The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY May 1, 2025
2025COA46
No. 24CA1066, Americans for Prosperity v. State of Colorado — Taxation — TABOR — Creation of a New Fee-based Enterprise
A division of the court of appeals reviews a challenge to S.B.
21-260 alleging that, by creating the enterprises that it did and by
increasing the excess state revenues cap, the bill violated the
Colorado Constitution and state statutes concerning the collection
and spending of state revenue. The division concludes that S.B. 21-
260 runs afoul of neither the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) nor
section 24-77-108, C.R.S. 2024. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA46
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1066 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV30971 Honorable Andrew J. Luxen, Judge
Americans for Prosperity, a Colorado nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
State of Colorado; Jared Polis, in his official capacity as the Governor of the State of Colorado; Colorado Department of Revenue; Robert Jaros, in his official capacity as the Controller for the State of Colorado; Community Access Enterprise; Clean Fleet Enterprise; Clean Transit Enterprise; Nonattainment Area Air Pollution Mitigation Enterprise; and Statewide Bridge and Tunnel Enterprise,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Pawar and Berger*, JJ., concur
Announced May 1, 2025
West Group Law & Policy, Suzanne M. Taheri, Englewood, Colorado; Stinson LLP, Perry L. Glantz, Denver, Colorado, Charles W. Hatfield, Jefferson City, Missouri, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ryann Hardman, Assistant Attorney General, Shelby A. Krantz, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 This appeal implicates provisions of the Colorado Constitution
and state statutes concerning the collection and spending of state
revenue. Plaintiff, Americans for Prosperity (AFP), asserts that the
General Assembly violated section 24-77-108, C.R.S. 2024, and the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR), Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, when it
created several enterprises as part of a transportation sustainability
bill passed in 2022. The district court disagreed and granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants, the State of Colorado,
Governor Jared Polis, the Colorado Department of Revenue,
Colorado Controller Robert Jaros, the Community Access
Enterprise, the Clean Fleet Enterprise, the Clean Transit
Enterprise, the Nonattainment Area Air Pollution Mitigation
Enterprise, and the Statewide Bridge and Tunnel Enterprise. We
affirm.
I. Background
A. TABOR
¶2 In 1992, Colorado voters adopted TABOR, which, among other
things, limits governmental entities’ ability to impose new taxes or
increase tax revenue without obtaining advance voter approval. See
Colo. Const. art. X, § 20. TABOR states that its “preferred
1 interpretation shall reasonably restrain most the growth of
government,” Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(1), and, to that end, it sets
annual caps on governmental spending: “The maximum annual
percentage change in state fiscal year spending equals inflation plus
the percentage change in state population in the prior calendar
year, adjusted for revenue changes approved by voters after 1991.”
Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(7)(a). Absent exclusion from fiscal year
spending limits or voter approval to the contrary, districts must
refund to taxpayers revenue exceeding these limits. Colo. Const.
art. X, § 20(7)(d); see also Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass’n, 264 P.3d
884, 890-91 (Colo. 2011).
¶3 TABOR applies to “districts,” which it defines as “the state or
any local government, excluding enterprises.” Colo. Const. art. X,
§ 20(2)(b). TABOR defines an “enterprise,” meanwhile, as “a
government-owned business authorized to issue its own revenue
bonds and receiving under 10% of annual revenue in grants from
all Colorado state and local governments combined.” Colo. Const.
art. X, § 20(2)(d); see also Nicholl v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 896
P.2d 859, 867-69 (Colo. 1995).
2 B. Referendum C
¶4 In 2005, Colorado voters adopted a referred measure known
as Referendum C. The measure paused TABOR’s spending limits
from 2005 to 2010, permitting the state to “retain and spend all
state revenues in excess of the limitation on state fiscal year
spending.” § 24-77-103.6(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Referendum C then
established a new cap on state spending beginning in 2010 that
exceeded the limit that TABOR would have otherwise set. This new
limit, dubbed the “excess state revenues cap,” was calculated using
“the highest total state revenues for a fiscal year” from the 2005-
2010 period during which TABOR’s spending limits were paused.
§ 24-77-103.6(6)(b)(I)(B). After 2010, the excess state revenues cap
was to be “adjusted each subsequent fiscal year for inflation, the
percentage change in state population, the qualification or
disqualification of enterprises, and debt service changes.” Id.
