Amfac, Inc. v. Ingram

694 P.2d 1005, 72 Or. App. 168, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2412
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedFebruary 6, 1985
Docket82-06472; CA A31160
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 694 P.2d 1005 (Amfac, Inc. v. Ingram) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amfac, Inc. v. Ingram, 694 P.2d 1005, 72 Or. App. 168, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2412 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

*170 NEWMAN, J.

Employer seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board that reversed the referee and held that petitioner’s claim was compensable as an occupational disease. ORS 656.802. We reverse.

After not working for six years, claimant began to work at the employer’s processing plant on February 1, 1982. She inspected potatoes on a conveyor and trimmed out defective portions. She handled about 16 potatoes per minute and made two or three knife trims to each potato. Claimant is right-handed and held the trim knife in her right hand. Within about two weeks she began to have numbness and tingling in her right hand. At the end of February she saw Dr. Johnson, a general practitioner, who suspected carpal tunnel syndrome. On May 17, 1982, Dr. Hendricks made nerve conduction studies and confirmed carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Nathan, a hand surgeon, examined claimant at employer’s request on June 14, 1982, and diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, right greater than left. 1 In November 1982 claimant had surgery on her right arm.

The parties do not dispute that, when claimant began work for employer in February 1982, she probably had had carpal tunnel disease for at least two years. She did not, however, have any symptoms before starting to work. Moreover, claimant’s off-the-job activities before and during her employment were normal. Her work at the plant required repetitive hand, wrist and arm motions that far exceeded what she did off the job or before her employment. The referee found that claimant’s work activity was the major contributing cause of her symptoms. The referee held, however, that the *171 carpal tunnel syndrome was not compensable, because claimant had failed to prove a worsening of her underlying condition, relying on Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or 27, 602 P2d 259 (1979).

After the referee’s order, this court decided Wheeler v. Boise Cascade, 66 Or App 620, 675 P2d 499 (1984), which held that proof of a worsened underlying condition is not necessary if the claimant had not previously sought medical attention for the underlying condition. Because claimant was asymptomatic and had not sought medical attention before she commenced work with employer, the Board ruled that she did not have to prove a worsening of her underlying condition:

“Because Weller does not apply to this case, and because we find that claimant has proven by a preponderance that her work activities were the major contributing cause of her symptoms, we reverse the Referee. The employer’s denial should be set aside.”

In Wheeler v. Boise Cascade Corp., 298 Or 452, 693 P2d 632 (1985), the Supreme Court reversed our decision. It stated:

«* * * reqUiremen^s for a claimant to prevail were set forth in Weller as follows:
“ ‘* * * we believe that in order to prevail claimant would have to prove by a preponderance of evidence that (1) his work activity and conditions (2) caused a worsening of his underlying disease (3) resulting in an increase in his pain (4) to the extent that it produces disability or requires medical services.’ ” 298 Or at 457 (footnote omitted.) 2

The Supreme Court stated that this court’s opinion in Wheeler “created a distinction that was not there,” and held “that the Weller analysis is the appropriate analysis whether the conditions are symptomatic or asymptomatic at the time of employment.” 298 Or at 457-58.

This is an occupational disease claim. James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343, 348, 624 P2d 565 (1981). Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her work activity caused a *172 worsening of her underlying carpal tunnel disease, even though she was asymptomatic and did not require medical services until after she commenced the employment. Wheeler v. Boise Cascade Corp., supra. Claimant, however, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her work activity worsened her underlying disease.

Claimant argues, and the evidence establishes, that an increase in pressure on the median nerve is a worsening of the disease. She then argues that her symptoms, or carpal tunnel syndrome, reflect an increase in pressure on the median nerve. She argues that, because she first had symptoms after she commenced work, she must have suffered from an increase in pressure on the median nerve because of her work activities. Therefore she argues that her work caused a worsening, including an acceleration, of her underlying carpal tunnel disease.

There is, however, no medical evidence to support her claim that her work caused a worsening of her underlying disease. Dr. Nathan wrote that “it does not seem reasonable that the work activity is either the cause of the underlying disease or significantly responsible for the symptoms.” He testified that, if the cumulative effect of her hand-wrist activities at work was greater than would have occurred off the job, which it was, that the work exposure brought about the need for medical treatment and the disabling condition sooner than might otherwise have occurred. Dr. Nathan, however, testified that the appearance of symptoms does not indicate that the disease process has worsened or changed. 3 He testi *173 fied that he was unable to say that the acceleration of the symptoms reflected a worsening of the disease process. 4 He also testified:

*174 “A. I can state as a reasonable medical probability that if she was not at work, that she would have presented with the symptomatology compatible with a carpal tunnel syndrome and underlying disease whether she was or was not gainfully employed for the 15 days at this particular employer, at a time relative to the time that she did. I can’t say it would have been the same day. But the markings were on the wall. They would occur. And I’m not saying five years from now, I’m talking about a proximity, I’m sure, in months.
“Q. [Claimant’s attorney] Okay. Did the work that she did in the interval between February 1 and when she presented to the doctor on February 26, in your opinion, hasten her presentation of carpal tunnel syndrome?
“A. If we confirm that these activities, in fact, and the accumulative effect were greater than she would have done in the same period of time at home as a housewife, and the symptoms occurred while doing these activities, I can’t disassociate the two. However, I cannot demonstrate — I cannot demonstrate that this represents a worsening of the disease process.”

Claimant’s attorney asked him directly:

“Q. This is my last little try at this.

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Related

Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp.
765 P.2d 1245 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1988)
Finch v. Stayton Canning Co.
761 P.2d 544 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1988)
Tucker v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
743 P.2d 761 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1987)
Ingram v. AMFAC, Inc.
698 P.2d 493 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
694 P.2d 1005, 72 Or. App. 168, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2412, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amfac-inc-v-ingram-orctapp-1985.