Ames Department Store, Inc. v. Assessor of Town of Greece

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ames Department Store, Inc. v. Assessor of Town of Greece

261 A.D.2d 835, 689 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4863

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 7, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 261 A.D.2d 835 (Ames Department Store, Inc. v. Assessor of Town of Greece) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ames Department Store, Inc. v. Assessor of Town of Greece, 261 A.D.2d 835, 689 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4863 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied respondents’ cross motion to dismiss three petitions seeking tax assessment review for 1995, 1996 and 1997. Petitioner, a fractional tenant occupying approximately 43% of a shopping plaza in the Town of Greece, is obligated under its lease to pay a proportionate share of the real property taxes. Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Real Property Tax Law § 704 (1) (see, Matter of Ames Dept. Stores v Assessor of Town of Concord, 102 AD2d 9, 11; see also, Matter of Big V Supermarkets v Assessor of Town of E. Greenbush, 114 AD2d 726) and has standing to maintain tax certiorari proceedings because its pecuniary interests are directly affected by the tax assessment and because the lease grants it the right to contest the taxes in its own name or in the name of the lessor (see, Waldbaum, Inc. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., 74 NY2d 128, 132; Matter of [836]*836Ames Dept. Stores v Assessor of Town of Concord, supra, at 10). The provision in the lease granting petitioner the right to contest the tax assessment in the name of the lessor allows petitioner to assert the requisite “unitary property interest” (Waldbaum, Inc. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., supra, at 134).

Petitioner and the lessor have equal standing to bring tax assessment review proceedings. The lease does not limit the grant of authority to petitioner, nor does it contain language from which it can be concluded that the lessor made a complete assignment of its right to seek tax assessment review. Because it was not a party to the agreement between the lessor and respondents in 1996, petitioner cannot be precluded by that agreement from maintaining these proceedings (see, Matter of Big V Supermarkets v Assessor of Town of E. Greenbush, supra, at 728). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J. — RPTL.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Callahan, JJ.

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—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied respondents’ cross motion to dismiss three petitions seeking tax assessment review for 1995, 1996 and 1997. Petitioner, a fractional tenant occupying approximately 43% of a shopping plaza in the Town of Greece, is obligated under its lease to pay a proportionate share of the real property taxes. Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Real Property Tax Law § 704 (1) (see, Matter of Ames Dept. Stores v Assessor of Town of Concord, 102 AD2d 9, 11; see also, Matter of Big V Supermarkets v Assessor of Town of E. Greenbush, 114 AD2d 726) and has standing to maintain tax certiorari proceedings because its pecuniary interests are directly affected by the tax assessment and because the lease grants it the right to contest the taxes in its own name or in the name of the lessor (see, Waldbaum, Inc. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., 74 NY2d 128, 132; Matter of [836]*836Ames Dept. Stores v Assessor of Town of Concord, supra, at 10). The provision in the lease granting petitioner the right to contest the tax assessment in the name of the lessor allows petitioner to assert the requisite “unitary property interest” (Waldbaum, Inc. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., supra, at 134).

Petitioner and the lessor have equal standing to bring tax assessment review proceedings. The lease does not limit the grant of authority to petitioner, nor does it contain language from which it can be concluded that the lessor made a complete assignment of its right to seek tax assessment review. Because it was not a party to the agreement between the lessor and respondents in 1996, petitioner cannot be precluded by that agreement from maintaining these proceedings (see, Matter of Big V Supermarkets v Assessor of Town of E. Greenbush, supra, at 728). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J. — RPTL.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Callahan, JJ.

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261 A.D.2d 835, 689 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ames-department-store-inc-v-assessor-of-town-of-greece-nyappdiv-1999.

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