[w]hether the respondent has
either: Acknowledged responsibility for acts of . . . domestic violence . . . or
successfully completed state-certified perpetrator treatment or counseling since
the protection order was entered.” RCW 7.105.405(5)(e). The superior court
focused on Garrett’s successful completion of therapy as recommended by Dr.
Singer:
Mr. Condel was determined to be Level 0. He engaged in the type of counseling that was recommended. He could not -- and I’m satisfied that through no fault of his own, he was unable to enter
12 No. 86967-1-I/13
into the DV Dads program originally ordered under the protection order. While I appreciate that the individual counseling that he did undergo at Dr. Singer’s recommendation did have a parenting component and it certainly went beyond the typical parenting course that parents have to go through, it at least, to me, satisfies the Court that he made a good-faith effort to try to be in compliance to the strict letter of the protection order.
Essentially, the superior court determined Garrett substantially complied with the
treatment ordered in the DVPO, and Garrett claims this satisfies the burden of
proving a substantial change in circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence.
However, Dr. Singer’s assessment has significant flaws that do not
support the superior court’s finding of substantial compliance with treatment. Dr.
Singer based his assessment mainly on Garrett’s self-reporting, noting “Mr.
Condel denies all DV.” In assigning Garrett a domestic violence treatment level of
0, Dr. Singer stated, “[t]here is no substantial documentation that any DV was
engaged in. The police were called on a couple of occasions but no arrests or
charges stemmed from those calls.”
Reliance on a lack of arrests or charges is specifically against the
domestic violence treatment and assessment standards established in the
Washington Administrative Code. “The recommended level of treatment must not
be diminished by factors such as the absence of legal charges . . . .” WAC 388-
60B-0400(19)(f)(i). Additionally, “[t]he program must recommend a level of
domestic violence intervention treatment when intimate partner violence has
occurred, unless the program has documented a reasonable and valid rationale
for a recommendation of an alternative service or no treatment at all in the
13 No. 86967-1-I/14
assessment.” WAC 388-60B-0400(19)(f)(ii). Here, the only reason cited for
assessment of level 0 is the lack of legal charges or arrests. This is not a
“reasonable and valid rationale” for recommending individualized therapy rather
than domestic violence treatment.
Dr. Singer’s assessment also includes an explicit limitation: “[t]his
assessment report should not be used for family, civil or criminal court unless
specific to the scope of this assessment. This agency defers to the court or
referring agency for the final decision of whether or not treatment is mandated.”
In this case, the DVPO court found that domestic violence had occurred and
ordered specific treatment. Based on the language of the assessment itself, Dr.
Singer’s recommendation of individual therapy cannot supersede the court’s
order mandating specific domestic violence treatment. Garrett’s completion of the
therapy recommended by Dr. Singer does not amount to substantial compliance
with the treatment ordered in the DVPO.
Moreover, Garrett’s claim he is unable to participate in DV Dads fails to
demonstrate substantial compliance. Garrett’s attorney sent an e-mail to the
agency that provides the DV Dads program to inquire whether someone
assessed at level 0 could enroll in a domestic violence treatment program and
whether his client could enroll in DV Dads without first completing a domestic
violence treatment program. The agency responded, “[s]omeone who has been
assessed at a zero could potentially be someone who would not benefit from this
type of intervention—it could also mean several other things, but that is the
simplest one.” As for treatment, the organization would not accept outside
14 No. 86967-1-I/15
assessments and clients were required to have completed the primary domestic
violence treatment program with the organization to be considered for enrollment
in DV Dads.
The DV Dads program did not deny Garrett access because he was
assessed at level 0. According to the agency, a level 0 assessment does not
conclusively establish that domestic violence intervention would provide no
benefit. Nor was the level 0 assessment the disqualifying factor for the DV Dads
program. Rather, the agency would not allow Garrett to participate in DV Dads
because he had not been assessed by the agency and had not participated in
the prerequisite program. Garrett’s claim that his level 0 assessment prevented
him from engaging in DV Dads was a self-serving misrepresentation and fails to
provide substantial evidence for the superior court’s finding that he was unable to
enroll in DV Dads through no fault of his own. The record does not support the
superior court’s finding that Garrett substantially complied with the treatment
ordered in the DVPO.
Finally, Garrett’s claim that the dissolution court’s findings that Amina was
not credible and the acts of domestic violence were de minimis cannot establish
a substantial change in circumstances for RCW 7.105.405(4). The dissolution
court found that the events “d[id] not demonstrate a history of domestic violence
for the purposes of RCW 26.09.191.” The dissolution court made these findings
in the context of RCW 26.09.191, considering the best interest of the children for
the parenting plan. The court acknowledged that the DVPO court had found
domestic violence as defined by statute and declined to terminate the DVPO.
15 No. 86967-1-I/16
The dissolution court’s findings are not relevant for the purposes of the DVPO
proceeding under RCW 7.105.405 and do not provide substantial evidence of a
substantial change in circumstances.
The court granted revision based on findings of fact that were not
supported by substantial evidence and misapplication of RCW 7.105.405(4).
Therefore, the court abused its discretion in granting revision, vacating the
renewal of the DVPO, and entering the order denying the DVPO. We reverse the
trial court and order the trial court to vacate its order granting revision and to
reinstate the commissioner’s order renewing the DVPO entered on May 24,
2024.
Fees on Appeal
Amina requests fees on appeal under RAP 18.1(a) and RCW
7.105.310(1)(j). RAP 18.1 allows a party to request attorney fees on appeal if
applicable law grants that right. In re Domestic Violence Protection Order for
Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 685, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). “An appellate court
may award attorney fees where allowed by statute, rule, or contract.” Aiken v.
Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 506, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). Under RCW 7.105.310(1)(j),
the court has discretion to “[r]equire the respondent to pay the administrative
court costs and service fees . . . and to reimburse the petitioner for costs incurred
in bringing the action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.” We exercise our
discretion to award Amina her reasonable fees and costs for bringing this appeal,
subject to her compliance with the requirements of RAP 18.1(d).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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WE CONCUR: