AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Swafford (In Re Swafford)

296 B.R. 66, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1728, 2002 WL 32136338
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 8, 2002
Docket14-64228
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 296 B.R. 66 (AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Swafford (In Re Swafford)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Swafford (In Re Swafford), 296 B.R. 66, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1728, 2002 WL 32136338 (Ga. 2002).

Opinion

ORDER DEFERRING MOVANT’S OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF DEBTOR’S AMENDED PLAN AND ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION

ROBERT E. BRIZENDINE, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the objection of Movant AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. to confirmation of Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan as amended. Specifically, objection is made to the provision whereby Debtor proposes to pay interest on Movant’s secured claim “at the rate of 12% on the value of the collateral securing the claim....” Movant filed a proof of claim in the amount of $11,163.80. The value of the automobile serving as collateral has been determined to be $11,900.00 and the contract rate of interest is 23.5% (APR). Movant objects to the proposed treatment of its claim on grounds that it is entitled by law to the contract rate of interest to preserve the value of its claim in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Movant contends that because it cannot immediately realize the value of its collateral due to the bankruptcy filing and automatic stay, and since the collateral is not being surrendered under subsection 1325(a)(5), it is protected by the Bankruptcy Code through the Debtor’s distribution of property with a value of not less than $11,163.80. In support of this assertion, Movant cites the following statutory language:

.. .with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-... (B)(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Movant argues it is being forced to extend credit under a defaulted loan and any rate of interest other than the original contract rate would be arbitrary and constitute the deprivation of the value of its bargained for property interest to which it is entitled on its allowed claim. See In re Cooper, 11 B.R. 391 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1981). If modified, Movant states that the rate of return for such a coerced loan must correspond with the rate Movant would charge to a third party outside bankruptcy with comparable risk and loan terms.

*68 Debtor counters this argument stating, pursuant to the authority of In the Matter of Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022, 104 S.Ct. 1275, 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984), that the “market rate of interest” controls in this case and any determination of same must be guided by the factors set forth in Southern States. 1 Attempting to follow Southern States, some courts have used the coerced loan approach to define the market rate of interest. See In re Chiodo, 261 B.R. 499 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000) and In re Howard, 212 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.1997). Debtor, however, adopts the criticism set forth in several other cases and argues that the coerced loan theory is based upon a non-realistic conception of market and allows for profit over and above present value. See e.g. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1991). 2 Additionally, Debt- or states that the contract rate as applied under this theory does not reflect the required market rate as it often results from what an unsophisticated debtor has accepted as opposed to what is truly available in the market. To arrive at the appropriate market rate, Debtor urges the Court to adopt the formula method (described hereafter) to avoid overcompensating Movant while accounting for risk factors and paying sufficient interest to compensate Movant for the time-value of money. 3

Based upon a review of the law, the Court concludes as follows. As held in Southern States, the holder of a secured claim, who is required under a confirmed plan to accept payment on its claim over time, must receive a rate of interest that compensates the creditor for the present value of its claim. 709 F.2d at 650, 652-53. In determining the proper interest rate, the Eleventh Circuit requires consideration of “the prevailing market rate for a loan of a term equal to the payout period, with due consideration of the quality of the security and the risk of subsequent default.” 709 F.2d at 652, quoting 5 Collier ¶ 1129.03, at 1129-65. As argued by Debt- or, some, courts have concluded that the “time value of money approach” or “formula approach” best enable the court to determine the proper market rate consistent with Southern States. See Matter of IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 547, 557 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992); Oaks Partners, 135 B.R. 440, 445. Under this method, a risk-free interest rate, such as the yield on a treasury obligation of like term, plus an additional amount to account for the risk factors referenced in Southern States results in an appropriate rate.

By contrast under the “coerced loan” theory urged by Movant, courts determine the market rate in reference to what another lender in the market would charge if it made a similar loan. In addition, under this theory the original contract rate is *69 considered some evidence of what would be required on a loan of similar character and duration. Baxter, 278 B.R. at 881; In re Pledger, 275 B.R. 394 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2002). As suggested by Debtor, the most compelling criticism against this approach is the nonexistence of an actual market for such a loan to a debtor in bankruptcy. American General Fin., Inc. v. Kleinknecht, 230 B.R. 207, 210 (M.D.Ga.1999). Other criticisms favoring a discounted rate include the lower monitoring costs and risk of default for a debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case who presumably has more incentive to pay. Also, a creditor making a new loan would have to account for loan and transaction costs which would be reduced in a bankruptcy situation.

The legal standard set forth in Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) states that “the court shall confirm a plan if’ it provides to the holder of a secured claim “the value, as of the effective date of the plan ... not less than the allowed amount of such claim.” Simply stated, the Court is required to set a value and determine an interest rate that will reasonably ensure a creditor will receive such value accounting for the financial situation of the debtor and assessment of the risk of nonpayment.

Even after Southern States, the case law in this circuit is at best inconclusive regarding the method which should be used in determining the prevailing market rate of interest consistent with the Southern States criteria. In this Court’s view, however, such a divergence of opinion is not an issue because it is not necessary to choose one approach over the other.

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Bluebook (online)
296 B.R. 66, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1728, 2002 WL 32136338, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/americredit-financial-services-inc-v-swafford-in-re-swafford-ganb-2002.