American Thermo-Ware Co. v. United States

6 Ct. Cust. 218, 1915 WL 20693, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 79
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 18, 1915
DocketNo. 1532
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 6 Ct. Cust. 218 (American Thermo-Ware Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Thermo-Ware Co. v. United States, 6 Ct. Cust. 218, 1915 WL 20693, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 79 (ccpa 1915).

Opinion

Barber, Judge,

delivered tlie opinion of the court:

In United States v. American Thermo-Ware Co. (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 9; T. D. 31571) certain oval-shaped glasses suitable for the manufacture of automobile goggles had been classified as ground and polished coquille glasses and assessed for duty under paragraph 109 of the act of 1897, which made specific provision therefor. The importers protested upon the ground that the merchandise was not such glasses, but was common window glass, bent, and as such dutiable under paragraphs 101 and 107 of the act which specifically provided therefor. The Board of General Appraisers sustained the protest.

Upon the argument of the case in this court the Government, among other things, insisted that the articles involved were dutiable under paragraph 108 of the act, which provided for "spectacles, eyeglasses and goggles, and frames for the same, or parts thereof, finished or unfinished.” This claim was denied and the judgment of the board was affirmed.

Speaking for the court, Smith, Judge, said with reference to the merchandise in the case, "the evidence submitted on the hearing shows without contradiction and the board finds that none of the glasses are ground or polished.” With reference to the Government’s claim for classification under paragraph 108, it was said:

In our opinion, the contention can not be successfully maintained. The glasses imported are not mounted and therefore can not be considered as spectacles, eyeglasses, or goggles, which terms necessarily carry with them the idea of suitably prepared glass or pebble or similar material so fitted to frames that it can be worn as an aid or protection to the eyes. True, the goods imported are admittedly parts of goggles, but then the question arises as to whether paragraph 108 really provides or was intended to provide for parts of the completed article. We think not. The language “or parts thereof” in the paragraph just mentioned does not refer to spectacles, eyeglasses, or goggles, but to the “frames for the same.” Had the phrase “or parts thereof” been intended to relate back to all that preceded it, the conjunction “and” would not have been repeated and that part of the paragraph would have been made to read as follows: “Spectacles, eyeglasses, goggles, and frames for the same or parts thereof.” Indeed, if it had been intended to impose a duty on spectacles, eyeglasses, goggles, and parts thereof all reference to the frames might well have been omitted, inasmuch as frames are essential parts of the completed articles.

Then followed a discussion of certain matters which tended to confirm the above conclusion.

[220]*220In United States v. American Thermo-Ware Co. (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 21; T. D. 33218) certain disks or pieces of glass, bent, used in the manufacture of "auto goggles,” were before us for consideration. These had been classified as coquille glasses with ground edges and assessed accordingly under paragraph 106 of the tariff act of 1909, the provisions of which were not different from those of paragraph 109 of the act of 1897, so far as affects any issue here. The protest claimed durability under paragraphs 99 and 104 of the same act as window glass, bent, provision for which was made in said paragraphs, as in the corresponding paragraphs in the act of 1897, under review in the earlier case. The protest was sustained and appeal brought by the Government to this court.

The Assistant Attorney General, upon the argument here, conceded that the assessment by the collector could not be sustained, but insisted that the importations were dutiable as manufactures of glass under paragraph 109, which provided as follows:

109. Stained or painted glass windows, or parts thereof, and all mirrors, not exceeding in size one hundred and forty-four square inches, with '■ or without frames or cases, and all glass or manufactures of glass or paste or of which glass or paste is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for in this section, forty-five per centum ad valorem.

No samples of the merchandise were retained by the collector in the case and no testimony was introduced. The merchandise had been originally returned by the appraiser as "coquille glasses, ground edges,” and subsequently reported by him as similar to those before this court in the earlier case. The Government admitted such similarity, and claimed that the merchandise had been so far advanced by previous manufacture that it had acquired a name, character, and use different from common window glass, and so had become a manufacture of glass, and dutiable under paragraph 109. In the opinion of this court, also by Smith, Judge, certain of the testimony in the prior case was reviewed for the purpose of determining the correctness of this claim. It was thereupon said of the merchandise:

That testimony, standing by itself, leaves the decided impression that the glasses are not always used for goggles and that they have to be completed. When that testimony is considered in conjunction with the further declaration of Wolfstein that the glasses were not ground or polished, and with the statement under oath of the witness Apffel that the unpolished and unground glasses presented objects to the eye in a distorted shape, it becomes very evident, indeed, that the merchandise has not taken on the character of a new article, completed, finished, and ready for use. Certainly pieces of glass which would present to the eye a distorted landscape and which would tend to increase rather than diminish the visual vagaries of the average chauffeur can hardly be considered as finished and completed constituent parts of automobile goggles.
But apart from all that, there was in the case referred to uncontradicted evidence to the effect that the glasses might be and were used for other purposes than that of making goggles. From this it would seem that the merchandise has not been so manipulated or processed as to remove it from the class of manufactures specially [221]*221provided for as window glass, bent, much less to put it in the category of manufactures of glass not specially provided for. From the testimony in T. D. 30266 we conclude that window glass, bent, such as that imported, may be used for lanterns, carriage lamps, and cameras, and possibly for many other purposes. These varied uses make it very evident that the merchandise under consideration has not been converted into any specific new article. Neither has it been so dealt with that it is limited to a definite, particular purpose, nor so processed that it is fitted to be used commercially in the manufacture of one thing only. The merchandise continues therefore to be window glass, bent — that is to say, -material not yet advanced to the stage of a new manufacture.

The judgment of the Board of General Appraisers was thereupon affirmed.

Wo have thus somewhat exhaustively referred to these cases, because it is urged by the importers that they rule the case at bar, and this brings us to a consideration of the precise issue here.

No samples of the merchandise in the case were shown the Board of General Appraisers and none are before us, but evidence was introduced by both parties at the hearing before the board. It is unnecessary to enter into any extended review thereof.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Ct. Cust. 218, 1915 WL 20693, 1915 CCPA LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-thermo-ware-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1915.