NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1201
AMGAD MUKHTAR & others1
vs.
MAURA HEALEY2 & others.3
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment issued by a Superior
Court judge dismissing their complaint alleging that numerous
Massachusetts firearm licensing statutes and other laws are
unconstitutional. Like the motion judge, we conclude that the
1Robert Egri, Katalin Egri, Michael Bush, Edward Chisholm, Vincent Cedrone, Phillip McLaine, and Joshua Ulrich.
2Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in her official and individual capacities.
3Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in her official and individual capacities; Geoffrey D. Noble, Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police, in his official capacity; Jordan Maynard, Chair of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Terrence M. Reidy, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, in his official and individual capacities; and the Massachusetts Port Authority, intervener. plaintiffs failed to establish standing to challenge any of the
laws except for the licensing fee. Further concluding that
binding Supreme Judicial Court precedent forecloses the
challenge to the licensing fee, we affirm.
1. Standard of review. "We review de novo the dismissal
of a complaint under either rule 12 (b) (1) or (6)." Hladik v.
LPL Fin. LLC, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 594 (2026).4 "Where a
party's challenge [to standing] is supported by affidavits or
other matters outside the record, the challenge is factual and
the burden falls to the nonmoving party to prove jurisdictional
facts." Id. at 595. By contrast, where the challenge is
unsupported by matters outside the complaint, the allegations of
the complaint are "taken as true for purposes of resolving the
complaint." Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505,
516 n.13 (2002). Here, the defendants presented extrinsic
evidence regarding only the Firearms Control Advisory Board. In
reviewing whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, we invariably "accept the allegations in
the complaint as true and draw 'all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff[s'] favor.'" Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner
LLC, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 486 (2021), quoting Baptiste v.
4 Because we review the dismissal de novo, the alleged procedural irregularities in the Superior Court are immaterial.
2 Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 97 Mass. App. Ct.
110, 114 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2626 (2021).
2. Standing. "A party has standing when it can allege an
injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory
scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious
action has occurred." Gibson v. Department of Correction, 106
Mass. App. Ct. 201, 206 (2025), quoting Doe No. 1 v. Secretary
of Educ., 479 Mass. 375, 386 (2018). "Simply alleging injury
alone is not sufficient and '[i]njuries that are speculative,
remote, and indirect' do not confer proper standing." Pugsley
v. Police Dep't of Boston, 472 Mass. 367, 371 (2015), quoting
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court,
448 Mass. 15, 21 (2006).
Here, the plaintiffs allege that they would act in various
ways currently prohibited by law were it not for those laws.
Each such allegation is conclusory. For example, the plaintiffs
allege that they "would bear arms on the property of and in
schools, colleges, and universities were it not for M.G.L.
Chapter 269 § 10(j)," and that they "have each been on the
property of and in schools, colleges, and universities multiple
times and intend to continue doing so." Nowhere in their
complaint do the plaintiffs provide any plan to act in these
3 ways, state which institutions they intend to visit, or explain
why they so desire to visit them while armed.
It is, of course, true that "when fear of criminal
prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not
imaginary or wholly speculative a plaintiff need not 'first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
challenge [the] statute.'" Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979), quoting Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs must
produce factual allegations that raise their assertion of
standing beyond the speculative. The sort of boilerplate
attempt to manufacture standing by ipse dixit attempted here is
not permitted. As the United States Supreme Court explained,
"'some day' intentions -- without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day
will be -- do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). The standing analysis concerns itself
with whether the plaintiffs actually face an imminent injury,
not whether they can recite the magic words in their complaint.
Similarly, it is hardly fair to the future plaintiff with
potentially an actual need, for instance, to bring a firearm
into a municipal building (for example, a municipal employee
4 with a dangerous ex-lover) to allow the legality of this
prohibition to be litigated by litigants without a concrete
stake in the question to be litigated.
The case relied upon by the plaintiffs, Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), is in accord. There,
"[b]oth petitioners ha[d] pleaded specific statements they
intend[ed] to make in future election cycles," and supported
these specific statements with examples of "substantially
similar activity" in the past. Id. at 161. Unlike the
petitioners in Susan B. Anthony List, the plaintiffs here have
provided no specific averments. The motion judge properly
determined that they lack standing to raise any of their claims
except for their challenge to the licensing fee.
3. Licensing fee. Except for Kaitin Egri, each of the
plaintiffs has a license to carry firearms and thus has been
directly harmed by the $100 fee to obtain a license to carry.
See G. L. c. 140, § 121F (o) (i). The Supreme Judicial Court
has held that a licensing scheme with reasonable processing
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1201
AMGAD MUKHTAR & others1
vs.
MAURA HEALEY2 & others.3
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment issued by a Superior
Court judge dismissing their complaint alleging that numerous
Massachusetts firearm licensing statutes and other laws are
unconstitutional. Like the motion judge, we conclude that the
1Robert Egri, Katalin Egri, Michael Bush, Edward Chisholm, Vincent Cedrone, Phillip McLaine, and Joshua Ulrich.
2Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in her official and individual capacities.
3Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in her official and individual capacities; Geoffrey D. Noble, Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police, in his official capacity; Jordan Maynard, Chair of the Massachusetts Gaming Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Terrence M. Reidy, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, in his official and individual capacities; and the Massachusetts Port Authority, intervener. plaintiffs failed to establish standing to challenge any of the
laws except for the licensing fee. Further concluding that
binding Supreme Judicial Court precedent forecloses the
challenge to the licensing fee, we affirm.
1. Standard of review. "We review de novo the dismissal
of a complaint under either rule 12 (b) (1) or (6)." Hladik v.
