Ameriprise Financial Services LLC v. Kenoyer

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided October 25, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-01675·Unknown

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 NO. 2:24-cv-1675 AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TRO 9 v.

10 DOUGLAS KENOYER, an individual and LPL FINANCIAL LLC, 11 Defendants.

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or 14 Preliminary Injunction, filed by Plaintiff Ameriprise Financial Services, LLC (“Ameriprise”). 15 Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Defendants Douglas Kenoyer, a financial advisor 16 affiliated with Ameriprise from 2006 to September 2024; and LPL Financial LLC (“LPL”), the 17 financial advisory Kenoyer joined after leaving Ameriprise. Having reviewed the briefs filed in 18 support of and in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and having held a hearing on the motion, the 19 Court finds and rules as follows. 20 II. BACKGROUND 21 Defendant Douglas Kenoyer is a financial advisor (or “registered representative”), who 22 joined the financial advisory firm Ameriprise in 2006. Compl., ¶ 15. On September 5, 2024, 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 24 MOTION FOR TRO

25 2 Defendant LPL the following day. Ameriprise alleges that Kenoyer misappropriated confidential 3 information belonging to Ameriprise and solicited Ameriprise clients prior to his departure, in 4 violation of, among other things, certain restrictive covenants governing his arrangement with 5 Ameriprise. By this action, Ameriprise seeks an injunction ordering Kenoyer and LPL to return 6 all client-related information and to forgo any further solicitation of clients Kenoyer served while 7 at Ameriprise. 8 Relevant to this dispute, over a series of transactions beginning in 2019, Kenoyer 9 purchased the book of business belonging to Ameriprise franchise owner Jan Gerards. This 10 purchase (the “Internal Client Transfer,” or “ICT”) included over 1,000 clients and approximately 11 $134 million in assets under management, and was financed by means of Kenoyer’s personal

12 funds and a commercial loan. Kenoyer Decl., ¶¶ 2-6. As part of that transaction, Kenoyer entered 13 into the “Independent Advisor Business Franchise Agreement” (“Franchise Agreement”) with 14 Ameriprise. By that agreement, Kenoyer was obligated “to not, during the term of this Agreement 15 or anytime thereafter, . . . communicate, divulge, or use for himself . . . or for the benefit of any 16 other person, association, corporation or partnership any confidential information or trade secrets, 17 including but not limited to Client names, addresses, and data.” Call Decl., Ex. A. The Franchise 18 Agreement also provided that Kenoyer would not “encourage, assist, participate, induce, or 19 attempt to encourage, assist, participate or induce any Client or prospective business or customer 20 to terminate an agreement” with Ameriprise, or “solicit any Clients that Independent Advisor 21 contacted, serviced or learned about while operating under this Agreement to open an account

22 other than an Ameriprise Financial account.” Id. 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 24 MOTION FOR TRO

25 2 and Defendants have not denied, that in the months leading up to his departure, Kenoyer began 3 soliciting Ameriprise clients to follow him to another firm. See Kinney Decl., ¶7; Ex. A. Kenoyer 4 has submitted a declaration stating that as early as April 2024, he advised his direct supervisor 5 and Ameriprise Vice President David Call that he (Kenoyer) was dissatisfied with his relationship 6 with Ameriprise, and was exploring an affiliation with other firms. Kenoyer states that he told 7 Call that he was sharing this information with some of his clients. Kenoyer Decl., ¶¶ 15, 16, 23, 8 27. While Call admits that he “was aware of Kenoyer’s general dissatisfaction with his 9 relationship with Ameriprise,” he avers that he “did not learn of his pre-solicitation until 10 immediately prior to Kenoyer submitting his Notice of Resignation,” and that “Kenoyer’s claim 11 he informed me that he was pre-soliciting Ameriprise’s clients is false.” Suppl. Call Dec., ¶¶ 3-5.

12 Both Ameriprise and LPL are signatories to what is known as the “Protocol for Broker 13 Recruiting” (the “Protocol”). Under the Protocol, signatory firms agree that financial advisors 14 moving from one firm to another “may take only the following account information: client name, 15 address, phone number, email address, and account title of the clients that they serviced while at 16 the firm,” known as the “Protocol List,” and “are prohibited from taking any other documents or 17 information.” Call Decl., Ex. C. However, this allowance applies only to advisors who comply 18 with other restrictions in the Protocol including, most relevantly to this case, that they be allowed 19 to solicit customers that they serviced while at their former firms “only after they have joined 20 their new firms.” Id. (emphasis added). Ameriprise has also clarified, in what is referred to as the 21 “Joinder Letter,” that the Protocol allowances do not apply to accounts acquired from, among

22 others, Ameriprise independent financial advisors (such as the ICT involving Gerards), for a 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 24 MOTION FOR TRO

25 2 When Kenoyer moved from Ameriprise to LPL, he provided Ameriprise with his 3 “Protocol List” of clients that he intended to take with him, which included a substantial number 4 of clients he had acquired from Gerards. For this reason, and because it has discovered that 5 Kenoyer had solicited clients before leaving Ameriprise, Ameriprise now claims that the Protocol 6 does not apply to Kenoyer’s departure and does not authorize him to take client information with 7 him to LPL. By this motion, Ameriprise seeks to enjoin Defendants from retaining the 8 information on the Protocol List or from taking any further action to solicit any of the clients 9 Kenoyer served while at Ameriprise. 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Standards for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

12 A TRO, like a preliminary injunction, is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be 13 awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 14 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To make such a showing, the moving party bears the burden 15 of demonstrating the following elements: “(1) ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that 16 he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of 17 equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. 18 Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 19 B. Whether Plaintiff Has Met Its Burden Under TRO Standard

20 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits1 21

22 1 Because, as discussed below, the Court finds that Ameriprise has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its breach of contract claim, it need not and does not reach the merits of Ameriprise’s other claims. 23 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 24 MOTION FOR TRO

25 2 proposition that Defendants do not dispute. Defendants also do not appear to dispute that Kenoyer 3 did in fact solicit clients before leaving Ameriprise, and that such actions would constitute a 4 breach of the Franchise Agreement. Instead, the question raised by Defendants is whether 5 Kenoyer can claim the protections of the Protocol. As referenced above, the Protocol authorizes 6 registered representatives, when moving from one Protocol signatory to another, to take with 7 them limited information related to their clients, but only when they have otherwise complied 8 with the Protocol’s provisions.

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