¶5 The state spent its revenue in this manner until the 2017-
2018 fiscal year, when the General Assembly, by statute,
voluntarily reduced the excess state revenues cap for that fiscal
year by $200 million. § 24-77-103.6(6)(b)(I)(C). During the
following two fiscal years, the legislature adjusted the excess state
3 revenues cap only for inflation, state population change, enterprise
qualification and disqualification, and debt service changes. § 24-
77-103.6(6)(b)(I)(D)-(E).
C. Proposition 117
¶6 In 2020, Colorado voters adopted a ballot initiative known as
Proposition 117, later codified at section 24-77-108(1), which
mandated statewide voter approval for any newly qualified or
created enterprise receiving more than $100 million in revenue from
fees and surcharges during its first five fiscal years. Proposition
117 also required that “[r]evenue collected for enterprises created
simultaneously or within the five preceding years serving primarily
the same purpose” be aggregated when determining whether voter
approval is necessary. § 24-77-108(2). Enterprises serving
primarily the same purpose are those that “provide the same
services in the same geographic area.” § 24-77-108(3)(a).
D. Transportation Sustainability Bill
¶7 The following year, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill
21-260 (S.B. 21-260). Ch. 250, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 1360. The
bill’s full title was:
4 An Act Concerning the Sustainability of the Transportation System in Colorado, and, in Connection Therewith, Creating New Sources of Dedicated Funding and New State Enterprises to Preserve, Improve, and Expand Existing Transportation Infrastructure, Develop the Modernized Infrastructure Needed to Support the Widespread Adoption of Electric Motor Vehicles, and Mitigate Environmental and Health Impacts of Transportation System Use; Expanding Authority for Regional Transportation Improvements; and Making an Appropriation.
Id. S.B. 21-260’s legislative declaration stated that “[t]he current
and future health and prosperity of the state and its growing
number of citizens requires the planning, funding, development,
construction, maintenance, and supervision of a sustainable
transportation system.” Sec. 1(1)(a), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at
1360.
¶8 To accomplish this, S.B. 21-260 created and funded four
enterprises (the Community Access Enterprise, the Clean Fleet
Enterprise, the Clean Transit Enterprise, and the Nonattainment
Area Air Pollution Mitigation Enterprise), Sec. 1(2)(c)(II), 2021 Colo.
Sess. Laws at 1364, and expanded the scope of the Statewide
Bridge Enterprise to become the Statewide Bridge and Tunnel
Enterprise. Sec. 48, § 43-4-805, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1442.
5 S.B. 21-260 also reversed the voluntary reduction in the excess
state revenues cap that the General Assembly had passed in 2017
by adding $224,957,602 (which we understand to be the inflation-
adjusted amount of the previous $200 million reduction) to the cap
for the 2020-2021 fiscal year. Sec. 8, § 24-77-103.6(6)(b)(I)(F), 2021
Colo. Sess. Laws at 1385.
E. The Lawsuit
¶9 In April 2022, AFP commenced this action. As relevant to this
appeal, it asserted the following:
• S.B. 21-260 violated section 24-77-108 because, without
receiving prior voter approval, S.B. 21-260
simultaneously created five enterprises that would
generate revenue exceeding $100 million in their first five
years of existence.
• S.B. 21-260’s creation of five enterprises in a single bill
violated the Colorado Constitution’s single-subject
requirement, see Colo. Const. art. V, § 21, because the
enterprises serve different purposes.
• S.B. 21-260’s increase to the excess state revenues cap
violated the single-subject requirement, as increasing
6 spending was distinct from ensuring the sustainability of
Colorado’s transportation system.
violated TABOR because the legislature’s voluntary $200
million reduction of the cap during the 2017-2018 fiscal
year was irreversible absent voter approval.
¶ 10 Among other things, AFP requested that the district court
(1) declare that S.B. 21-260 violated section 24-77-108 or,
alternatively, the state constitution; (2) enjoin the enterprises from
operating or charging or collecting fees until receiving statewide
voter approval; (3) enjoin the Colorado Department of Revenue from
collecting fees for, or transferring funds to, the enterprises prior to
statewide voter approval; (4) strike the increase to the excess state
revenues cap from S.B. 21-260; and (5) alternatively, set aside S.B.
21-260 in its entirety.
¶ 11 Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that all of
AFP’s claims failed as a matter of law. The district court granted
defendants’ motion.
7 II. Summary Judgment
¶ 12 We first address whether, as AFP urges, the district court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants when
genuine issues of material fact remained that warranted a trial. We
conclude that the district court did not err.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 13 We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo.
Robinson v. Legro, 2014 CO 40, ¶ 10. Summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, or
admissions demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 814,
819 (Colo. 2004). “In the context of a summary judgment
proceeding, an issue of material fact is one, the resolution of which
will affect the outcome of the case.” Krane v. Saint Anthony Hosp.
Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. App. 1987).
¶ 14 At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he moving party bears the
initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists.”
Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25, ¶ 20. Once this burden
is met, the nonmoving party must “establish that there is a triable
8 issue of fact.” D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. D & S Landscaping, LLC,
215 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008). “A court must afford all
favorable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts
to the nonmoving party, and must resolve all doubts as to the
existence of a triable issue of fact against the moving party.” Cotter
Corp., 90 P.3d at 819. However, the nonmoving party may not rest
on the allegations made in the pleadings but instead must provide
facts “by affidavit or otherwise” to show that there is a triable issue.
Han Ye Lee v. Colo. Times, Inc., 222 P.3d 957, 960 (Colo. App.
2009).
B. Analysis
¶ 15 In alleging that genuine issues of material fact remained when
the district court granted summary judgment, AFP incorrectly
characterizes questions of law as questions of fact. AFP asserts
that the following were fact questions in dispute at the time of the
court’s ruling: (1) the proper interpretation of section 24-77-108
and whether S.B. 21-260 violated it; (2) the proper interpretation of
TABOR and whether S.B. 21-260 violated it; and (3) whether S.B.
21-260 violated the Colorado Constitution’s single-subject
requirement. These issues, however, posed questions of law that
9 were properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See
Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7 (“Constitutional
interpretation and statutory interpretation present questions of
law . . . .”); TABOR Found. v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 2018 CO 29, ¶ 14
(“When the parties do not dispute the material facts, summary
judgment is appropriate if the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”).
¶ 16 AFP contends that, in response to defendants’ summary
judgment motion, it “put forth sufficient evidence demonstrating
that a triable issue existed regarding the electorate’s intent in
enacting [section 24-77-108].” This evidence was made up solely of
the declaration and deposition testimony of Michael Fields, whom
AFP describes as “the primary drafter of . . . Proposition 117,”
addressing what he actually intended for the ballot initiative to
mean when he drafted it. Regardless of his relationship to
Proposition 117, however, Fields’s opinions about how section 24-
77-108 should be interpreted have no bearing on the legal
questions before us. See In re Interrogatories Relating to the Great
Outdoors Colo. Tr. Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 540 (Colo. 1996) (“When
courts construe a constitutional amendment that has been adopted
10 through a ballot initiative, any intent of the proponents that is not
adequately expressed in the language of the measure will not govern
the court’s construction of the amendment.”); see also Davidson v.
Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2004) (“The intent of the
drafters, not expressed in the language of the amendment, is not
relevant to our inquiry.”).
¶ 17 Thus, Fields’s declaration and deposition testimony created no
triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment, and the district
court appropriately resolved the issues before it as a matter of law.
III. S.B. 21-260’s Legality
¶ 18 According to AFP, the General Assembly’s passage of S.B. 21-
260 violated section 24-77-108, TABOR, and the Colorado
Constitution’s single-subject requirement. We are not persuaded.
¶ 19 As noted above, we review a trial court’s summary judgment
ruling de novo. Robinson, ¶ 10. Likewise, we review a district
court’s interpretation of ballot measures, statutes, and
constitutional provisions de novo. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs,
129 P.3d 988, 992 (Colo. 2006); HCA-Healthone, LLC v. City of Lone
Tree, 197 P.3d 236, 240 (Colo. App. 2008).
11 ¶ 20 We apply general principles of statutory interpretation to ballot
initiatives. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519,
533 (Colo. 2009). In doing so, we first determine whether the ballot
initiative has a plain and ordinary meaning. Fischbach v.