LPL Fin. LLC, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 594 (2026).4 "Where a
party's challenge [to standing] is supported by affidavits or
other matters outside the record, the challenge is factual and
the burden falls to the nonmoving party to prove jurisdictional
facts." Id. at 595. By contrast, where the challenge is
unsupported by matters outside the complaint, the allegations of
the complaint are "taken as true for purposes of resolving the
complaint." Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505,
516 n.13 (2002). Here, the defendants presented extrinsic
evidence regarding only the Firearms Control Advisory Board. In
reviewing whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, we invariably "accept the allegations in
the complaint as true and draw 'all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff[s'] favor.'" Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner
LLC, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 486 (2021), quoting Baptiste v.
4 Because we review the dismissal de novo, the alleged procedural irregularities in the Superior Court are immaterial.
2 Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 97 Mass. App. Ct.
110, 114 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2626 (2021).
2. Standing. "A party has standing when it can allege an
injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory
scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious
action has occurred." Gibson v. Department of Correction, 106
Mass. App. Ct. 201, 206 (2025), quoting Doe No. 1 v. Secretary
of Educ., 479 Mass. 375, 386 (2018). "Simply alleging injury
alone is not sufficient and '[i]njuries that are speculative,
remote, and indirect' do not confer proper standing." Pugsley
v. Police Dep't of Boston, 472 Mass. 367, 371 (2015), quoting
Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court,
448 Mass. 15, 21 (2006).
Here, the plaintiffs allege that they would act in various
ways currently prohibited by law were it not for those laws.
Each such allegation is conclusory. For example, the plaintiffs
allege that they "would bear arms on the property of and in
schools, colleges, and universities were it not for M.G.L.
Chapter 269 § 10(j)," and that they "have each been on the
property of and in schools, colleges, and universities multiple
times and intend to continue doing so." Nowhere in their
complaint do the plaintiffs provide any plan to act in these
3 ways, state which institutions they intend to visit, or explain
why they so desire to visit them while armed.
It is, of course, true that "when fear of criminal
prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not
imaginary or wholly speculative a plaintiff need not 'first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
challenge [the] statute.'" Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979), quoting Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs must
produce factual allegations that raise their assertion of
standing beyond the speculative. The sort of boilerplate
attempt to manufacture standing by ipse dixit attempted here is
not permitted. As the United States Supreme Court explained,
"'some day' intentions -- without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day
will be -- do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). The standing analysis concerns itself
with whether the plaintiffs actually face an imminent injury,
not whether they can recite the magic words in their complaint.
Similarly, it is hardly fair to the future plaintiff with
potentially an actual need, for instance, to bring a firearm
into a municipal building (for example, a municipal employee
4 with a dangerous ex-lover) to allow the legality of this
prohibition to be litigated by litigants without a concrete
stake in the question to be litigated.
The case relied upon by the plaintiffs, Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), is in accord. There,
"[b]oth petitioners ha[d] pleaded specific statements they
intend[ed] to make in future election cycles," and supported
these specific statements with examples of "substantially
similar activity" in the past. Id. at 161. Unlike the
petitioners in Susan B. Anthony List, the plaintiffs here have
provided no specific averments. The motion judge properly
determined that they lack standing to raise any of their claims
except for their challenge to the licensing fee.
3. Licensing fee. Except for Kaitin Egri, each of the
plaintiffs has a license to carry firearms and thus has been
directly harmed by the $100 fee to obtain a license to carry.
See G. L. c. 140, § 121F (o) (i). The Supreme Judicial Court
has held that a licensing scheme with reasonable processing
delays and fees is consistent with the Second Amendment. See
Commonwealth v. Marquis, 495 Mass. 434, 458-459 (2025), cert.
denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 520 (2026). This is consistent with the
United States Supreme Court's statement in dicta that such
licensing schemes are constitutional unless "lengthy wait times
5 in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny
ordinary citizens their right to public carry." New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n.9 (2022). It is
true, as the plaintiffs point out, that the Supreme Judicial
Court was considering the fee imposed on nonresident applicants,
but we can see no reason why that would make a constitutional
difference.5
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that a violation of equal
protection arises from the reduced or waived fees provided to
certain government officials, gunsmiths, and elderly persons.
They provide no argument -- nor do we envision any -- that there
is no rational basis for these reasonable exemptions. Rather,
they argue that strict scrutiny is required "whenever a
fundamental right is implicated." This is not so. Rather,
"strict scrutiny applies only where State action 'significantly
interfere[s] with' the fundamental right at issue,' not simply
where State action involves a fundamental right (citations
omitted)." Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81, 87 (2022). The
plaintiffs make no argument -- nor could they -- that the $100
5 The plaintiffs also state that they are preserving the issue whether Marquis was properly decided for review by the Supreme Judicial Court, presumably on further appellate review. We acknowledge that this claim was fully raised here. We, of course, are bound to follow the law as set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 730 n.1 (2001).
6 fee significantly interferes with the fundamental right to bear
arms. Accordingly, the motion judge properly concluded that the
plaintiffs' complaint on this point failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.6
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Shin, Ditkoff & Tan, JJ.7),
Clerk
Entered: June 5, 2026.
6 The plaintiffs argue in passing that the motion judge should have granted them leave to amend their complaint. Denials of such motions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Chang v. Winklevoss, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 202, 212 (2019). A motion to amend must attach a proposed complaint or "describe[] the proposed amendment in enough detail to meet the notice pleading requirement." Williamson v. Barlam, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 737 (2024). Accord Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569, 582 (2009). Here, the plaintiffs provided no description of any proposed amendments but rather asked the court to identify how they should amend their complaint. The motion judge acted within his discretion in declining this invitation.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.