American Trim, LLC v. Oracle Corp.

230 F. Supp. 2d 803, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21749, 2002 WL 31505943
District Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided November 6, 2002·No. 3:99CV7265·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

ORDER

CARR, District Judge.

This is a diversity case in which American Trim, L.L.C. purchased software from the defendant Oracle Corporation. Following trial before a jury, judgment was returned in American Trim’s favor on fraud and related claims. Pending are motions by American Trim to recover costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to a motion by Oracle for reconsideration of a pretrial ruling (Doc. 238) and American Trim’s bill of costs. (Doc. 246).

1. Motion for Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Oracle’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 117) sought reconsideration of an order directing that issues relating to liability be tried separately from issues relating to damages. After restating my reasons for bifurcating the proceedings, and confirming my decision to do so, I stated, in *805 overruling Oracle’s motion for reconsideration:

The present motion was unnecessary. Following the completion of all proceedings in this case, I presently expect to call on Oracle to show cause why plaintiff should not be compensated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for the attorneys’ fees it incurred in responding to the instant motion.
It is time that lawyers who file unfounded motions for reconsideration, which is all this motion really is, and renew objections to rulings that have been preceded by consideration of the arguments they simply repeat in support of motions to reconsider, come to understand that there will be a cost to their doing so. A party that prevails on rulings should not have to invest resources in having those rulings reconfirmed.

(Doc. 133).

Oracle’s response to American Trim’s request for its costs and fees is, in essence, a complaint about its uncertainty about the scope of the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding. I believe that I made myself clear from the outset of my discussion of separate trials about the scope of the first phase when I stated, “that’s a pretty straightforward issue, was something called Oracle Automotive promised, and if so, was it delivered, and if not that’s the end of the fraud case and could potentially impact significantly on the contract claims.” (July 23, 2001, pretrial conference).

This is how I envisioned the initial trial on liability. And I thought my perception of the limited scope of the first stage was clear.

Oracle purports to have been confused by my shorthand reference to liability being tried first, and damages being tried later. Because causation, as Oracle pointed out, is an element of liability in a fraud claim under California law, Oracle purports to have been confused as to just what I had in mind.

It should have been manifestly clear to Oracle that I was attempting to limit the first phase to determinative issues of fact that could be submitted and considered discreetly and efficiently by the jury: namely, what was promised, and what was delivered, without consideration of whether American Trim suffered a loss, or whether any misrepresentation by Oracle caused such loss.

On consideration of Oracle’s response to American Trim’s motion for costs and fees, I will accept its explanation for having filed its useless motion at face value, and deny American Trim’s motion for reimbursement of its costs and fees. But I remain of the view that any uncertainty on Oracle’s part could and should have been raised without the inconvenience of requesting reconsideration.

Lawyers more willing to acknowledge what I was trying to do — namely, to make the trial more comprehensible to the jury, and to limit the first phase to issues that were discrete and, as well, potentially dis-positive — would have readily understood and accepted that objective. They would have understood that, though causation may technically have been a “liability” issue, it was not necessary to include that issue in the first phase. If the jury concluded either that Oracle had not promised to deliver “Oracle Automotive,” or if it did promise to do so, had, in fact, done so, consideration of injury and its cause would not have been necessary.

I repeat my admonition that motions to reconsider are strongly disfavored, and should rarely be filed. Lawyers and litigants who file such motions should expect that, if those motions fail, they will have to pay the costs and fees incurred by the prevailing party. In this instance, no fees *806 or costs will be awarded or other sanctions imposed.

2. Bill of Costs

American Trim seeks reimbursement under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 for costs incurred during the course of this litigation. To the extent pertinent to American Trim’s request, that section permits the prevailing party to recover: 1) court reporter fees for stenographic transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case, § 1920(2); and 2) fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case, § 1920(4).

Oracle argues that four categories of American Trim’s request are not reimbursable: 1) counsels’ lodging fees; 2) expenditures for digitalized conversion of videorecorded testimony for presentation to the jury; 3) consultant fees relating to preparation of demonstrative exhibits; and 4) expert witness fees beyond the daily maximum allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1821. Oracle also notes a computational error and asserts that some of the witnesses’ expenses have not been documented.

American Trim acknowledges the computational error, agrees to reduce its request for expert witness fees to the statutory limit, and concurs in the objection to payment of lodging expenses. It shall supplement its Bill with documentation of its payment of the witness fees.

What remains disputed are expenditures related to preparing and presenting vid-eorecorded testimony and demonstrative exhibits.

With regard to the videorecorded testimony, § 1920(2), relating to court reporter and transcript fees, authorizes recovery of the costs of procuring, recording, and obtaining a conventional transcript of the testimony. Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Services, Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1297 n. 5 (11th Cir.2001); Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 163 F.R.D. 308, 329 (N.D.Cal.1995).

This issue here, however, is whether American Trim can also be reimbursed for the cost of enabling the jury to see the testimony on the screen as the videore-cording was being played. Section 1920(2), as presently written, is, however, limited to stenographic transcripts.

With regard to the “papers” covered by § 1920(4), courts distinguish between conceptualizing and researching demonstrative exhibits, creating such exhibits, and presenting them at trial.

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American Trim, LLC v. Oracle Corp., 230 F. Supp. 2d 803, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21749, 2002 WL 31505943 (N.D. Ohio 2002).

230 F. Supp. 2d 803 (American Trim, LLC v. Oracle Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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