Holzberlein, 215 P.3d 407, 409 (Colo. App. 2009). “Unless the
language is ambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the
ballot question” and do not use extrinsic evidence to ascertain voter
intent. Mesa County, 203 P.3d at 533-34.
¶ 21 If the ballot language is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, we may consider relevant extrinsic evidence to
determine the electorate’s intent. Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917
P.2d 280, 283 (Colo. 1996); see also Davidson, 83 P.3d at 655
(“Courts may determine [voter intent] ‘by considering other relevant
materials such as the ballot title and submission clause and the
biennial “Bluebook,” which is the analysis of ballot proposals
prepared by the legislature.’” (quoting In re Submission of
Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo.
1999))); Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 962 (Colo. App. 2003)
(“While not binding, the Blue Book provides important insight into
the electorate’s understanding of the amendment when it was
12 passed and also shows the public’s intentions in adopting the
amendment.”). As noted above, however, the intent of the ballot
initiative’s drafters is irrelevant when not expressed within the
language of the ballot initiative. Mesa County, 203 P.3d at 534.
B. Compliance with Section 24-77-108
¶ 22 We agree with the district court’s conclusion that S.B. 21-260
did not violate section 24-77-108.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 23 As codified at section 24-77-108, Proposition 117 states in
relevant part:
(1) A state enterprise . . . shall not receive more than $100,000,000 in revenue from fees and surcharges in its first five fiscal years unless approved at a statewide general election. . . .
(2) Revenue collected for enterprises created simultaneously or within the five preceding years serving primarily the same purpose shall be aggregated in calculating the applicability of this section.
(3) For the purposes of applying the requirements of subsections (1) and (2) of this section:
(a) Enterprises serve primarily the same purpose when they provide the same services in the same geographic area . . . .
13 ¶ 24 S.B. 21-260 directed the five enterprises at issue to do the
following:
• It directed the Community Access Enterprise to “reduc[e]
and mitigat[e] the adverse environmental and health
impacts of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions
produced by motor vehicles used to make retail deliveries
to consumers within local communities” by “support[ing]
the adoption of electric motor vehicles and electric
alternatives to motor vehicles at the community level.”
Sec. 1(2)(d)(I), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1364.
• It directed the Clean Fleet Enterprise to “reduc[e] and
mitigat[e] the adverse environmental and health impacts
of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions produced
by the increasing number of fleet motor vehicles being
used to provide transportation network company rides
and make retail deliveries” by “supporting the
electrification of such fleets and other motor vehicle
fleets.” Sec. 1(2)(d)(II), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1365.
14 • It directed the Clean Transit Enterprise to “reduc[e] and
by retail deliveries by supporting the replacement of
existing gasoline and diesel public transit vehicles with
electric motor vehicles.” Sec. 1(2)(d)(III), 2021 Colo. Sess.
Laws at 1365.
• It directed the Nonattainment Area Air Pollution
Mitigation Enterprise to “mitigate[e] the environmental
and health impacts of increased air pollution from motor
vehicle emissions in nonattainment areas that results
from the rapid and continuing growth in retail deliveries
made by motor vehicles and in prearranged rides
provided by transportation network companies” by
providing funding for projects that reduce traffic or
directly reduce air pollution. Sec. 1(2)(d)(IV), 2021 Colo.
Sess. Laws at 1365.
• And it directed the Statewide Bridge and Tunnel
Enterprise to “complete designated bridge projects and
tunnel projects, . . . impose a bridge safety surcharge and
15 a bridge and tunnel impact fee and issue revenue bonds,
and . . . contract with the state” to receive loans and “to
use the revenues generated by the bridge safety
surcharge and the bridge and tunnel impact fee to repay”
any loans received. Sec. 45, § 43-4-802, 2021 Colo.
Sess. Laws at 1440.
2. Analysis
¶ 25 The parties disagree on the interpretation of section 24-77-
108(2) — specifically, the role played by the phrase “serving
primarily the same purpose.” AFP contends that this phrase
modifies “within the five preceding years.” Thus, according to AFP,
when assessing whether voter approval for an enterprise is
required, enterprise revenue must be aggregated under either of two
circumstances: (1) when enterprises created within the five
preceding years serve primarily the same purpose; or (2) when
enterprises are created simultaneously — irrespective of the
purposes those enterprises serve. Based on this interpretation, AFP
asserts that S.B. 21-260 violated section 24-77-108 because
without first obtaining voter approval, it simultaneously created five
16 enterprises with projected revenue exceeding $100 million from fees
and surcharges in their first five fiscal years.
