American Piano Co. v. Cunningham Piano Co.

2 F.2d 463, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2080
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedNovember 14, 1924
DocketNo. 3199
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2 F.2d 463 (American Piano Co. v. Cunningham Piano Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Piano Co. v. Cunningham Piano Co., 2 F.2d 463, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2080 (3d Cir. 1924).

Opinion

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.

In the court below the American Piano Company, a corporate citizen of New Jersey, brought an action for libel against the Cunningham Piano Company, a corporate citizen of Pennsylvania. The alleged libel consisted of an advertisement published by the defendant, and printed in the margin.1 The case was tried before a jury, and at the close of the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff the trial court, on motion of the defendant, granted a compulsory nonsuit, saying:

“The libel charged in this case is that, in making and selling the Knabe and Chiekering pianos, the plaintiff is acting fraudulently, and that the fraud consists in bolding out to the public that Knabe and Chickering pianos are of a very superior grade and quality, whereas, in fact, the‘plaintiff is imposing on the public under the names ‘Chiekering’ and ‘Knabe/ inferior instruments. That is the libel charged, and I think that this article is not capable of such a construction, and that therefore there is no question to submit to a jury.”

After careful consideration, we are of opinion the ease should have been submitted to the jury. As the ease goes back for retrial, we deem it proper to refrain from here discussing the advertisement, and stating the reasons why its construction was the province of a jury, and confine ourselves to stating our conclusion, only adding that we think the present case is one that falls within the middle ground referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Warner, 231 U. S. 588, 34 S. Ct. 175, 58 L. Ed. 384, where that court said:

“It was for the jury, and not for the court, to determine the meaning of ambiguous language in the published article. Where words are libelous per se, the judge can so instruct the jury, leaving to them only the determination of the amount of damages. Where the words are not libelous per se, and, in the light of the extrinsic facts averred could mot possibly be construed to have a defamatory meaning, the judge can dismiss the declaration on demurrer, or, during the trial, may withdraw the case from the jury. But there is a middle ground where, though the words are not libelous per se, yet, in the light of the extrinsic facts averred, they are susceptible of being construed as having a defamatory meaning. Whether they have such import is a question of fact. In that class of cases the jury must not only determine the existence of the extrinsic circumstances, which it is alleged bring to light the concealed meaning, but they must also determine whether those facts, when coupled with the words, make the publication libelous.”

The judgment below is therefore reversed, and the record remanded, with instructions to reinstate the case for further procedure.

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Related

Bocchicchio v. Curtis Publishing Co.
203 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1962)
Webb v. United States
14 F.2d 574 (Eighth Circuit, 1926)

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Bluebook (online)
2 F.2d 463, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-piano-co-v-cunningham-piano-co-ca3-1924.