¶ 26 Conversely, defendants argue that “serving primarily the same
purpose” modifies “enterprises.” Thus, whether they are created
simultaneously or within the five preceding years, enterprise
revenue need only be aggregated when those enterprises serve
primarily the same purpose, which the five enterprises under S.B.
21-260 do not.1 Both a plain reading of the statute and
consideration of extrinsic evidence confirm that defendants’
interpretation of Proposition 117 is correct.
¶ 27 Although the phrase “serving primarily the same purpose”
immediately follows the phrase “within the five preceding years” in
section 24-77-108(2), “serving primarily the same purpose” must
modify “enterprises” because “enterprises” is the nearest subject.
While “years” is the nearest noun, “years” is merely part of the
prepositional phrase “within the five preceding years.” Thus, rules
1 AFP does not challenge defendants’ argument that the five
enterprises serve different purposes. Indeed, as explained below, AFP argues that the enterprises’ different purposes mean that S.B. 21-260 violates the Colorado Constitution’s single-subject requirement.
17 of grammar and plain English both demonstrate that “serving
primarily the same purpose” cannot modify “within the five
preceding years.”
¶ 28 This plain reading of the statute is sufficient to ascertain the
meaning behind section 24-77-108(2). But even if we were to
conclude that the ballot initiative was ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence proper for consideration confirms that voters held this
same understanding. Under a heading that read “What happens if
Proposition 117 passes?” the 2020 Bluebook explained: “For
multiple enterprises created to serve primarily the same purpose,
including those created during the past five years, revenue is added
together to determine whether voter approval is required.” Legis.
Council, Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2020 State Ballot Information Booklet,
Rsch. Publ’n No. 748-1, at 50 (emphasis added),
https://perma.cc/8ZRJ-F89W. This clear statement of Proposition
117’s effects puts to rest any uncertainty about its interpretation.
¶ 29 Section 24-77-108(2) only requires voter approval of newly
created enterprises when they (1) are created simultaneously or
within the preceding five years; (2) serve the same purpose; and
(3) have a projected aggregate revenue exceeding $100 million from
18 fees and surcharges in their first five fiscal years. Because it is
undisputed that the enterprises at issue here were created for
different purposes and no enterprise individually had a projected
five-year revenue exceeding $100 million, the General Assembly was
not required to seek voter approval before establishing them.
C. Compliance with TABOR
¶ 30 The district court also correctly determined that S.B. 21-260’s
addition of $224,957,602 to the excess state revenues cap did not
violate TABOR.
¶ 31 According to AFP, once the General Assembly voluntarily
reduced the excess state revenues cap in 2017, TABOR’s
restrictions on increases to state spending prohibited the General
Assembly from reverting to the previous cap without first obtaining
statewide voter approval. Instead, under Referendum C, the
legislature could only increase the cap between fiscal years by an
amount tied to “inflation, the percentage change in state
population, the qualification or disqualification of enterprises, and
debt service changes.” § 24-77-103.6(6)(b)(I)(B). Thus, AFP asserts,
once the legislature reduced the cap by $200 million, it could only
thereafter raise the cap consistent with these variables.
19 ¶ 32 AFP’s position misapprehends Referendum C. True,
Referendum C restricts annual cap increases to amounts tethered
to the variables that AFP cites. But the annual cap is just that: a
cap. Referendum C limits the annual growth of the maximum
amount of money that the state is “authorized to retain and spend.”
§ 24-77-103.6(2.5)(c)(II). It does not, however, limit the annual
growth of the amount of money that the state actually spends
within that permissible range.
¶ 33 We conclude that such a limitation would conflict with
TABOR’s “preferred interpretation . . . reasonably restrain[ing] most
the growth of government,” Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(1), by creating
a “use-it-or-lose-it” principle encouraging the state to spend money
even when it is not needed. Indeed, imposing such consequences
would discourage precisely the type of fiscal prudence that led the
General Assembly to voluntarily reduce the cap in the first place,
and it would conflict with the Colorado Supreme Court’s
“consistent[] reject[ions] [of] interpretations of TABOR that ‘would
hinder basic government functions or cripple the government's
ability to provide services.’” In re Interrogatory on House Bill 21-
20 1164, 2021 CO 34, ¶ 31 (quoting Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238,
248 (Colo. 2008)).
¶ 34 In short, the General Assembly’s determination that for three
fiscal years it did not need to spend all of the money that it was
authorized to spend had no impact on the excess state revenue cap
approved by voters when they adopted Referendum C. Accordingly,
S.B. 21-260’s restoration of $224,957,602 to the 2020-2021 fiscal
year budget did not run afoul of TABOR.
D. Compliance with Single-Subject Requirement
¶ 35 Lastly, the district court correctly concluded that S.B. 21-260
did not violate the single-subject requirement. See Colo. Const. art.
V, § 21 (stating, in pertinent part, that “[n]o bill, except general
appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title”).
¶ 36 As noted above, S.B. 21-260’s full title was:
An Act Concerning the Sustainability of the Transportation System in Colorado, and, in Connection Therewith, Creating New Sources of Dedicated Funding and New State Enterprises to Preserve, Improve, and Expand Existing Transportation Infrastructure, Develop the Modernized Infrastructure Needed to Support the Widespread Adoption of Electric Motor Vehicles, and Mitigate Environmental
21 and Health Impacts of Transportation System Use; Expanding Authority for Regional Transportation Improvements; and Making an Appropriation.
2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1360.
¶ 37 AFP contends that S.B. 21-260 violated the single-subject
requirement in two ways: (1) it created five enterprises that serve
different purposes, and (2) it adjusted the excess state revenues cap
in a bill intended instead to ensure the sustainability of Colorado’s
transportation system.
¶ 38 With respect to the first contention, AFP conflates the
purposes served by the enterprises with the subject matter of S.B.
21-260. But these are two distinct concepts: what each enterprise
specifically does is not the same as what subject the bill creating
them addresses. That the enterprises may serve various different
purposes is not enough to violate the single-subject requirement;
rather, the enterprises’ different purposes must concern more than
one subject. And in this regard, the enterprises do not differ. The
purposes served by the enterprises are (1) community-level electric
vehicle adoption; (2) electrification of motor vehicle fleets; (3)
electrification of public transit vehicles; (4) reduction of air pollution
22 in nonattainment areas; and (5) completion of bridge and tunnel
projects. Secs. 1(2), 45, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1364-65, 1440.
While each of these purposes is distinct, they each undoubtedly
concern S.B. 21-260’s sole subject matter: ensuring the
sustainability of Colorado’s transportation system.
¶ 39 AFP’s second argument, that S.B. 21-260’s inclusion of an
adjustment to the excess state revenues cap violated the single-
subject requirement, is similarly unavailing. In its order, the
district court reasoned that “S.B. 21-260’s title spells out in no
uncertain terms that one of its goals is to ‘create new sources of
dedicated funding’ in connection with sustaining Colorado’s
transportation system.” To this end, the court noted, S.B. 21-260
provided for “new or expanded fees associated with the five
enterprises” and “other fees that factor into the excess state
revenues cap,” such as registration fees for electric vehicles and
indexing per gallon fuel charges to reflect inflation. And, the court
explained, it credited defendants’ argument that ensuring the
sustainability of Colorado’s transportation system “cannot be
achieved without a reliable funding source, and increasing the
excess state revenues cap is directly related to that goal.” We agree
23 with the district court’s conclusion that the increase to the excess
state revenues cap was encompassed by the single subject
expressed in S.B. 21-260’s title, and AFP’s conclusory assertions to
the contrary do not persuade us otherwise.
IV. Remaining Issues
¶ 40 In light of the foregoing analysis, we do not consider the
parties’ arguments as to whether (1) the legislature’s authority to
pass laws is subject only to constitutional limitations rather than
limitations imposed by previously enacted statutes, and (2) section
24-77-108 is inapplicable to the Statewide Bridge and Tunnel
Enterprise because that enterprise was neither created nor qualified
by S.B. 21-260.
V. Disposition
¶ 41 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE BERGER concur.